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Messages - matle85

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General Discussion / Re: BitShares 5.0 (2020-09-30)
« on: September 17, 2020, 05:54:23 am »
Completely support the introduction of AMM tools and them being pushed through.

The other change removing voting from liquid BTS is a huge and fundamental change to the functioning of BTS and should not be introduced without consensus. The previous change with stake multiplier already gives an (excessive in my view) increase in voting strength to stakers.

The removal of voting for collateral was a special case as far as I'm concerned - it was giving disproportionate voting power to a group that had every reason to corrupt the system during bear markets.

Similarly voter decay eliminated impact from dead / inactive accounts.

So yeah I support introduction of the AMM measures (which would be a great and necessary addition) but stop changing the voting rules without consensus - also please be upfront and honest about what you are proposing.

You can't say 'the big one is AMM' and just ignore another massive fundamental change to how voting works - it's disingenuous and pointless, as you know that as soon as people start reading and digging a bit they will see and understand it.

General Discussion / Re: BitShares 5.0 (2020-09-30)
« on: September 16, 2020, 12:30:26 pm »
AMM is a strong addition - can we see an overview of how it will work? (I.e. is it deployed on testnet or anything?)

Can we get an overview of each of the changes and why they are proposed? List copied below for clarity.

Release Notes: BitShares Core 5.0.0

Add extended history tracking for select accounts.
Extended operation history for accounts selected by ID or by registrar
Implement Automated Market Maker (AMM) aka Liquidity Pool
Implement liquidity pool
Remove voting power from liquid BTS and tickets
Remove liquid vp


中文 (Chinese) / Re: 关于4.0的几点说明
« on: August 20, 2020, 05:59:43 am »
I'm glad you took this step and think the changes are beneficial for Bitshares governance.

I would have preferred change by consensus but consensus was broken and corrupted by debt voting.

As stated I think the staking vote multiplier should be lower but all the other changes are clear and dramatic improvements to consensus mechanism.

If staking is removed for now then the only winner is proper governance / consensus.

I'm open to discussions on staking and how it can protect from exchanges etc but I think really that part needs a lot of thought.

I will just steal Thule's listing format:

vote decay          YES
collateral            YES
DPOS1               YES
Stacking            No - needs some thought about weighting etc, let's figure that out first.

Way of implementation    - we need to figure out how this vulnerability is closed in the future. I agree with Bitcrab that Abit wasn't doing evil and I'm actually glad someone has stepped up but really it shouldn't be possible for one person to make such big changes.

Ill vote on chain when I'm at my computer.

The solution I suspect is probably that witnesses will have to do some due diligence on deployment in the future so the process of reviewing updates is more decentralised.

Part of this may be the calibre of witness - cn-vote brought in witnesses who agree to give them part of their pay and we lost witnesses like clockwork, does anyone think clockwork would have missed this change?

Maybe the corrupt voting of witnesses is part of what let this happen.

Alternatively we code in some additional payment to witnesses that they get at each release to pay for the time they spend on this review or something if we feel it is too much to ask of them otherwise.

I will just steal Thule's listing format:

vote decay          YES
collateral            YES
DPOS1               YES
Stacking            No - needs some thought about weighting etc, let's figure that out first.

Way of implementation    - we need to figure out how this vulnerability is closed in the future. I agree with Bitcrab that Abit wasn't doing evil and I'm actually glad someone has stepped up but really it shouldn't be possible for one person to make such big changes.

Ill vote on chain when I'm at my computer.

I do not like changes against consensus but consensus was broken / corrupted so I think Abit actually did what needed to be done.

I don't like the 'stake to increase vote' really but overall the changes are much healthier than the old system.

I guess if cn-vote want to apply a patch and some witnesses accept it probably it will end up being a fork? Nobody sane and not indebted thinks collateral voting is a good idea and has caused anything other than corruption so maybe the two groups are better going their own way.

中文 (Chinese) / Re: 4.0 投票机制变化
« on: August 02, 2020, 07:23:54 pm »
I don't like changes against consensus but I support Abit here - consensus was broken, the debt holders forcing witnesses to feed fake prices is completely unacceptable and demonstrates broken DPOS.

The changes made are necessary.

If we had voted I would not have supported stake voting at the levels proposed because I think this will cause some unforeseen issues, but overall I think Abit has stepped forward (bravely) to try and save Bitshares.

Ideally I do not think debt holders should be punished really - let's promote these changes and the upgrades to Bitshares so that the price rises and then the false price feeds can be removed without people losing their debt.

中文 (Chinese) / Re: 4.0 投票机制变化
« on: July 31, 2020, 09:53:07 am »
Big holders like beos or alt can lock for 360 days 100million bts which is not an issue and get 400 million votes +  remaining 200 milliion votes.Who is going to oppose them ?Where do you find on the other side 100 million bts willing to lock  ?
Such a system favours big holders giving them the opportunity to get even more stronger if there is such a will from their side.

Also BTS was created as utlity token with the funcionality to be used as collateral and main currency on DEX.This voting system is in deny with that functionality as you can't participate in the ecosystem creating bitassets and getting at the same time the same amount of votes as being inactive to participate in bitshares progress.

A general question.

Is a BTS holder who doesn't use his BTS better than somebody who uses his BTS in bitshares ecosystem for which it was constructed ?
The simple holder non active member gets a benefit of up to 8 times VP from his BTS where the active member who is using his BTS activly on bitshares dex gets punished for it?

A non active member should have the possibility to have up to 8 times more voting power than an active member ?

Do we really favor inactive members over active members?

I think that the lock mechanism will be used by some big holders so there will be some unintended consequences - I guess that by locking their BTS they are at least now committed tangibly to the long term performance of the chain and the impact of their voting... I suppose the hope is also that the 'locked' BTS will increase scarcity and help drive the price up.

Re: the collateral point - in the existing (previous?) system debt holders end up with a disproportianately large vote (based on debt + new BTS they buy with that debt) which they are then able to use to dictate the functioning of the chain and artificially protect the debt positions. Thats a complete failure of the system.

One option would be to include bitUSD, bitCNY etc in voting weight so holders of these assets are not left out of the voting system. I guess that could also have some unintended consequences (someone holding a lot of bitUSD might want to push the price down). It is very hard when financial incentives and governance overlaps as things become very messy, separating them out as far as practical is probably a good idea.

中文 (Chinese) / Re: 4.0 投票机制变化
« on: July 31, 2020, 09:35:25 am »
My summary in English after reading Google Translate:

1.   Voter Decay – vote decay starts after 360 days of voting inactivity. The reduction is 12.5% and then a further 12.5% every 45 days. After 675 days of voting inactivity the voting weight is zero.
2.   Committee Voting – one BTS is equal to one committee vote so it can no longer be reused multiple times. If you vote for 3 people, then 1/3 of your voting weight goes to each of them.
3.   Lock Up voting mechanism – lock up BTS for increased voting power. The ratios are 180d/360d/720d eading to 2x/4x/8x voting power. You can also lock up BTS permanently and get up to 32x voting power with the remaining BTS you hold (not quite clear on this). It takes 15d to gain voting power for your lock up.
4.   Voting rules after permanent lock up takes place
4.1   Accounts without a lock up position will have zero weighting (I don’t understand this).
4.2   Collateral BTS will no longer be allowed to vote.[/li][/list]

In my view item 1, item 2 and item 4.2 sound very sensible and like an improvement to proper functioning of consensus.

Item 3 is interesting and I can understand the thought process behind it (empowering small holders etc) but I think we will see some unintended consequences when the big holders decide to lock up their holdings.

As a group I think the changes are positive for proper functioning of consensus and they eliminate some real problems/oddities that put us in a bad position. I suspect we will have some problems with the lock up voting / multiplier but hopefully less than we have now.

In terms of how it has been done…Abit has taken steps to fix a broken consensus system without first seeking approval of that broken consensus system. It is an interesting challenge of decentralised governance and consensus – if the system of decision making is broken then should it be allowed to continue its death spiral or is it better for someone to step up and make the necessary changes?

中文 (Chinese) / Re: 4.0 投票机制变化
« on: July 31, 2020, 08:02:28 am »
Only getting partial translation but the change to exclude collateral voting sounds completely sensible - the debt positions dominating the vote has led to fake price feeds to protect those debt positions. That can't be sustainable.

Consensus has been a mess for a while now so overall I think this one sounds like a positive change.

Locking your BTS for increased voting power...that's interesting and on paper means longer term thinking voters get more power. It may be open to abuse by big holders locking up large sums but hopefully also means smaller long term thinking holders can come together and have more of an impact.

Decaying votes feels sensible too but I need to read the details a bit.

How much difference has this change actually made to voting?

BSIP77 looks sensible.

I actually wouldnt mind hearing more details of a bail out / debt reduction proposal to see how that would work and how much it would cost.

Either way hopefully we can get some consensus that bitUSD should trial an alternative way.

My reading is that the request by DL is that we transition to non-faked price feeds on bitUSD.

I support this - Abit has flagged up the primary challenge. It could be done via a phased transition to real price feed over a period of X weeks?

That would give time for big debt holders to shift their positions over and also maybe create some volatility / speculation opportunities in the market if people expect some improvement in price during the period.

Good initiative and timely considering the issues on steem (hive?).

Great news. Strongly support!

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