Quote from: gordonhucn on October 14, 2014, 04:09:20 pm

Quote from: gordonhucn on October 14, 2014, 04:06:20 pm

It doesn't make sense to me. The fee will force people either sell their unclaimed stakes or transfer the stakes once awhile , neither way you can get 5% fee from them, unless they don't know about it at all. Which means although this can be announced as widely as possible but the punishments will only drop to the people who hasn't heard it, it still feels morally not right.

People with unclaimed stakes paid for their stakes as everyone else, they are being more supportive to the whole market than the dumpers at least.

A fee that can be avoided with a as little work as importing your wallet and making a single transaction is not really a fee.    All future DACs will have a much stronger inactivity fee: losing 100% of your stake over 12 months if you don't get involved within the first 3 months.   This is a good way to drive new users to try out your DAC and gain adoption.  Otherwise many people may not even bother trying a new DAC.... silent partners if you will.     

So then i get 108.5 USD, but inflation was 10%, so the vaule of my USD after that year is now 97.65 USD.

You don't seem to be getting the reason why I want a separation of roles between delegates and other workers of the DAC. If some magic consensus technology meant delegates weren't necessary, that would be ideal. I would still want to have workers that are paid by the DAC to improve it. Delegates to me are only necessary to make the consensus technology work. In my opinion that should be their only role.

Let me put it another way. To me delegates are not the board of directors of the company. They are the machinery of the company that unfortunately needs a human element to it. In my proposed system, either there is no board of directors at all and the company is run by code that is modified in limited ways by shareholders directly with their votes, or alternatively shareholders could even appoint specific workers through the proposal system to act as a limited board of directors that get to direct some of the decisions of the DAC. Either way, the delegates should have a very limited role in my view. I don't want shareholders choosing delegates because of the promises they provide on how they will improve the DAC. The only promise I want the delegates to fulfill is to keep the DAC running and not collude to filter transactions or double spend. In my view, complicating their role adds new attack vectors for malicious actors to trick shareholders into voting for their delegates.