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Messages - Crypto Kong

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General Discussion / Re: Bitshares at the cross roads
« on: May 19, 2019, 03:04:47 pm »
Ok , I don’t know the agreement is stated in advance,I apologize for my mistakes.

Very good of you to own up to your mistakes, much respect :)

General Discussion / Re: Bitshares at the cross roads
« on: May 19, 2019, 02:56:51 pm »
I have quite a bit to say in response, but I will let Daniel Larimer answer for me.

EOS - Dan Msg Only, [16.05.19 07:44]
No. The issue is any post launch decisions made by any means other than chain splits like bitcoin cash violates token some buyers expectations. So a network must be committed to immutability or it is fundamentally governed by minority of influencers. Governance isn’t bad, it has a place.  The problem is those who want every solution to solve every problem

Replying to:
 >  Voting buying is the biggest issue

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EOS - Dan Msg Only, [16.05.19 18:17]
The purpose of bp is to decentralize decisions on protocol updates and censorship resistance and generally scaling trx processing.

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Regarding the BEOS model of semi centralization/governance (BEOS holders still vote with their stake):

EOS - Dan Msg Only, [16.05.19 18:17]
The purpose of bp is to decentralize decisions on protocol updates and censorship resistance and generally scaling trx processing.

Chains can be centralized and have value. Especially in a multichain world.

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Centralized chains in good hands can grow faster and carry on creators vision.

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Decentralized chains slow to a crawl.

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My point is don’t hate on centralized systems unless they become monopoly scale.

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Everything is decentralized in a competitive market

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Remember you are centralized

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Decentralization is a tool not a goal in itself

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This. Plus with public accountability .

Replying to:
 >  we trust companies to run databases but the thought of one running a private blockchain makes people go nuts. who cares if someone wants to fork EOS and run all the BP's themselves? average users wont give a shit about that. they'll care about the dapps and services.

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If you want real companies doing mass adoption scale things with real investors under government regulation then they need control over the platform that they build.

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You might kill it too young.

Replying to:
 >  Is it necessary for us to hate so it doesn't become monopoly scale?

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Basically people don’t want to go to jail

So hating them for creating something is misguided

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I think we need systems that are more decentralized than bitcoin, eos, and eth. I also think we need more centralized solutions too.  I’m working toward enabling both sides to scale.

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Nicely done, shows that OP has cherry picked a couple of messages to suit his agenda that doesn't represent bytemasters full opinion.

General Discussion / Re: Bitshares at the cross roads
« on: May 19, 2019, 02:53:14 pm »
Are you talking about BEOS?
I think the boes account shouldn’t vote, it just hold others’ BTS, and holders don’t give vote rights to beos!

You don't speak for me or the others who have sent BTS to the BEOS gateway. I understand I am giving BEOS team the right to vote with my BTS and am happy for them to do so, I'm sure the others can speak for themselves too.

General Discussion / Re: Bitshares at the cross roads
« on: May 19, 2019, 01:10:41 pm »
This is a throw-away account to protect us from defamation from Stan Larimer. You can call me Don.

It is our opinion that the Bitshares community has to make a hard decision sooner than later: How to deal with bribery and vote-buying that is currently taking place.
The question this community needs to answer is:

Should Bitshares community allow vote buying and concentration of voting power and are we fine with the consequences?

If we let the current situation go on, we (yes, the entire community) set a dangerous precedence for subsequent "projects" to repeat the same scheme - and they may be even more convincing and successful then what is currently taking place. Greed can be dangerous to Bitshares.

Now, answer these questions:

  • Are you willing to risk the entire reserve fund be taken by some random/new player making empty promises to greedy retards?
  • Are you willing to risk our developers to move on because their workers are at stake?
  • Do you want to hand over control over the Blockchain to someone unfamiliar with the technology?
  • Do you honor the work done by 3rd parties that delivered without even claiming to be a partner of Bitshare
  • Do you realize a hostile takeover can end in the blockchain being crippled by hostile committee?

Good for you, we have options and are discussing them with key players in the space already.

Finally, some random quotes from Daniel Larimer:

I suspect that it would be trivial for any of the previously elected delegates to black-list transactions that vote for the attacker.  They could then easily hard fork out the transactions that voted in the attacking delegates and block any future transactions that would vote for them.

If attacker is a collusion by the largest whales, then either the whales think the "attack" is a feature that will enhance the protocol or the "community" will fork the whales out. Bitcoin and Ethereum have both seen what happens when those with large influence use it to change the rules against the minority interests (ETC and BCC).
(Daniel Larimer,

@Admins: I request this account being deleted (with this post staying, if possible).

Nice way to be taken seriously by starting off your thread with ad hominem calling a significant portion of the community, holders of 360 million BTS, "retards". Your argument is so bad you choose to open it this way, making your first point to insult the community... Well done.

Could you explain exactly how you will use this on your exchange and the estimated demand for the service provided etc. This way we can get an idea of initial usage, I'm all up for adding features to BitShares but a certain amount of research needs to be carried out so we aren't paying for features that will never be used. Thanks.

Stakeholder Proposals / Re: Proxy:B-DEX
« on: April 03, 2019, 12:10:49 pm »
Good stuff

Sent from my SM-G920F using Tapatalk

General Discussion / Re: Introduce CEX in governance?
« on: April 03, 2019, 09:36:47 am »
I will also add that i agree with steffan that getting centralised exchanges involved is not a good idea.

We have big whale voters in bitshares, often many of us disagree with them. I have disagreed many times with bitcrab and alt on various things but understand it is just a difference in opinion and that both want bitshares to succeed.

We are often more vocal on things we disagree with than things we agree with but we are one community, we should keep voting in the community and not include CEX, they do not have our best interest at heart.

We need a more competitive platform for proxies, the answer is to get more community involved in actively voting.

Sent from my SM-G920F using Tapatalk

General Discussion / Re: Introduce CEX in governance?
« on: April 03, 2019, 09:24:26 am »
There should be a collective push from all sides of community to create a decent platform for people to promote themselves as proxies. A social media style website with proxy profiles and easy voting, perhaps with Beet used so a click on the website alters the blockchain.

Some kind of incentive should also be considered to get more people to become proxies where you benefit from gaining proxy votes and loose benefits for losing weight for example.

There is a lot of BTS in circulation that is not voting, we need to incentevise voting.

Sent from my SM-G920F using Tapatalk

General Discussion / Re: Market fee sharing for BitAssets
« on: April 03, 2019, 09:07:26 am »
Its a nice idea in theory... but risks just giving away fees for little gain... id rather see a maker taker fee schedule implemented.
I believe a simple maker/taker fee is in the pipeline

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General Discussion / Re: Market fee sharing for BitAssets
« on: April 02, 2019, 10:02:00 pm »
Its a nice idea in theory... but risks just giving away fees for little gain... id rather see a maker taker fee schedule implemented.

Sent from my SM-G920F using Tapatalk

General Discussion / Re: Add "close long" feature?
« on: April 02, 2019, 09:56:15 pm »
Good idea

Sent from my SM-G920F using Tapatalk

General Discussion / Re: Review of OMO
« on: February 25, 2019, 11:24:47 am »
I will also add that stabalising the price of BTS would make everything else we wish to tackle with regards to improving our markets far easier. Less people would get called with a more stable collateral, smartcoins would keep their peg better, more people would feel confident increasing smartcoin supply with a more stable collateral.

Also worth mentioning that the more assets we pair BTS with such as gold and silver, the less influence BTC will have on price. We need to deepen order books on other market pairings, not related to crypto.

BitCNY may well be more liquid and in some peoples opinion not need market making program but we still need to resist price change to create stability, in as many markets as possible.

We have some very intelligent people in this community but I cant help but think a lot of you are over complicating things, looking for a technical answer to all our problems. Lets get back to basics and make a real effort to stabalise the price of BTS and lay some decent foundations to build upon.

With a volatile, unpredictable base asset we are gonna be constantly fighting an uphill battle.

General Discussion / Re: Review of OMO
« on: February 24, 2019, 07:40:53 pm »
We've had a thorough discussion of this in the chat yesterday, and here are some points:

C. First use the funds to revive GS markets.

A lot of people believe that the GS events happened due to market manipulations by OMO and BSIP42 exacerbating the situation, as modified feeds disincentivised buying out of margin call orders.

As for how to proceed further:
Liquidity providing via dexbot sounds like an interesting idea, but we need clear rules on how it is going to happen, and automated contingencies on what to do when market begins rapidly falling or rallying. On traditional exchanges, liquidity providing works like this: MM is obligated to keep preset amount of liquidity in the books, until certain volume obligations are met. Then it can remove one of the sides.

Before we even start, we need to agree on what percentage of the funds can OMO use daily, and do a daily check if it was profitable or not (which is okay).
In our case we need something like that to happen once the market begins moving, for example. Bot places 30 orders on both buy and sell sides, but starts removing them from one side in case 10 of them are taken on one side, without getting an order taken from the other side (or something like that).

During sideways market provision of liquidity might be profitable. During movements contingency rules would limit the amount of loss. In case of profits I suggest some of them are taken and put back into the reserve pool, with the rest going to OMO fund, and its percentages readjusted accordingly.

If the strategy for the OMO is explicitly talked about, and clear then I would support such decision but not before.

The DEXBot staggered orders strategy basically places buy and sell orders in a given range lets say $0.03-$1.00 at say 2% increments, these orders would stay on the books as long as the operation continued. Every time a sell order is filled it is replaced with a buy order 2% lower. Profits get compounded which increases order sizes, making the strategy more profitable. Which basically means that the longer the strategy runs the more liquidity will be provided on both sides of the book via increased order sizes. If price wants to pump (or dump) it has to fight through added resistance of the DEXBot orders, once it fills those orders they are replaced with ones on the other side. Resistance turns into support. This helps to stabalise the market by resisting price change. More liquidity, more stability.

The longer the operation runs the more liquid and stable the market becomes, once we have solid foundations in place we can then start talking about advancing market operations to more sophisticated strategies such as perhaps increasing smart coin supply. Until we have solid foundations, there is little point.

The only real consideration for setting up a staggered orders strategy is the range in which you want it to work, the last thing you want is price leaving the range you are set up in as then there are no orders providing liquidity around the price, no accumulation and increasing of order sizes and no resistance to price change. With it being a long term strategy, it is pretty simple to select a range that price stays within.

General Discussion / Re: Review of OMO
« on: February 24, 2019, 07:30:30 pm »
I am considering to restart the OMO fund operation.

I believe that the market fee income should be used in supporting the smartcoin ecosystem. we learned lessons in the past 10 months, so I think we need to update some essential setting of the fund.

first, it will not get BTS through worker proposal, it will only get the market fee of smartcoins for operation.

here are 2 policies for the operation of the updated OMO fund.

Plan A:
1.BTS buying orders can be placed only when there is margin called orders stayed.
2.BTS selling orders can be placed only when the smartcoin has at least 0.5% discount.
3.smartcoin borrowing is not allowed.

Plan B:
1.BTS buying orders can be placed only when there is margin called orders stayed.
2.BTS selling orders can be placed only when the smartcoin has at least 0.5% discount.
3.smartcoin borrowing is allowed, but the margin call price of the debt position should always be lower than the global settlement price, anytime the margin called price is above global settlement price, all the available liquidity should be used to reduce the margin called price.

Plan A is conservative, it just buy and sell BTS, do not borrow.
Plan B is a little audacious.

maybe we can begin with Plan A, Plan B is for subsequent discussion.

The fact that you seem to think keeping a margin call price below global settlement price is safe shows me that you have learned nothing. As price goes up so does the global settlement price, therefore by your own new rules you will end up being called again should a bull market turn into a bear market as it is quite obvious you will keep the ratio just below GS price, increasing your call price as price rises. You even state it in the above quote "anytime the margin called price is above global settlement price". How would that happen unless you were tightly following GS price?

Like I said before in the thread before you started OMO, call price (for USD) needs to be around 2 cents. We would be hundreds of thousands of dollars better off had you paid any attention to my comment. It's about time you started listening to others around you.

The use of DEXBot takes the decision making away from people like you who seem to struggle with quite simple market dynamics. Our markets cannot be fixed easily, there is a lot that needs to be improved but increased liquidity and more stable markets is a good start. DEXBot does this by resisting price change, any filled sell orders turn automatically into buy support and vice versa.

If you don't want to run DEXBot, go ruin bitCNY with your reckless margin trading. We will make our own decisions for bitUSD.

General Discussion / Re: Review of OMO
« on: February 17, 2019, 07:24:44 pm »
I have a better idea. Forget about OMO and turn off market fees on bitassets.

With the use of DEXBot staggered orders all market fees would be turned into liquidity providing orders which continually increase in size through the compounding of profits from the back and forth of price.

This is the simplest, safest, most efficient way forward for open market operations.

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