4.0 投票机制变化

[gghi]

              一票应该一投，否则，一个大票仓可以控制全部的见证人以及理事会，还有WORKER.那么锁仓高倍票权其实也是公平的，大家都可以锁仓获得高倍票权。唯一和旧机制不同的是需要锁仓，锁仓显然有利于BTS的长期价格。结论：新的投票机制应该得到社区大力支持！

[binggo]

I know about what BEOS is and what BEOS done, but i don't want to choose a devil to against another devil, but you choose to stand with a devil which you can't controll and this devil can expand very fast with a fake price.

170M VP can't control anything, but a expanding leveraged collateral VP can controll everything, if they unite, no one can stop them!

No one are talking debtors is bad, i'm a debtor too, but i give your a truth thought about a debtor, but you choose to not believe it, and please remember i told you before: don't believe the tears of gambler, don't believe any words of CN-VOTE, kang8 or zhouxiaobao-2010. As a long debtor from 2017, i know more about them than you.

All what i suggest to the bitasset, it is not to protect the debtor, just only want to make this market more fair, rules can protect the maker and debtor have a fair competition in the market, to make the bitasset become more better, any cheat rules is inexcusable in this market.

In other words, as a debotor this action didn't have any benefit to me, but i still choose to support it, many cn-members choose to support it, are we stupid?
No, what you see just is a small step of bts, we hope a more deep changes happened in bts, maybe this will be happened or not, but this will attract the real bts holder and dev return.

Same rules apply to all about collateral.In real world collateral is also giving voting rights.

You must clealy to see the word: "Same rules apply to all about collateral", if any bts holder want to make a collateral? if any bts holder want to make a high collateral in a fake price like them? what you say is just want to push other to cheat the system without ethics like them, this become the sins as the others didn't want to do.

Please see the real world, bro, no project will give the VP to leveraged collateral, even in the real company, no person will allowed the leveraged collateral have the voting rights, it has a very stricter laws about this. I will gvie you a very simple example again：

When a debor borrowed money from the bank to buy the collateral and make this leverage again and again，if the price of collateral rised，everything is ok，the debor can make this leverage continuously, but if the price of collateral fell, their first thought is not to return the debt, but is to control the lending system to save their position as this is the best way to save their interests, if they really have power to control the lending system, they will make this happend immediately.
No one can decide the changes of real price of collateral, so this behaviour will be happend certainly.

I have told the truth to you very clearly and you didn't know how terrible big of these cumulate leverage will become until now which cn-members know long time ago, that's not your fault, as you are never one member of us.

If you choose to stand with another devil, god bless you, bro!

This is over.

[Thul3]

CN-Vote has only 250 million votes so blaming everything on them is wrong.BEOS is at least to be blamed the same making the deep corruption in committee even possible and blocking workers you claim to be important.
I will explain more in detail why i disagree tonight.

But one question.
Are Dev's going to fork everytime a new voting system when someone gets to powerfull they disagree with ?

You just see cn-vote have 250M VP now, but you didn't see the future, about BEOS, this is the choice of real bts holder not the debtor.

making the deep corruption in committee even possible and blocking workers

About this, any big proxy can't avoid the responsibility.

But one question.
Are Dev's going to fork everytime a new voting system when someone gets to powerfull they disagree with ?

About this question, i think i have give the answer, but you don't want to see, the Dev can't fork anything, only the witness can.

when someone gets to powerfull

This is a very interesting question, this is about the powerful come from where, come from the leveraged collateral or real bts? if this powerful come from the real bts, no one can fork it, even the witness.

If this powerful come from the leveraged collateral，then i have a question for you:

When the cn-vote have 650M leveraged collateral VP in the future(certainty event), and use this VP locking the feed price again, so what do you want to do with this? you want to make a same leveraged collateral VP to fight with them and what you did you want the other bts holder to do?

No the problem is i know BEOS.
BEOS is corrupt.Way more corrupt than CN-Vote.
Their community asked so many times to vote for something which they didn't.They preach A but do B.
Majority of foreigners hates BEOS.
BEOS comes to power you can trust me they will leave.
The 170 million votes left on BEOS are people who are mainly there to get some sort of benefit via rainfall not caring about bitshares voting at all.
BEOS did inside deals on bitshares destroying witnesses.They made the committee corrupt with inside deals.They never participated in any voting from themself.You always had to ask them to do something.CN-Vote was created because BEOS approved all workers making the dilution very high.They created workers which instantly failed already during funding.
If i had to chose between BEOS and CN-Vote i would ALWAYS chose CN-Vote.
People who know them for a longer time always write they leave a long tail of tears.

Also people are talking debotos bad.
A debtor is nothing bad.
He is long on BTS and more important in real world debtors get also voting rights.
The only thing which would need to be changed is bitassets getting protected from debtor votings in bad times.
However did you see BEOS supporting something like that other than just claiming ?
Did you see community willing to do something about it ?

Because i can tell you i tried a lot and to say the truth the majority gives a fuck even unwilling to take 2 minutes for a vote.



Committee is conntrolled by 2 entities.DPOS1 is the solution to it i proposed for a long time but not the way it was implemted.


Same rules apply to all about collateral.In real world collateral is also giving voting rights.

The current voting system change basicly punishes now being long on BTS via collateral and favorise paid votings rights via rainfall like at BEOS.

DL being a longterm partner of BEOS is the reason why he suppports these changes.
But this would end in a total centralization of bitshares.
Who is going to follow that ?

[binggo]

CN-Vote has only 250 million votes so blaming everything on them is wrong.BEOS is at least to be blamed the same making the deep corruption in committee even possible and blocking workers you claim to be important.
I will explain more in detail why i disagree tonight.

But one question.
Are Dev's going to fork everytime a new voting system when someone gets to powerfull they disagree with ?

You just see cn-vote have 250M VP now, but you didn't see the future, about BEOS, this is the choice of real bts holder not the debtor.

making the deep corruption in committee even possible and blocking workers

About this, any big proxy can't avoid the responsibility.

But one question.
Are Dev's going to fork everytime a new voting system when someone gets to powerfull they disagree with ?

About this question, i think i have give the answer, but you don't want to see, the Dev can't fork anything, only the witness can.

when someone gets to powerfull

This is a very interesting question, this is about the powerful come from where, come from the leveraged collateral or real bts? if this powerful come from the real bts, no one can fork it, even the witness.

If this powerful come from the leveraged collateral，then i have a question for you:

When the cn-vote have 650M leveraged collateral VP in the future(certainty event), and use this VP locking the feed price again, so what do you want to do with this? you want to make a same leveraged collateral VP to fight with them and what you did you want the other bts holder to do?

Did Abit disagree with CN-Vote ?Am asking because he was always supportive to them and their actions,banning dev's who questioned some actions.
Was DL disagreeing with CN-Vote ?Cause i saw him claiming cn-vote to be wise and smart when getting his worker approved.
It seems he always blames chinese when his worker doesn't seem to get approved.

What here talk about just is this action, no other behaviour, i  focus on this action will give what to the community, helpful than harmful or harmful than helpful，other behaviour belong to other things, did Abit or DL disagree with or not disagree with CN-Vote, it's their business.

About other behaviour, you support cn-vote that means you support BEOS too, vote buying.

And i don't believe after this action bts will make a more development, as i don't believe the most of the big proxy can give a right direction about bitasset and bts, just only one thing is good, the BTS will never be controlled by the leveraged collateral VP.

Has Abit and DL support of foreigners?
A clear no and majority of foreigners having anykind of influence on bitshares sees it as a hostile takeover

This is a question, the normal holder of bts didn't have any big influence with this action, just affect the debtor, most belong to the cn-vote.

What i see is most of foreigners agreed with this action, maybe we exist different channel, as i'm banned long time ago in the tl.

hostile takeover

This is a interesting word, hostile takeover by who, if by the real holder of bts, so it is right.

[Thul3]

CN-Vote has only 250 million votes so blaming everything on them is wrong.BEOS is at least to be blamed the same making the deep corruption in committee even possible and blocking workers you claim to be important.
I will explain more in detail why i disagree tonight.

But one question.
Are Dev's going to fork everytime a new voting system when someone gets to powerfull they disagree with ?

Did Abit disagree with CN-Vote ?Am asking because he was always supportive to them and their actions,banning dev's who questioned some actions.
Was DL disagreeing with CN-Vote ?Cause i saw him claiming cn-vote to be wise and smart when getting his worker approved.
It seems he always blames chinese when his worker doesn't seem to get approved.


Has Abit and DL support of foreigners?

A clear no and majority of foreigners having anykind of influence on bitshares sees it as a hostile takeover but are silent as they belive both sides are not bringing bitshares forward

[binggo]

Accepting such a break in protocol that one persons decides about the chain is going only to lead that noone is going to put any money
into BTS anymore.It's far worse than BSIP76.
Today its about the voting system tomorrow he decides to change something else.

I also don't like many decissions of cn-vote as everyone could read it on the forum but breaking protocol in this way is far worse in my opinion.

I think you should clearly know what caused these happened, if have enough dev to check the code, did this will happen? Why most of dev left BTS, just because of abit ? no, the unfair voting system is the main reason, that threaten the safe of the system and development, threaten the real bts holder.

If this time didn't remove the VP of leveraged collateral and you want to remove it through voting, that will be never passed, when the VP of leveraged collateral begin to swell, you think you can control it? no, you can't stop it in the past, you still can't stop it in the future, what left will just is a dead chain, no development, no dev, no future, no trader, just a gruop of gambler.

And you think you know more about cn-vote than us, you are wrong, we are one of cn-vote in the past, what they think, what they want to do, we know that more clearly than themselves, they only fight for themselves(the gambler), not the community. Yes, that's we, many of cn-community members, we support abit this action, it's necessary and can't be avoided, even the process is not suitable, we all didn't want a chain to be controlled by a group of gambler in the future, we all didn't want a dead chain in the future, this is not the fault of  abit, this is the fault of all community, the community didn't realise the problem and didn't have the ability to fix it in the past.

Yes, you still can support this fork of cn-vote, this is your freedom, you will know you fight for who in the future.
Make a decision is very easy, but to judge it's right or not is hard, brother.

When pc has this thought, i argue with him, but i realised i'm wrong from what i seen in the reality, when i have a margin position, i can't think about the things rationally and can't make a right decision, the margin position controlled me, this is the debtor and gambler.

[Thul3]

You can also add that abit destroyed the main bitshares telegram channel by adding his bot and indirectly and directly banning people who
argued about his bad actions.He banned very active admins there who where nicely invested in BTS and made majority of people going silent there.Another part is now moving to digital lucifers chat where he is owner and these cheaters admins.

They are conditioning people there for their own agenda and doesn't allow any other opinion than theirs.


People myself included had been fighting abits one men show quite long.
He is definetly a good dev and very active however he should not be in committee because of his lack of ethics and economic understanding.His sole power in github already upset the old core team showing he thinks he have sole power over bitshares which haven't changed till today which is why cn-vote had to fork it.

I don't like and don't believe cn-vote more, in the future who will kill bts, that must be cn-vote, this time, i support abit, when the debtor have the power to control the lending system, then there didn't have lending system any more.

Accepting such a break in protocol that one persons decides about the chain is going only to lead that noone is going to put any money
into BTS anymore.It's far worse than BSIP76.
Today its about the voting system tomorrow he decides to change something else.

I also don't like many decissions of cn-vote as everyone could read it on the forum but breaking protocol in this way is far worse in my opinion.

[binggo]

You can also add that abit destroyed the main bitshares telegram channel by adding his bot and indirectly and directly banning people who
argued about his bad actions.He banned very active admins there who where nicely invested in BTS and made majority of people going silent there.Another part is now moving to digital lucifers chat where he is owner and these cheaters admins.

They are conditioning people there for their own agenda and doesn't allow any other opinion than theirs.


People myself included had been fighting abits one men show quite long.
He is definetly a good dev and very active however he should not be in committee because of his lack of ethics and economic understanding.His sole power in github already upset the old core team showing he thinks he have sole power over bitshares which haven't changed till today which is why cn-vote had to fork it.

I don't like and don't believe cn-vote more, in the future who will kill bts, that must be cn-vote, this time, i support abit, when the debtor have the power to control the lending system, then there didn't have lending system any more.

[Thul3]

You can also add that abit destroyed the main bitshares telegram channel by adding his bot and indirectly and directly banning people who
argued about his bad actions.He banned very active admins there who where nicely invested in BTS and made majority of people going silent there.Another part is now moving to digital lucifers chat where he is owner and these cheaters admins.

They are conditioning people there for their own agenda and doesn't allow any other opinion than theirs.


People myself included had been fighting abits one men show quite long.
He is definetly a good dev and very active however he should not be in committee because of his lack of ethics and economic understanding.His sole power in github already upset the old core team showing he thinks he have sole power over bitshares which haven't changed till today which is why cn-vote had to fork it.

[litepresence]

 工会凉不凉没关系了，因为像abit这样私自决定修改的，投票已经失去了意义。都可以私自添加修改了，还要投票啥的？
私自添加修改这种事，坚决不妥协。投票已经失去了意义。
去中心化共识已经破坏。绕过理事会，绕过投票，自己一个人骗了整个社区，自己一个人说了算，abit一个人即是社区天下，BTS是他的？以后投票有什么意义吗？直接改就行了。
虽然木已成舟，我虽然无力改变，我也要喷他几个月，虽然人家BM也直接改，但人家BM是创始人，人家权力大，不过BM也照样被喷了不久，所以abit准备好被喷几个月了没有啊？
实在不行，支持巨蟹硬分叉BTS。
我虽然不反对abit这添加的规则，永久锁仓这不是让人家的BTS废了？锁仓不应该有回报的么？没回报的锁仓简直。。。。但我反对的是他的做法，程序不按规定走，这以后的再多的投票又显得有什么意义？就算你有30亿票权，也敌不过一个abit。这共识，没意义了。

translation attempt:

It doesn't matter if his merged hotfix is cool or not:  If the outcome can be decided privately by abit, voting thereafter has lost all meaning.  If one can make changes without consensus, what else is left to be voted on? In making changes privately without compromise, the vote has lost its meaning.

The decentralized consensus has been broken.   Bypassing the committee and voters, one man deceived the entire community alone; seizing the final say.   So is abit the the community overlord; BitShares is his?   What is the point of anyone voting thereafter?  He will just change it again.

Although it is already done and I cannot change it, I will disparage him for a few months.   Although Bytemaster (BM) is also directly affected, he is the founder and has great power and insomuch he's been ridiculed for a long time.  Is abit ready to be disrespected for a few months?  I doubt it.

Supporting this cancerous hard fork just does not work.

Although I don't object to the changes abit made, isn't it effectively burning BTS for permanent lockup?   Shouldn't there be some additional reward? Instead the permanent lock ticket simply has no return. 

What I really oppose is the approach:  The voting rules were not followed in the upgrade procedure.  Why vote again in the future?   Even if you have 3 billion votes you cannot outvote abit; therefore any consensus is meaningless.

[bitcrab]

求分叉，草泥马的，分出去你和工会自己玩去。

别激动，我只是把了解到的事情公开一下，希望引起社区的关注而已。

我不清楚公会发布代码的能力怎样，但他们目前的票权还是够多的，是有可能通过使用他们的票权让支持他们的见证人上位的。社区应该对此有所准备。

[binggo]

They increased their debt some time after the announcement of BSIP76.
So blaming them to create or increase debt in BitUSD after BSIP76 is just wrong and making them responsible or hurting for this even more.

This is their choice, no one has made a promise for BSIP76 will keep forever，but the cn-vote used the vote power of margin to give them this promise and this encourage them to do that, more debt in Bitusd more vote power, a disaster cycle，maybe you know or not，they even want to lock more higher feed price if the price rise in the future，this is a certain event.

No one blaming them, but they chose the danger themself, if want to recover the bitusd, the hurt can't be avoided.



What the DL and George said and planned is not the important thing, no one can control the chain, just as sschiessl said.

Even without this event, the fork still will happen in the future, the cn-vote and the big proxy has the opportunity and time to repair the consensus and rebuild the reputation in the past, but they chose to to nothing, now everyone face a choice...

And these were not the most important things, the most important thing is recover the feed price of bitasset, even use BAIP2, set BSIP74 and BSIP77, higher the settlement offset to 5%, redesign the black swan，P2P lending，Cross-Chain let more coins like BTC，EHT as collateral.


另外，我感觉有必要再絮叨一遍关于强清补偿：
适当高的强清补偿对于尤其是 bitcny/bts这种锚定资产/抵押品的市场而言，有百益而无一害，bitcny在正常喂价形态下的适当贬值一般体现为内盘价格高于喂价，这个价格差提供的买单深度对于债仓能够及时平仓是极为有利的，类似于MSSR的一样的效果，却没有MSSR的副作用，也不会带来滚仓效应，而过低的强清补偿带来的强清循环不仅压制内盘买单市场的深度与活跃度，对于债仓的平仓也极为不利。正常喂价情况下，像bitcny是很难维持5%的贬值，承兑商不仅面临入金套利，内盘市场也面临外盘搬砖带来的套利压力，所以适当提高强清补偿的天花板到5%以上，也不需要太高，对于整个市场而言是极为有利的。
而一个强清补偿为2%, 外部资金根本不想做入金套利，外盘搬砖也不愿意进入内盘套利，因为承兑等还要有承兑费率风险费用等等费用，已经基本把这个2%的补偿消解到零，形同与补偿为零的效果。
很简单的一个市场交易套利行为分析...

而对于强清可以化解风险bulabulabula之类的说辞，你既然设置了MCR，就必要是考虑到抵押品的价格波动，市场接受度，流动性等等风险因素，从而设置的这个MCR值是可以抵御以上综合风险的，再讲强清可以化解风险之类的说辞，不感觉脸疼吗？！

像biteur市场，补偿为1%, 任何位置的债仓都有被清的可能，就好比头上立着一把尖刀，长一点就削一点，怎么可能长高？！

而像honest市场，25%的MSSR，稍微带点脑子都不会设置这样的MSSR，不仅会迅速摧毁市场深度也会彻底把市场买单搞嗝屁，对于承兑而言，这种高MSSR简直是一个灾难，对于吃单者而言，还要寄希望于市场深度不要被击垮，从而有套利的机会，然而这可能吗？除了去砸外盘市场，别无他选，一旦这种市场带量的话，连续的滚仓效应要多美就有多美，17年以来的教训这些人是一点都没有吸取，国外的各种经济学理论多如牛毛，这点市场道理总应该清楚吧。

[Thul3]

I don't like DL too，but

Debt holders in bitusd will get rekkt with his actions.

These were just a part of CN-VOTE debtor in bitusd.
 
1   1.2.458268   fangli0755   1.94
2   1.2.698   map   1.67
3   1.2.544003   chinaking888   1.5
4   1.2.166673   facem   1.88
5   1.2.1688430   dqt812   1.7
6   1.2.415588   hangjun-btss   1.73
7   1.2.18114   cny123   5.58
8   1.2.878397   zb170352718   2.99
9   1.2.5420   ptschina   2.87
10   1.2.186512   jinlicheng1   1.7
11   1.2.712461   waterkawaye509   1.78
12   1.2.187916   hongcaibao111   1.72
13   1.2.169701   yinghuilong   1.69
14   1.2.900314   guotiger1206   1.71
15   1.2.1037129   suny5392   1.73
16   1.2.1750391   shlzbts2020   1.93
17   1.2.1620696   get-richy   1.69
18   1.2.20197   xiaoshan   1.85
19   1.2.155713   hwbts   2.7
20   1.2.998   spring   1.7
21   1.2.480517   sunshine991019   1.73
22   1.2.403666   gold-star   1.68
23   1.2.129515   jinjue082016   1.84

Want to solve the problem of bitusd, i will give some thoughts later...Devaluation is too big...very hard...

They can't make a patch on BitShares for BitShares

Maybe he said is right，seems he own the trademark of “BitShares” and "BTS", if this is true, anyone can't change it.


About consensus, i want to say when we support a consensus like BSIP 76 in such a long time and didn't want to resovle these problems quickly, we only have a false consensus, when we use a BAIP-threthold not be approved by the community as a voting standards，we didn't have consensus any more.

I was monitoring bitusd debtors before bsip76 and after.
Majority of the current debt positions had no bad debt being in margin call before BSIP76.
They increased their debt some time after the announcement of BSIP76.
So blaming them to create or increase debt in BitUSD after BSIP76 is just wrong and making them responsible or hurting for this even more.

Maybe he said is right，seems he own the trademark of “BitShares” and "BTS", if this is true, anyone can't change it.

He has no authority at all.He would love to control bitshares with legal and trademarks but his EU trademark is worth horseshit.
His threaths to gateways or all social media account users showed that he completly lost reality and looks to centralize bitshares arround him.
Calling gateway owners animals or telling gateways like rudex that he is going to kick them out of bitshares calling chinese in general dumb scammers and many other points are not acceptable .His ethics are also totaly fucked up.You should have read what he supported everything in the past and how he already planned with george a hostile takeover using witnesses even they may be held liable for their actions in their jurisdiction and fork out chinese.
His comment was "its their issue."
He has only trademark for EU so he basicly has nothing as long as he won't get world wide trademark.Also even when getting
world wide he can keep only the name community will take the chain.

Noone is going to invest a dime into his shit


George:
The main thing is we maintain the BTS ticker on exchanges during a fork.

Then China can fork off and their chain will die and if they have some new ticker on some random China exchanges who cares

xeroc: Uff
that's gonna cause a lot of drama if you think about it


George:
Also any fork will cause drama

xeroc:
not if you start 'fresh' .. different name .. learn from the past mistakes ..

George:
Yes but the mountain to climb for liquidity and impact on existing businesses is very large with a fresh chain

Building BTS traction and liquidity with exchanges in 2019 literally requires millions of dollars upfront

Therefore imho a fork of existing chain and maintaining existing liquidity and tickers is preferable as there is no upfront costs for listings and small switching costs for existing users. If stakeholders want to change name at that point too then I’m sure that get support and it may look more ‘fresh’

xeroc:
to do that 'morally' right, you'd need consensus on chain. you wont get that imho

also, whoever would do that 'forking' could be liable for fraud

George:
If people want to follow the fork then they can, if they don’t they won’t. Won’t get everyone agreeing and that’s ok


DL:
and its morally ok

compared to situation blockchain has after being too fair (moral) to some players

George:
It’s up to witnesses to move to a new fork

Xeroc:
liability!

George:
So? It’s up to witnesses who are random accounts on the internet. If you’re talking about someone who lives in some jurisdiction who may have a problem with that then that’s their problem. Not BTS or the new chain

DL:
thumbs up for (So? It’s up to witnesses who are random accounts on the internet. If you’re talking about someone who lives in some jurisdiction who may have a problem with that then that’s their problem. Not BTS or the new chain)
giving a choice is fair enough
picking one is not concern of fork


Only one who kept ethics up during that conversation was xeroc

[binggo]

They can't make a patch on BitShares for BitShares

Maybe he said is right，seems he own the trademark of “BitShares” and "BTS", if this is true, anyone can't change it.

The blockchain consensus is ultimately decided by the witnesses and what version they are running, and the voters have the indirect power over that by voting in witnesses that support whatever version they deem the correct one. It boils down to similar situation like the Steem does it's consensus upgrades now, I don't see yet how the trademark affects that.

That is right, this the choice of wittnesses.

What i mean is he has the right to call the patch Bitshares is not Bitshares, this is the affects of trademark, this is also a problem of other coins.

[sschiessl]

They can't make a patch on BitShares for BitShares

Maybe he said is right，seems he own the trademark of “BitShares” and "BTS", if this is true, anyone can't change it.

The blockchain consensus is ultimately decided by the witnesses and what version they are running, and the voters have the indirect power over that by voting in witnesses that support whatever version they deem the correct one. It boils down to similar situation like Steem does it's consensus upgrades now, I don't see yet how the trademark affects that.

[binggo]

I don't like DL too，but

Debt holders in bitusd will get rekkt with his actions.

These were just a part of CN-VOTE debtor in bitusd.
 
1   1.2.458268   fangli0755   1.94
2   1.2.698   map   1.67
3   1.2.544003   chinaking888   1.5
4   1.2.166673   facem   1.88
5   1.2.1688430   dqt812   1.7
6   1.2.415588   hangjun-btss   1.73
7   1.2.18114   cny123   5.58
8   1.2.878397   zb170352718   2.99
9   1.2.5420   ptschina   2.87
10   1.2.186512   jinlicheng1   1.7
11   1.2.712461   waterkawaye509   1.78
12   1.2.187916   hongcaibao111   1.72
13   1.2.169701   yinghuilong   1.69
14   1.2.900314   guotiger1206   1.71
15   1.2.1037129   suny5392   1.73
16   1.2.1750391   shlzbts2020   1.93
17   1.2.1620696   get-richy   1.69
18   1.2.20197   xiaoshan   1.85
19   1.2.155713   hwbts   2.7
20   1.2.998   spring   1.7
21   1.2.480517   sunshine991019   1.73
22   1.2.403666   gold-star   1.68
23   1.2.129515   jinjue082016   1.84

Want to solve the problem of bitusd, i will give some thoughts later...Devaluation is too big...very hard...

They can't make a patch on BitShares for BitShares

Maybe he said is right，seems he own the trademark of “BitShares” and "BTS", if this is true, anyone can't change it.


About consensus, i want to say when we support a consensus like BSIP 76 in such a long time and didn't want to resovle these problems quickly, we only have a false consensus, when we use a BAIP-threthold not be approved by the community as a voting standards，we didn't have consensus any more.

[lochaling]

某些人就是大盗，专偷公共资金的。

小人出走，才是BTS的最大利好。

[binggo]

锁喂价造成的是bitCNY的贬值，和抵押的BTS有毛关系。

你好狗狗。

嘴上再不干净，我就要喊你傻*了。

你自己看看你说得这句话，你脑子有坑吗？！锁喂价跟抵押的bts没有关系，你还锁个毛的喂价？！

[bitcrab]

锁喂价造成的是bitCNY的贬值，和抵押的BTS有毛关系。

你好狗狗。

[Thul3]

Quote from Digital Lucifer

Here a quote from Digital Lucifer

You need to lock 1BTS to keep voting power x1
No collateral voting - at all.

They can. Make a patch, rename BTS and BitShares and move on
They can't make a patch on BitShares for BitShares. Especially not a patch which is saying "I want to have 1.7x more power than I have money"
This change, when it comes to BitShares is irreversible and there is no coming back to corruption regardless what everyone said
Second of all fixed price and collateral just means dead markets - and even margin holders are aware of that because they have no way to close positions
If you take a look at the debts of first top 5 holders in BitUSD - none of them has that BTS or BitUSD left to close the debt
Instead of arbitrage BTS/BitUSD and BTS/USDT we have no arbitrage, no markets and no liquidity
And having in mind all that BTS collateralized, held by cexes and no ability to get new one in some serious amount - no new MPA has sense (like honest assets) until we have enough BTS to spin it properly.
So only real solution to any MPA having sense here is removal of bad debts and restoration of price feeds
Mm contest and liquidity mining as proven did nothing in terms of activity or bringing new users - and costed us more than core prelude worker or UI and infra that are much needed for long time
Now if we look back 2019, workers were stopped as useless cost to the blockchain but milking contest are ok.
Wait for votes to get locked and voting slate to be formed. Workers are useless without anyone to vote on them and we changed consensus not things voted or available for voting on it. There is a limit of how much this push can do, now it's up to the new holders
I'll have worker up by end of the week for BitUSD
No, clear worker poll to remove fixed feeds, 30 days to close their margins and terms and conditions on witnesses when to apply.

You can see that guy has completly no knowledge about trading.Debt holders in bitusd will get rekkt with his actions.
And something like him is being promoted as legal for bitshares.
Anyone supporting this idiot will kill bitshares even more.People with funds will keep leaving.

If he is unhappy he could make a fork.But who with money is going to follow such an idiot ?
Instead he pushed for a hostile takeover to keep getting paid from these people funds he destroyes.

I won't support this hostile takeover and damage of big part of the community.

Best part of him claiming they changed consensus.Does he really think some people with no BTS forcing others their point of view has anything to do with a consensus ?

The reputation damage i won't even mention

They can. Make a patch, rename BTS and BitShares and move on

DL will be hold liable as he as core prelude manager knew that the mainnet 4 will include this unaproofed code.

[binggo]

当锁喂价之下，庞大的虚假投票权出现的时候怎么没有人来质疑共识？！这种虚假票权也是共识？

当随着价格上升抵押票权无限放大的时候，你们扪心自问谁能阻挡这种指数型放大的抵押票权？当他们想再次做作弊喂价的时候谁来维护那些真正bts持有者的利益？谁来维护bitasset持有者的利益？！

反正你喜欢啥就是啥，抵押的票权成了虚假票权，锁一下翻几倍倒是真实票权？

我承认抵押的票权会在态度上有偏见，我也不是不能接受取消抵押票权，但不齿的这种喜欢啥就是啥的态度。

锁喂价之下庞大的抵押票权不是虚假票权是什么？跌到6分的时候实际价值计算有几个票权是真的？某些人喊着一路锁上去的时候，到时候有多少票权是真的？

长时间锁仓放弃的是流动性与机会成本，中间还有大量的时间成本，做适当的票权补偿不应该吗？！虽然我不是很赞成这种高倍票权，但是做适当补偿有什么可非议的吗？！这就跟一个股东承诺几年不出售公司股票以换取更多的表决权，有什么很大的可质疑性吗？这跟抵押票权的性质能一样？！逼着bts持有者到时候只能选择同流合污？

我喜欢不喜欢，自然有逻辑分析做支撑，总不能你不齿我的态度，我就要高喊: 巨蟹大佬，你好靓仔！

[bitcrab]

抵押没票权，这个其实大多数人并不是一定不能接受。 韭菜对票权这个东西 其实不太在乎，在乎的是价格，和利用随意修改规则的割韭菜行为。     
但是abit偷偷添加代码 改投票机制这个 ，不论出于什么目的  都是不能接受的，  改投票机制可能本身没有问题，但是以隐瞒 欺骗的方式偷改  就是个大问题。

所以 将投票机制变化这部分先以patch的方式关掉 然后再进行投票 ,至少流程上是正确的。
abit至今仍不露面,           至少要给出解释，解释其 苦衷 原因， 大家也好理解  支持  不是吗？       

苦衷？至少苦衷之一应该是许多人认为的公会的“充满偏见的态度”。

公会的仓位是高抵押仓位，因此公会对各种解锁喂价的方案都持消极乃至抵制的态度。

走正常流程得不出最“有利”的结果。

[xixi002020]

当锁喂价之下，庞大的虚假投票权出现的时候怎么没有人来质疑共识？！这种虚假票权也是共识？

当随着价格上升抵押票权无限放大的时候，你们扪心自问谁能阻挡这种指数型放大的抵押票权？当他们想再次做作弊喂价的时候谁来维护那些真正bts持有者的利益？谁来维护bitasset持有者的利益？！

反正你喜欢啥就是啥，抵押的票权成了虚假票权，锁一下翻几倍倒是真实票权？

我承认抵押的票权会在态度上有偏见，我也不是不能接受取消抵押票权，但不齿的这种喜欢啥就是啥的态度。

抵押没票权，这个其实大多数人并不是一定不能接受。 韭菜对票权这个东西 其实不太在乎，在乎的是价格，和利用随意修改规则的割韭菜行为。     
但是abit偷偷添加代码 改投票机制这个 ，不论出于什么目的  都是不能接受的，  改投票机制可能本身没有问题，但是以隐瞒 欺骗的方式偷改  就是个大问题。

所以 将投票机制变化这部分先以patch的方式关掉 然后再进行投票 ,至少流程上是正确的。
abit至今仍不露面,           至少要给出解释，解释其 苦衷 原因， 大家也好理解  支持  不是吗？       

[bitcrab]

当锁喂价之下，庞大的虚假投票权出现的时候怎么没有人来质疑共识？！这种虚假票权也是共识？

当随着价格上升抵押票权无限放大的时候，你们扪心自问谁能阻挡这种指数型放大的抵押票权？当他们想再次做作弊喂价的时候谁来维护那些真正bts持有者的利益？谁来维护bitasset持有者的利益？！

反正你喜欢啥就是啥，抵押的票权成了虚假票权，锁一下翻几倍倒是真实票权？

我承认抵押的票权会在态度上有偏见，我也不是不能接受取消抵押票权，但不齿的这种喜欢啥就是啥的态度。

[binggo]

Forgat to add as i already promoted DPOS1 for several months that i personly will support
vote decay and DPOS1  (one vote for one person only) both for witness and committee

But i don't support that non active members get a reward across from active members on bitshares dex as this is a clear paradox since we want active members on bitshares dex.

There didn't have non active members and active members.

The active members which you mean just a group of people want to get profit every moment, you think they love bts but they only love profit, they want the management right just as they want to squeeze more profit from bts, if they can't get any profit from bts, they will run away very quickly. They didn't care about the further development of bts is good or bad, they just care about how to get the more profit from it as soon as possible, this is the reality.

As the new rule, if a account has any amount bts locked in "permanently locked state", then the rest bts in this account will have normal VP, the most account VP will exist like this, so it didn't affect the most account which want to participate the management but didn't want to lock bts.

You just need to lock 1 bts in a  "permanently locked state", then you will have a "permanently locked state"

The no active member which you mean, they just only can get reward from the further development of bts, not come from the immediate profit.

For the debtor, they were gambler, anything can't change that(even i have margin position, i still need to define it like that), no company and system want to be managed by gambler, they just try to gain more and more profit from the collateral, the management what they want，just as they can get profit from the margin as soon as possible，when the price dropped，when they can‘t bear the risk，then they will use the VP of big collateral to make a cheating decision to save their position！ So they must not have the VP.

No defi and stablecoin project will be allowed to give the management right to a debtor, as when give the management right to a debtor, that mean the player and the referee become one person, this project will fail fast.

If you have a margin position and was in margin call, can you keep the impartiality in the voting？I can't and i believe the most of the person can't, it is human nature, when i have a position in margin call，then i will becom blinded and crazy，i will vote anything to keep my position，yes，i have voted the BSIP76 once，even i didn't have a position in margin call，but i‘m afraid，so i do it subconsciously.

A gambler is crazy, nothing can stop them!


这句话也讲给所有的债仓持有者：

如果你有债仓且在强平排队中，你们能够保证你们在投票中保持公平公正吗？我做不到，我相信绝大多数人都做不到，人性使然，当我有一个债仓且在强平排队时，我必然会变的盲目与疯狂，我会投给任何可以保护我的债仓不被强平的提案，即使是作弊提案，不错，我也曾经投过BSIP76, 即使我的债仓离强平还有相当一段距离而且基本不可能被爆，但是恐惧感使我下意识的去做了投票。

没有什么事情可以阻止赌徒的疯狂！


即便是抵押的bts没有投票权，抵押者依然可以通过调仓的方式临时获得大量的临时投票权重，就跟现在锁喂价这种情况，全部贴着线把bts调仓调出来，你们会发现冒出海量的调仓票权。

[matle85]

I don't like changes against consensus but I support Abit here - consensus was broken, the debt holders forcing witnesses to feed fake prices is completely unacceptable and demonstrates broken DPOS.

The changes made are necessary.

If we had voted I would not have supported stake voting at the levels proposed because I think this will cause some unforeseen issues, but overall I think Abit has stepped forward (bravely) to try and save Bitshares.

Ideally I do not think debt holders should be punished really - let's promote these changes and the upgrades to Bitshares so that the price rises and then the false price feeds can be removed without people losing their debt.

[Thul3]

Forgat to add as i already promoted DPOS1 for several months that i personly will support
vote decay and DPOS1  (one vote for one person only) both for witness and committee

But i don't support that non active members get a reward across from active members on bitshares dex as this is a clear paradox since we want active members on bitshares dex.

[btstodamoon]

据我所知，由于公会认为abit的改动侵害了公会的利益，也违背了公链的共识，目前正在准备开发patch，将投票机制变化这部分先以patch的方式关掉。

公会的计划是，先去除掉不在开发计划内的功能，然后再按正常流程投票对这几项功能进行取舍，再进行升级。

在我看来，票权衰减，一票一投这两项应该通过概率很大，锁仓也不小，抵押和挂单无票权这两项应该通不过。

既然如此，何不当下就把4项功能分开投票，以作取舍？ @abit

as I know, cn-vote is preparing a patch to remove the unplanned 4 features which are added to 4.0 release, and force witnesses to install.

and then, they will submit vote for the 4 features for the one new release again.

in my view, vote decay, 1 power 1 vote are in high possibility to be passed, deposit lock is also not low, "collateral and order no power" should not be approved.

so why submit the voting for these 4 features immediately?

求分叉，草泥马的，分出去你和工会自己玩去。

[btstodamoon]

支持abit，巨蟹，你去草婷吧

[binggo]

现在有人来质疑公链的共识了，当初MM支出的时候怎么没有人质疑共识，当用毫无效力的BAIP－threshold作弊投票的时候怎么没有人质疑共识？

当锁喂价之下，庞大的虚假投票权出现的时候怎么没有人来质疑共识？！这种虚假票权也是共识？

当随着价格上升抵押票权无限放大的时候，你们扪心自问谁能阻挡这种指数型放大的抵押票权？当他们想再次做作弊喂价的时候谁来维护那些真正bts持有者的利益？谁来维护bitasset持有者的利益？！

一个公司的股东把股票质押给自家公司，然后拿从公司质押来的钱继续买公司股票，然后再把股票质押给公司贷钱，以此循环做无限杠杆，你们还要给这个人无限票权来管理公司，你们扪心自问一下，这是不是嫌这个公司爆的不快？

贾跃亭怎么掏空乐视的都没点数吗？


新投票机制有潜在的风险吗？有，但是这个风险远远没有无限膨胀与虚假的抵押票权大。


说句实话，改不改对我们韭菜的影响不大，改了还是大票仓之间的游戏，无非没有抵押来搅局，屁股还都能做的正一些，而不改，还是大票仓之间的游戏，等抵押膨胀之后，大概也就抵押说啥就是啥，屁股全部坐在抵押上，无非我们到时候去投其它的分叉链。

另外，我个人对这种锁仓倍数持怀疑态度，这给了大户更大的话语权，他们可以把筹码分出几部分去锁获得更多的话语权，剩下的筹码做流动风险对冲，而小户根本没有这种流动对冲的空间。

抵押票权与挂单必须没有票权，不能再让交易行为绑架管理行为。

至于程序是否合乎共识，把抵押投票权去了再谈共识，不然所谓的共识不过是建立在虚假票权与杠杆票权上的虚假共识。


-------------------------


像公会这样的自私自利的小算盘打的叭叭响，以为锁仓的都是傻子吗？

投票衰减，一票一投，锁仓支持，去除抵押及挂单票权不支持，让锁仓的给抵押的减少流动性，然后抵押获得票权倍数还远高于锁仓票权，有风险的时候抵押跑路还能跑的飞快，公会这个算盘打的真是好，秒啊，真是智多星再世呢，灵感都这么好，怎么不建一个新链来玩呢？！！！！！

[binggo]

so why submit the voting for these 4 features immediately?

Because the voting results would be diffrent with the new voting system and the main reason
bitshares protocol has been completly broken.

Today the voting system and what will come tomorrow if you accept something like that ?

Who is going to hold money in a system where a single person can decide about everything and make your investment worthless with no information,voting or announcement ?

Also what has been done so something like that can't happen again ?

The new voting system is totaly immature and has some features which are dangerous.



Also in my opinion witnesses are not being forced but its basicly their duty to be the keeper that cheats in code can't be added into bitshares.They gurantee the security of bitshares.

Why this happened i think you should  know that very clearly, most of developer had leave away BTS as they very disappointed the whole design of management, the whole system was controlled by a group people and cheating the system, especially the vote of collateral, when the vote power of collateral become more and more bigger as the price rising, who can stop them? who can stop them don't cheate the system again and again?

A shareholder made a pledge of stocks to the company, then he used the money to buy the stocks again, make this cycle again and again, so you want give this guy the power to manage this company?

Yes the wittness maintain the security of bitshares, but they should clearly know which is the best for the system, when the the shareholder of bts make a cheating decision like freeze the feed price, they should say no, but they didn't, when the cheating vote like VP of collateral and BAIP voting happend they should say no, the committee should say no, but they didn't.

Why no body ask how many collateral votes were real under the freezed feed price? is this not a cheating for the system? is it not dangerous for the system?

The danger of the fake and leverage VP of collateral is more dangerous than the new voting system.

I think some ideas may come from BM:
https://medium.com/@bytemaster/blockchain-governance-proposal-470478e42686

To ensure a long-term outlook and “skin in the game”, only tokens locked in a long-term staking contract qualify for voting.

Few people will want to give up liquidity for 10 years so they will earn a higher relative yield and more power over the network. More people will be willing to give up liquidity for 3 months, so they will get a lower yield and less power.

[bitcrab]

Also in my opinion witnesses are not being forced but its basicly their duty to be the keeper that cheats in code can't be added into bitshares.They gurantee the security of bitshares.

right, this is the more political correct statement.

[Thul3]

so why submit the voting for these 4 features immediately?

Because the voting results would be diffrent with the new voting system and the main reason
bitshares protocol has been completly broken.

Today the voting system and what will come tomorrow if you accept something like that ?

Who is going to hold money in a system where a single person can decide about everything and make your investment worthless with no information,voting or announcement ?

Also what has been done so something like that can't happen again ?

The new voting system is totaly immature and has some features which are dangerous.



Also in my opinion witnesses are not being forced but its basicly their duty to be the keeper that cheats in code can't be added into bitshares.They gurantee the security of bitshares.

[binggo]

所谓的共识早就消亡。

票权衰减，一票一投，锁仓都是细枝末节无关紧要的东西。

而抵押与挂单必须无票权，这是最重要的的东西，让交易行为去决定治理行为本身就是一个区块链上最为傻叉的行为，就好比证监会的工作人员一边炒股一边管理股市一样，顺便还玩杠杆借贷，一个公司的股东股票质押完再去回购股票然后再质押再回购，然后还要给全额投票权，最后公司怕是怎么死的都不知道。

人身上长了一颗毒瘤，要切的时候还要问一下毒瘤的意见与感受，跟与狐谋皮何异？！

要么各自分叉单过，反正分叉在将来是不可避免的事件，想留抵押与挂单票权简直做梦！

为什么会发生这种事情，有些人还没有回过味来，那是因为bts离心离德到根本没有开发care，公会可以继续秀！

[bitcrab]

据我所知，由于公会认为abit的改动侵害了公会的利益，也违背了公链的共识，目前正在准备开发patch，将投票机制变化这部分先以patch的方式关掉。

公会的计划是，先去除掉不在开发计划内的功能，然后再按正常流程投票对这几项功能进行取舍，再进行升级。

在我看来，票权衰减，一票一投这两项应该通过概率很大，锁仓也不小，抵押和挂单无票权这两项应该通不过。

既然如此，何不当下就把4项功能分开投票，以作取舍？ @abit

as I know, cn-vote is preparing a patch to remove the unplanned 4 features which are added to 4.0 release, and force witnesses to install.

and then, they will submit vote for the 4 features for the one new release again.

in my view, vote decay, 1 power 1 vote are in high possibility to be passed, deposit lock is also not low, "collateral and order no power" should not be approved.

so why submit the voting for these 4 features immediately?

[binggo]

锁仓对工会完全没有影响，工会也可以锁仓，票也是公平的，又不是针对公会，是大家都同样条件的。 这功能牛逼哄哄的，比减半币要牛逼得多了，永久的牛逼下去，要飞了。要飞，为了票，这下锁仓要打破头，要流血了，要牛逼了，要飞了。BTS要报复性上涨了，这次下车的人基本被甩下车了，后面的路一片美好，上涨空间无限。

CN-VOTE 没有抵押的筹码算算也有至少3千万，也算是一个大票仓了。

[xixi002020]

甘少炒币炒出人格分裂了,abit要负全责

[lovegan007]

锁仓对工会完全没有影响，工会也可以锁仓，票也是公平的，又不是针对公会，是大家都同样条件的。 这功能牛逼哄哄的，比减半币要牛逼得多了，永久的牛逼下去，要飞了。要飞，为了票，这下锁仓要打破头，要流血了，要牛逼了，要飞了。BTS要报复性上涨了，这次下车的人基本被甩下车了，后面的路一片美好，上涨空间无限。

[lovegan007]

重大利好，BTS要飞了，赶紧梭哈，之前是我没理解abit，现在理解了，abit干得漂亮，为BTS增加了一个牛逼的功能，这下想不飞都难了，这功能完美，牛逼，比TM的减半还要牛逼得多了，BTS不涨上2块钱，天理难容啊。

[binggo]

Now can use BTS++ v6.2 to creat locked vote position

----------------------------------------------

BitShares移动端钱包 / BTS++ v6.2 更新 （iOS和安卓均以更新）。
更新日志
  1、新增创建锁仓投票功能。
  2、资产界面添加【锁仓】入口。
  3、部分BUG修复。增强稳定性。

官网APP下载地址：https://app.btspp.io/
GooglePlay地址：http://t.cn/EMb19J7
官网：https://btspp.io/en/index.html
电报：https://t.me/btsplusplus
GitHub源代码仓库：https://github.com/bitshares/bitshares-mobile-app

-----------------------

对于我们这些韭菜，永久锁仓一个bts意思一下就行了

[时光旅行机]

能涨就行，管他娘的，巨蟹不也偷偷改锁喂价

[binggo]

I would claim that majority of bitshares users have no idea how to use cli wallet based on my personal experience.

This means they have already a disadvantage in the voting system against the few who use it.

Maybe need to fund UI?

but i think who didn‘t have locked forever positions can support the wittness then he gets the full normal VP may be more better and easy, one wittness one vote.


简易中文cli_wallet教程，没有电脑动手能力及时间的话，只看看就好:
https://github.com/shulthz/BTS-/issues/1

[Thul3]

I would claim that majority of bitshares users have no idea how to use cli wallet based on my personal experience.

This means they have already a disadvantage in the voting system against the few who use it.

[binggo]

偏题的话：
任何投票机制都不能够阻止大票仓的行为，这是DPOS机制中致命性的缺陷，随着筹码的财阀化及利用人贪便宜的心思用各种空投来取得大票仓，最终都会导致DPOS越来越趋向中心化控制，想要摆脱这种缺陷，只能是重新设计一套合理的见证机制，足够多的见证人数量，足够高的抗攻击操控成本，让见证人尽量摆脱票仓控制，让见证人投票来决定系统的一切方向。当然这只是我个人的想法。


像这个投票机制最大的作用是将BTS从滑向抵押票权的深渊中拉了回来，至于锁仓时间获得的票权越多是否合适，这要看锁仓所消耗的时间成本设计是否能够抵挡人性中的贪婪。

关键是找出锁仓人最可能的作恶时间点在什么时候？

这种锁仓时间获取倍数越多我感觉并不是太好，很容易会形成一个大票仓锁了横行的局面，导致一言堂，其它自由投票人失去投票积极性，投票有效性大幅降低。而且并不是锁定越多越好，锁的太多会严重影响流动性...

[matle85]

Big holders like beos or alt can lock for 360 days 100million bts which is not an issue and get 400 million votes +  remaining 200 milliion votes.Who is going to oppose them ?Where do you find on the other side 100 million bts willing to lock  ?
Such a system favours big holders giving them the opportunity to get even more stronger if there is such a will from their side.


Also BTS was created as utlity token with the funcionality to be used as collateral and main currency on DEX.This voting system is in deny with that functionality as you can't participate in the ecosystem creating bitassets and getting at the same time the same amount of votes as being inactive to participate in bitshares progress.


A general question.

Is a BTS holder who doesn't use his BTS better than somebody who uses his BTS in bitshares ecosystem for which it was constructed ?
The simple holder non active member gets a benefit of up to 8 times VP from his BTS where the active member who is using his BTS activly on bitshares dex gets punished for it?

A non active member should have the possibility to have up to 8 times more voting power than an active member ?


Do we really favor inactive members over active members?

I think that the lock mechanism will be used by some big holders so there will be some unintended consequences - I guess that by locking their BTS they are at least now committed tangibly to the long term performance of the chain and the impact of their voting... I suppose the hope is also that the 'locked' BTS will increase scarcity and help drive the price up.

Re: the collateral point - in the existing (previous?) system debt holders end up with a disproportianately large vote (based on debt + new BTS they buy with that debt) which they are then able to use to dictate the functioning of the chain and artificially protect the debt positions. Thats a complete failure of the system.

One option would be to include bitUSD, bitCNY etc in voting weight so holders of these assets are not left out of the voting system. I guess that could also have some unintended consequences (someone holding a lot of bitUSD might want to push the price down). It is very hard when financial incentives and governance overlaps as things become very messy, separating them out as far as practical is probably a good idea.

[binggo]

Big holders like beos or alt can lock for 360 days 100million bts which is not an issue and get 400 million votes.Who is going to oppose them ?Where do you find on the other side 100 million bts willing to lock ?
Such a system favours big holders giving them the opportunity to get even more stronger if there is such a will from their side.


Also BTS was created as utlity token with the funcionality to be used as collateral.This voting system is in deny with that functionality as you can't participate in the ecosystem creating bitassets and getting more votes to participate in bitshares progress.


A general question.

Is a BTS holder who doesn't use his BTS better than somebody who uses his BTS in bitshares ecosystem for which it was constructed ?
The simple holder non active member gets a benefit of up to 8 times VP from his BTS where the active member who is using his BTS activly on bitshares dex gets punished for it?

A non active member should have the possibility to have up to 8 times more voting power than an active member ?

Collateral and participate ecosystem is trading behaviour not governance behaviors, the trading system and collateral system is part functions of BTS,

It's just like professional standard of the SEC staff，they can't trade in stocks，so the governance should be separated, shouldn't be effected by the trading behaviour，if the governance behaviors was effected by trading behaviour，what will happened i think we all clear about that.
Governance behaviors is not inactive, it is a very important avtive for system.

No one can stop BEOS and alt even they didn't lock to get VP, but still no one can stop the more and more vote of collateral when the price rise, then you will find there is not 36X for vote of collateral，the vote of collateral will become 100X in a very short time，then they will control everything.


I think the divergence is long locked time to get more VP, 2x/4x/8x voting power, the potential threat，if we just locked to get full VP not times VP, if it's more better?

[matle85]

My summary in English after reading Google Translate:

1.   Voter Decay – vote decay starts after 360 days of voting inactivity. The reduction is 12.5% and then a further 12.5% every 45 days. After 675 days of voting inactivity the voting weight is zero.
2.   Committee Voting – one BTS is equal to one committee vote so it can no longer be reused multiple times. If you vote for 3 people, then 1/3 of your voting weight goes to each of them.
3.   Lock Up voting mechanism – lock up BTS for increased voting power. The ratios are 180d/360d/720d eading to 2x/4x/8x voting power. You can also lock up BTS permanently and get up to 32x voting power with the remaining BTS you hold (not quite clear on this). It takes 15d to gain voting power for your lock up.
4.   Voting rules after permanent lock up takes place
4.1   Accounts without a lock up position will have zero weighting (I don’t understand this).
4.2   Collateral BTS will no longer be allowed to vote.[/li][/list]

In my view item 1, item 2 and item 4.2 sound very sensible and like an improvement to proper functioning of consensus.

Item 3 is interesting and I can understand the thought process behind it (empowering small holders etc) but I think we will see some unintended consequences when the big holders decide to lock up their holdings.

As a group I think the changes are positive for proper functioning of consensus and they eliminate some real problems/oddities that put us in a bad position. I suspect we will have some problems with the lock up voting / multiplier but hopefully less than we have now.

In terms of how it has been done…Abit has taken steps to fix a broken consensus system without first seeking approval of that broken consensus system. It is an interesting challenge of decentralised governance and consensus – if the system of decision making is broken then should it be allowed to continue its death spiral or is it better for someone to step up and make the necessary changes?

[Thul3]

Big holders like beos or alt can lock for 360 days 100million bts which is not an issue and get 400 million votes +  remaining 200 milliion votes.Who is going to oppose them ?Where do you find on the other side 100 million bts willing to lock  ?
Such a system favours big holders giving them the opportunity to get even more stronger if there is such a will from their side.


Also BTS was created as utlity token with the funcionality to be used as collateral and main currency on DEX.This voting system is in deny with that functionality as you can't participate in the ecosystem creating bitassets and getting at the same time the same amount of votes as being inactive to participate in bitshares progress.


A general question.

Is a BTS holder who doesn't use his BTS better than somebody who uses his BTS in bitshares ecosystem for which it was constructed ?
The simple holder non active member gets a benefit of up to 8 times VP from his BTS where the active member who is using his BTS activly on bitshares dex gets punished for it?

A non active member should have the possibility to have up to 8 times more voting power than an active member ?


Do we really favor inactive members over active members?

[binggo]

当然我可能理解这种机制是为了给bts持有量少者利用锁仓时间倍数来获取更大的声音，但是大象的腿即使瘦三圈还是比蚂蚁粗，这是任何机制都无法避开的，但可能会好过没有声音

[binggo]

The whole voting system is weak.Has so many dangerous features which can be exploited to death by wealthy holders.
Take control over committee with x32 and you take control over bitassets income.
Get 11 witnesses voted in and you control the chain.

People are going to monitor and pay with their own investments to protect bitshares from these attacks ?


Personly i'm positive for voting changes but discussed within the community to not have these risky wholes and without destroying confidence that bitshares can't be controled by a single person.

This voting system mainly benefits BEOS and makes the reserve pool wide open to them to get the funding for their so desired gateway integration.

Who is going to pay millions of BTS to retort beos attempt getting funding ?
They can win ten's of millions of BTS what is the guy winning who is going to protect the reserve pool ?
Only a loss.Who is going to do that ?

This is the potential threat.

But want to get pay from the reserve pool is not a cost-effective operation，take control over bitassets income is a good way.
It is dangerous for this account to get 32X VP，if he want to picked up sesame and lost watermelon？

But it is still better than the old system, use vote of the margin position to rebalance the big vote like BEOS is another dangerous behavior，very easy lost control.

About control 11 witnesses, this the design problem of DPOS witneess, the DPOS witneess design is a disaster，let's learn the EHT2.0 and VSYS to improve it.

No design can stop the vote type like BEOS，as he control the bts in wallet directly, he is a exchange and rainfall again and again, the people love these too much...

So what i think is only locked position will have full VP，unfreeze time is more less, may be 7 days，let they go to support wittness get dividend， one witness one vote，let 21 witness to instead of committee.

[matle85]

Only getting partial translation but the change to exclude collateral voting sounds completely sensible - the debt positions dominating the vote has led to fake price feeds to protect those debt positions. That can't be sustainable.

Consensus has been a mess for a while now so overall I think this one sounds like a positive change.

Locking your BTS for increased voting power...that's interesting and on paper means longer term thinking voters get more power. It may be open to abuse by big holders locking up large sums but hopefully also means smaller long term thinking holders can come together and have more of an impact.

Decaying votes feels sensible too but I need to read the details a bit.

How much difference has this change actually made to voting?

[lochaling]

现在的机制可能依然存在漏洞，但明显比原来的规则合理，支持

[Thul3]

The whole voting system is weak.Has so many dangerous features which can be exploited to death by wealthy holders.
Take control over committee with x32 and you take control over bitassets income.
Get 11 witnesses voted in and you control the chain.

People are going to monitor and pay with their own investments to protect bitshares from these attacks ?


Personly i'm positive for voting changes but discussed within the community to not have these risky wholes and without destroying confidence that bitshares can't be controled by a single person.

This voting system mainly benefits BEOS and makes the reserve pool wide open to them to get the funding for their so desired gateway integration.

Who is going to pay millions of BTS to retort beos attempt getting funding ?
They can win ten's of millions of BTS what is the guy winning who is going to protect the reserve pool ?
Only a loss.Who is going to do that ?

[btstodamoon]

support the fucking change

[mike.wang]

support the change

[binggo]

这个规则本来就是老外社区提出来的，老外肯定支持啊

BTS已经没救了，Abit一个人可以敌得过整个BTS社区和全部理事会，Abit一个人敌得过30亿BTS票权，还有什么好投票的?理事会全是渣渣了，干不过一个Abit。Abit一人即是天下。

我看到国外社区基本对这个规则意见不大啊😂，国内部分社区也没意见啊😹

至于规矩嘛，不是早就坏了嘛，MM投票换仓作弊，用未被社区投票激活的BAIP做规则不也是溜的不行嘛😹

所以不要激动😅

No the foreigner doesn't support anything which has not being implemented according to protocol.
Don't call Digital Lucifer/BEOS foreigners

We have lost rules long time ago,  the process may be not right, but the things looks not so bad, the big
affected party is cn-vote, more and more bigger vote of margin position is a more serious problem than this in the further, and we will can't do anything with it.
i don't support this process, but i support this change, maybe the change is not so good, will make beos or baozi become big vote，maybe not so good as we think in the further, but if it is more worse than now? Let's hope this process doesn't happen again.

[btstodamoon]

支持

[Thul3]

这个规则本来就是老外社区提出来的，老外肯定支持啊

BTS已经没救了，Abit一个人可以敌得过整个BTS社区和全部理事会，Abit一个人敌得过30亿BTS票权，还有什么好投票的?理事会全是渣渣了，干不过一个Abit。Abit一人即是天下。

我看到国外社区基本对这个规则意见不大啊😂，国内部分社区也没意见啊😹

至于规矩嘛，不是早就坏了嘛，MM投票换仓作弊，用未被社区投票激活的BAIP做规则不也是溜的不行嘛😹

所以不要激动😅

No the foreigner doesn't support anything which has not being implemented according to protocol.
Don't call Digital Lucifer/BEOS foreigners

[ripplexiaoshan]

这个规则本来就是老外社区提出来的，老外肯定支持啊

BTS已经没救了，Abit一个人可以敌得过整个BTS社区和全部理事会，Abit一个人敌得过30亿BTS票权，还有什么好投票的?理事会全是渣渣了，干不过一个Abit。Abit一人即是天下。

我看到国外社区基本对这个规则意见不大啊😂，国内部分社区也没意见啊😹

至于规矩嘛，不是早就坏了嘛，MM投票换仓作弊，用未被社区投票激活的BAIP做规则不也是溜的不行嘛😹

所以不要激动😅

[binggo]

BTS已经没救了，Abit一个人可以敌得过整个BTS社区和全部理事会，Abit一个人敌得过30亿BTS票权，还有什么好投票的?理事会全是渣渣了，干不过一个Abit。Abit一人即是天下。

我看到国外社区基本对这个规则意见不大啊😂，国内部分社区也没意见啊😹

至于规矩嘛，不是早就坏了嘛，MM投票换仓作弊，用未被社区投票激活的BAIP做规则不也是溜的不行嘛😹

所以不要激动😅

不破不立，力挺✊

[lovegan007]

BTS已经没救了，Abit一个人可以敌得过整个BTS社区和全部理事会，Abit一个人敌得过30亿BTS票权，还有什么好投票的?理事会全是渣渣了，干不过一个Abit。Abit一人即是天下。

[binggo]

见证人不是一票一投？？  那配合锁仓  直接把见证人全部接管了，以后喂价想喂多少都行？

见证人倒是必须要改，一票多投本身就存在严重的贿选问题，像eos大家基本是心照不宣的你投我我投你。

见证人质押，一票一投，投票阈值激活。

锁仓控制见证人获利看似可行，实则难行。

[lovegan007]

见证人不是一票一投？？  那配合锁仓  直接把见证人全部接管了，以后喂价想喂多少都行？

不是，你想简单了。

[lovegan007]

有预谋的，Abit偷偷的添加了代码规则，又亲自的开启了这个功能，一步一步精算你们。现在被喷却不出来解释，也不说话，恶意得很，说不定在销毁2.5亿BTS的时候又偷偷的添加进来了25亿呢。

[xixi002020]

见证人不是一票一投？？  那配合锁仓  直接把见证人全部接管了，以后喂价想喂多少都行？

[btstodamoon]

cnm abit

[binggo]

永久锁仓，则这部分 BTS 失去投票权，但帐户剩余的等量 BTS 获得 8 倍权重加成

如果账户有100万个bts，永久锁仓1个bts，账户剩下的99余万个BTS就获得了8倍权重加成？

等量，锁1个只有1个bts有八倍票权。

剩下的那些是正常票权大概。

所以我感觉没啥大问题，大家最后基本会都锁一个意思意思，用正常票权投票，一些铁杆子可能会锁个半年一年的，当然这些铁杆子里如果有千万级别的大户就有点恐怖。

[lochaling]

永久锁仓，则这部分 BTS 失去投票权，但帐户剩余的等量 BTS 获得 8 倍权重加成

如果账户有100万个bts，永久锁仓1个bts，账户剩下的99余万个BTS就获得了8倍权重加成？

[lovegan007]

 工会凉不凉没关系了，因为像abit这样私自决定修改的，投票已经失去了意义。都可以私自添加修改了，还要投票啥的？
私自添加修改这种事，坚决不妥协。投票已经失去了意义。
去中心化共识已经破坏。绕过理事会，绕过投票，自己一个人骗了整个社区，自己一个人说了算，abit一个人即是社区天下，BTS是他的？以后投票有什么意义吗？直接改就行了。
虽然木已成舟，我虽然无力改变，我也要喷他几个月，虽然人家BM也直接改，但人家BM是创始人，人家权力大，不过BM也照样被喷了不久，所以abit准备好被喷几个月了没有啊？
实在不行，支持巨蟹硬分叉BTS。
我虽然不反对abit这添加的规则，永久锁仓这不是让人家的BTS废了？锁仓不应该有回报的么？没回报的锁仓简直。。。。但我反对的是他的做法，程序不按规定走，这以后的再多的投票又显得有什么意义？就算你有30亿票权，也敌不过一个abit。这共识，没意义了。

[binggo]

好奇楼上的怎么不喷 中心化了？投票机制变化 有投过票？结果偷偷写进代码了！！！！

我就担心锁仓 最高8倍投票权 这个！！ 被人利用 投Workers， 然后动资金池。 这个能防范吗？
锁一亿 然后拿5亿出来！！！！！！！！！！！！！！！！！！！！！！！！！！

前因后果不清楚，不好喷...

何况现在不一直是这样嘛...再喷也改变不了什么

锁7500万，8倍票权6亿，然后再用剩下可用的7500万来投worker，每天拿20多万的bts，一年差不多似乎可以回本...而180就会降2倍，这个买卖不能做。

我感觉与其担心这个，还不如担心抵押票权膨胀后的可怕局面，那不是简单的8倍票权的问题，而是指数级别的增长...现在锁喂价的情况下，这些虚假抵押票权就骚操作的不行，一旦再涨一点，那简直无法想象，看看bitusd的抵押排名就知道抵押票权里的水分有多大。

把治理权交给真正的bts持有者，远比屁股坐在抵押上的抵押者好的多，虽然这些bts持有者也不见的有多靠谱，比如beos。

因为我的屁股坐在去除抵押票权这边，所以只会喜闻乐见。

这个规则对猴子，beos有利，对真正的持有bts者有利，对抵押不利，对bts系统长远来说，我的看法是利大于弊。

当然这个规则太硬，锁仓解锁都来个7天时间就好了，也不用锁仓时间长的就投票权重大，只要锁仓就能获全部投票权就行，不锁仓的降票权，抵押物无票权，见证人（见证人直接兼任理事就行）一票一投，这样就能够分散代理票权，防止出现巨无霸代理，还能够一定程度上防交易所，beos这样的...

[xixi002020]

好奇楼上的怎么不喷 中心化了？投票机制变化 有投过票？结果偷偷写进代码了！！！！

我就担心锁仓 最高8倍投票权 这个！！ 被人利用 投Workers， 然后动资金池。 这个能防范吗？
锁一亿 然后拿5亿出来！！！！！！！！！！！！！！！！！！！！！！！！！！

[binggo]

For newly registered accounts, the user's voting power (VP) is zero.  VP only apply after you begin voting.

That's it

If a old account never have any voting operations , its voting power (VP) is zero too，VP only apply after you begin voting.

One committee one vote，if you support many committees，so every your supporting committees will get the total VP you have/the numbers of your supporting committees

Locked 180 days, you will get 2X VP；

Locked 360 days, you will get 4X VP；

Locked 720 days，you will get 8X VP；

Locekd forever，you will lose these bts，but you will get 8X VP if your account have equal available amount bts，and these VP will decay 2X every 180 days.


There have four levels above, they need to update to next level, the VP will become full as the time，15 days will get full VP;

You can cancle the update in these 15 days，but the fund will be vesting in 7 days.

Every account can creat many separate locked positions，the locked positions can split but can't merge.

Every locked positions can change before updating to a formal Locekd forever, if a locked position become a true formal Locekd forever already，then can't be changed.

4.  If a true formal Locekd forever position appears on the chain, then:

The acccount which didn' have Locekd forever[/b] position will didn't have any VP;

The margin position and orders book will didn't have any VP.

[litepresence]

1. 投票权重衰减机制 (vote decay)

新注册的账户，投票权重为零，主动投票后，票才开始生效。

每次主动更新投票后，投票权重更新为 100% ，第360天衰减 12.5% ，然后每过 45 天衰减总权重的 12.5% ，到第 675 天投票完全失效。

代理投票的，代理人和被代理人投票权重按【乘数关系】叠加生效。

via google

1. Voting weight decay mechanism (vote decay)

For newly registered accounts, the voting weight is zero, and the votes will only take effect after actively voting.

After each active update of the vote, the voting weight is updated to 100%, and it decreases by 12.5% on the 360th day, and then decreases by 12.5% of the total weight every 45 days, and the voting is completely invalid on the 675th day.

For proxy voting, the voting weights of the proxy and the proxy are superimposed according to the [multiplier relationship].

my sinology

1. VOTE DECAY

For newly registered accounts, the user's voting power (VP) is zero.  VP only apply after you begin voting.

    After each active update of the vote, the user's VP is updated to 100%. 
    On the 360th day, the VP decreases by 1/8th (to 87.5%).
    Thereafter the user's VP decreases by another 1/8th ​​of the initial VP every 45 days,
    (to 75% then, then 62.5%, then 50% and so on...)
    until after 8 decay periods, on on the 675th day, the user's VP is zero.

For proxy voting, the relative voting weights of each proxy are multiplied by element wise with regard to their respective remaining VP.

2. 理事会选举一票一投机制

如果一个投票人投了多个理事会成员，则每个理事得票数 = 投票人总票数 / 投票人投的理事会成员数量

via google

2. One vote, one vote mechanism for council election

If a voter casts multiple board members, the number of votes for each board = the total number of votes of the voter / the number of board members voted by the voter

my sinology

2. Voting Mechanism for Council Election

If a voter elects more than one board member, the voting power applied toward each candidate is equal to:

    ( The user's voters power ) / ( Number of board members chosen )

3. 锁仓投票机制

参考 https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php?topic=32357.0

新增一个锁仓操作 ticket_create_operation 和一个修改锁仓的操作 ticket_update_operation ，可指定锁仓帐号、时间和金额。

锁仓和修改操作手续费固定为 50 BTS ，理事会不可修改。

锁仓时间有几个选项： 180 天， 360 天， 720 天，永久
其中，
锁仓 180/360/720 天，则锁仓的 BTS 获得 2/4/8 倍投票权重
永久锁仓，则这部分 BTS 失去投票权，但帐户剩余的等量 BTS 获得 8 倍权重加成
推论：一个帐户最多可以获得 32 倍权重。

永久锁仓获得的权重加成，每 180 天衰减 2 倍， 720 天后失效。

锁仓导致的投票权重变化，采用升级/降级机制。
发起锁仓交易后，投盘人并不是马上获得对应倍数的投票权重，而是逐渐升级到指定的锁仓级别。
升级：每升一级需要 15 天。
如果 15 天内取消升级，资金从取消时间开始继续锁 7 天。
降级：即时生效，资金按之前指定的锁仓时间释放。

每个帐户可以有多个锁仓仓位，各仓位的时间、金额各自独立。
锁仓仓位可以拆分，不能合并。

锁仓仓位升级到“永久锁仓状态”前可随时修改；
锁仓仓位升级到“永久锁仓状态”后不可修改。

via google

3. Lock-up voting mechanism

Reference https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php?topic=32357.0

A new lock operation ticket_create_operation and a change lock operation ticket_update_operation are added, which can specify the lock account, time and amount.

The operating fee for lock-up and modification is fixed at 50 BTS, and the board cannot modify it.

There are several options for lock-up time: 180 days, 360 days, 720 days, permanent
among them,
Locked for 180/360/720 days, the locked BTS will get 2/4/8 times the voting weight
Permanent lock-up, this part of BTS loses the right to vote, but the remaining equivalent BTS in the account gets an 8 times weight bonus
Corollary: An account can get up to 32 times the weight.

The weight bonus obtained by permanent lock-up will attenuate by 2 times every 180 days and expire after 720 days.

The change of voting weight caused by lock-up adopts an upgrade/downgrade mechanism.
After initiating a lock-up transaction, the investor does not immediately obtain the corresponding multiple of the voting weight, but gradually upgrades to the designated lock-up level.
Upgrade: It takes 15 days to upgrade each level.
If the upgrade is cancelled within 15 days, the funds will continue to be locked for 7 days from the cancellation time.
Downgrade: Take effect immediately, and funds will be released according to the previously specified lock-up time.

Each account can have multiple locked positions, and the time and amount of each position are independent.
Locked positions can be split but cannot be merged.

The locked position can be modified at any time before it is upgraded to the "permanent locked state";
The locked position cannot be modified after it has been upgraded to the "permanent locked position".

my sinology

3. Voting Power Lock Mechanism

Reference https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php?topic=32357.0

A new lock operation and a change lock are added, `ticket_create_operation` and `operation ticket_update_operation` respectively. 

These new operations can specify the lock `account`, `time`, and `amount`.

The operating fee for lock-up and modification is fixed at 50 BTS.  This fee cannot be modified by the board.

There are 4 options for lock-up time; 180 days, 360 days, 720 days, and permanent lock.

TIME LOCK:

When locked for 180, 360, or 720 days, the locked BTS will generate 2X, 4X, and 8X the voting power respectively

PERMANENT LOCK:

When locked permanently - effectively burned - the locked BTS loses the right to vote
and the remain equivilent BTS in the account gets an 8X weight bonus. 
The weight bonus obtained by permanent lock-up will be halved every 180 days and expire completely after 720 days.

MAXIMUM POWER:

The maximum allowed VP weight is 32X which can be obtained through both permanent lock and timelock of 360 days or more.

UPGRADE / DOWNGRADE MECHANISM

The change of voting weight caused by lock-up adheres to an upgrade and downgrade mechanism as follows:

UPGRADE:

After initiating a lock-up transaction, the investor does not immediately obtain the corresponding multiple of the voting weight.  Instead the investor gradually upgrades to the designated lock-up level. It takes 15 days to upgrade each level.  If the upgrade is cancelled within 15 days, the funds will continue to be locked for 7 days from the cancellation time.

DOWNGRADE:

Downgrading takes effect immediately upon the user's request, however the funds will be released according to the previously specified lock-up time.

FAQ:

Can you have more than on locked position?

    Each account can have multiple locked positions, and the time decay and amount locked, of each position, are independent.

Can locked positions be split or merged?

    Locked positions can be split but cannot be merged.

When can locked positions be modified?

    The locked position can be modified at any time before it is upgraded to the "permanent locked state".
    Once permanently locked, it can never be modified again.

4. 永久锁仓生效后的投票规则

当链上出现第一个“永久锁仓状态”的锁仓仓位后，如下投票规则生效：

4.1 不持有“永久锁仓状态”仓位的帐号，投票权重为零
4.2 抵押的 BTS 和挂单的 BTS 不再有投票权


更新：如何通过 cli_wallet 命令行进行锁仓相关操作，请往下翻页查看。

更新2： BitShares Mobile (BTS++) 手机钱包 v6.2 已经加入锁仓功能

via google

4. Voting rules after permanent lock-up takes effect

When the first "permanent lock state" locked position appears on the chain, the following voting rules will take effect:

4.1 Accounts that do not hold positions in the "permanent lock-up state" have a voting weight of zero
4.2 Mortgage BTS and BTS with pending orders no longer have voting rights


Update: How to perform lock-up related operations through the cli_wallet command line, please scroll down to see.

my sinology

4. Voting Rules in BitShares 4.0.0

When the first user's "permanently locked state" position appears on the chain, the following voting rules will take effect:

4.1 Accounts that do not hold at least 1 BTS in "permanently locked state" have a no voting power
4.2a BTS held as MPA collateral no longer has voting rights
4.2b BTS held as limit orders no longer has voting rights

Please scroll down to see how to perform the lock-up related operations via the command line interface

[binggo]

当链上出现第一个“永久锁仓状态”的锁仓仓位后，如下投票规则生效：

4.1 不持有“永久锁仓状态”仓位的帐号，投票权重为零
4.2 抵押的 BTS 和挂单的 BTS 不再有投票权

发起锁仓交易后，投盘人并不是马上获得对应倍数的投票权重，而是逐渐升级到指定的锁仓级别。
升级：每升一级需要 15 天。
如果 15 天内取消升级，资金从取消时间开始继续锁 7 天。

50136317 2020-07-30T15:19:27 ticket_create_operation abit fee: 50 BTS   result: 1.18.3

那么你这个直接永久锁仓操作需要15*4=60天才能连续不间断升级成正式的“永久锁仓状态”？还是只需要15天就会升级为正式的“永久锁仓状态”？！

我的理解是：

如果有一个仓位是180天，只能按顺序升级为360，然后才能升级为720.

而新建一个360仓位，可以直接15天内升级到360.


如果是60天的话，那么现在公会有2.6亿票权可以各种骚操作60天；

如果是15天的话，那么现在公会有2.6亿票权可以各种骚操作15天；

或者B-DEX，baozi及BEOS都需要重新投票操作一下恢复票权。

[binggo]

一件不是好事的好事？……虽然很硬……

4.1 不持有“永久锁仓状态”仓位的帐号，投票权重为零

这个的意思是，只要有一个永久锁仓上链了，没有永久锁仓位的账号投票权为零，那180天的呢？如果都为零了，这中间岂不是有很大的空档期？

这个规则太硬了，后期能优化一下话可能就好多了……

180 天的，可以销毁（永久锁） 1 个 BTS 意思意思。

这个我感觉最后会要变成大家都永久锁一个bts意思意思，beos肯定还是山上的猴子，那山上的猴子必然还是猴子😸，交易所钱包有极大的投票优势

[abit]

一件不是好事的好事？……虽然很硬……

4.1 不持有“永久锁仓状态”仓位的帐号，投票权重为零

这个的意思是，只要有一个永久锁仓上链了，没有永久锁仓位的账号投票权为零，那180天的呢？如果都为零了，这中间岂不是有很大的空档期？

这个规则太硬了，后期能优化一下话可能就好多了……

180 天的，可以销毁（永久锁） 1 个 BTS 意思意思。

[abit]

目前锁仓相关操作可以通过 cli_wallet 命令行完成。

1. 锁仓

op code: 57

参数
fee 手续费，固定 50 BTS （如果用其他资产支付请自行计算）
account 账号，格式 1.2.x
target_type 目标类型（决定锁多久）， 1 表示锁 180 天， 2 表示锁 360 天， 3 表示锁 720 天， 4 表示永久锁仓
amount 金额和币种，币种只能是 BTS 也就是 1.3.0

注：因为 BTS 是 5 位小数，所有金额需要乘以 10 万。

比如：

abit 锁 10 万 BTS ，锁两年：

sign_transaction {"operations":[[ 57,{ "fee":{"amount":"5000000","asset_id":"1.3.0"}, "account": "1.2.12376", "target_type": 3, "amount": { "amount": "10000000000", "asset_id": "1.3.0" }} ]]} true

abit 锁 1000 BTS ，永久锁仓：

sign_transaction {"operations":[[ 57,{ "fee":{"amount":"5000000","asset_id":"1.3.0"}, "account": "1.2.12376", "target_type": 4, "amount": { "amount": "100000000", "asset_id": "1.3.0" } } ]]} true


2. 检查锁仓操作结果

可以用 get_account_history 命令查看帐户操作历史，比如

Code: [Select]

get_account_history abit 10

结果示例

Code: [Select]

50136317 2020-07-30T15:19:27 ticket_create_operation abit fee: 50 BTS   result: 1.18.3
50136106 2020-07-30T15:08:21 ticket_create_operation abit fee: 50 BTS   result: 1.18.0

格式为：块号 时间 操作 帐号 手续费 结果

结果里 1.18.x 就是仓位 ID ，可以通过 get_object 命令查看

Code: [Select]

>>> get_object 1.18.0
[{
    "id": "1.18.0",
    "account": "1.2.12376",
    "target_type": "lock_720_days",
    "amount": {
      "amount": "10000000000",
      "asset_id": "1.3.0"
    },
    "current_type": "liquid",
    "status": "charging",
    "value": "10000000000",
    "next_auto_update_time": "2020-08-14T15:08:18",
    "next_type_downgrade_time": "1969-12-31T23:59:59"
  }
]

结果说明：
id 仓位 ID
account 帐号
target_type 仓位目标类型， liquid 未成功锁仓或者已解锁待释放， lock_xxx_days 锁仓xxx天， lock_forever 永久锁仓
amount 仓位金额和币种
current_type 仓位当前类型，因为升降级的关系，和目标类型可能不同
status 状态，charging 升级中， stable 稳定， withdrawing 降级中
value 仓位价值，也就是实际投票权（永久锁仓时仓位价值的算法不同）
next_auto_update_time 下次仓位自动更新时间，是用于连续升降级的辅助字段
next_type_downgrade_time 下次降级时间，用于降级或者解锁的辅助字段


3. 修改仓位（解锁/升级/降级/取消升降级/拆分）

op code: 58

参数
fee 手续费，固定 50 BTS （如果用其他资产支付请自行计算）
ticket 要修改的仓位 ID ，格式 1.18.x
account 账号，格式 1.2.x
target_type 目标类型（决定锁多久）， 0 表示解锁， 1 表示锁 180 天， 2 表示锁 360 天， 3 表示锁 720 天， 4 表示永久锁仓
amount_for_new_target 可选参数，新目标的金额和币种。如果不设置这个参数，表示修改整个仓位；如果设置了这个参数，并且金额小于原仓位金额，则是拆分仓位。币种只能是 BTS 也就是 1.3.0 。

注：因为 BTS 是 5 位小数，所有金额需要乘以 10 万。

比如：

abit 将 1.18.0 这个仓位调整为锁一年：

sign_transaction {"operations":[[ 58,{ "fee":{"amount":"5000000","asset_id":"1.3.0"}, "ticket":"1.18.0", "account": "1.2.12376", "target_type": 2 } ]]} true

abit 将 1.18.3 这个仓位中拆分 100 BTS 解锁：

sign_transaction {"operations":[[ 58,{ "fee":{"amount":"5000000","asset_id":"1.3.0"}, "ticket":"1.18.3", "account": "1.2.12376", "target_type": 0, "amount_for_new_target": {"amount":"10000000","asset_id":"1.3.0"} } ]]} true

操作结果仍然可以通过 get_account_history 命令和 get_object 命令查看

结果里，
updated_objects 表示发生变化的仓位 ID
new_objects 表示拆分出的新仓位 ID


4. 相关信息

4.1 帐户统计信息里新加了几个字段来记录按帐号汇总的仓位信息

Code: [Select]

>>> get_object 2.6.12376
[{
    ...
    "total_core_inactive": 0,
    "total_core_pob": 0,
    "total_core_pol": "10100000000",
    "total_pob_value": 0,
    "total_pol_value": "10100000000",
    ...
  }
]

其中，
total_core_inactive 已永久锁定2年或以上、投票权重为零的仓位总金额
total_core_pob 已永久锁定2年以内的、投票权重为正的仓位总金额
total_core_pol 非永久锁定的仓位总金额
total_pob_value 永久锁定2年以内的仓位总价值
total_pol_value 非永久锁定的仓位总价值


4.2 动态全局信息里增加两个字段记录链上永久锁定的仓位汇总信息

Code: [Select]

>>> get_object 2.1.0
[{
    ...
    "total_pob": 0,
    "total_inactive": 0,
    ...
  }
]

其中，
total_pob 已永久锁定2年以内的、投票权重为正的仓位总金额
total_inactive 已永久锁定2年或以上、投票权重为零的仓位总金额


5. 批量查询 API （待开发）

* 查询指定帐户的所有锁仓仓位
* 查询指定类型的所有锁仓仓位

[R]

Why didn't you support BSIP 22 if you want vote decay? https://github.com/bitshares/bsips/blob/master/bsip-0022.md

[binggo]

一件不是好事的好事？……虽然很硬……

4.1 不持有“永久锁仓状态”仓位的帐号，投票权重为零

这个的意思是，只要有一个永久锁仓上链了，没有永久锁仓位的账号投票权为零，那180天的呢？如果都为零了，这中间岂不是有很大的空档期？

这个规则太硬了，后期能优化一下话可能就好多了……

[abit]

1. 投票权重衰减机制 (vote decay)

新注册的账户，投票权重为零，主动投票后，票才开始生效。

每次主动更新投票后，投票权重更新为 100% ，第360天衰减 12.5% ，然后每过 45 天衰减总权重的 12.5% ，到第 675 天投票完全失效。

代理投票的，代理人和被代理人投票权重按【乘数关系】叠加生效。


2. 理事会选举一票一投机制

如果一个投票人投了多个理事会成员，则每个理事得票数 = 投票人总票数 / 投票人投的理事会成员数量


3. 锁仓投票机制

参考 https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php?topic=32357.0

新增一个锁仓操作 ticket_create_operation 和一个修改锁仓的操作 ticket_update_operation ，可指定锁仓帐号、时间和金额。

锁仓和修改操作手续费固定为 50 BTS ，理事会不可修改。

锁仓时间有几个选项： 180 天， 360 天， 720 天，永久
其中，
锁仓 180/360/720 天，则锁仓的 BTS 获得 2/4/8 倍投票权重
永久锁仓，则这部分 BTS 失去投票权，但帐户剩余的等量 BTS 获得 8 倍权重加成
推论：一个帐户最多可以获得 32 倍权重。

永久锁仓获得的权重加成，每 180 天衰减 2 倍， 720 天后失效。

锁仓导致的投票权重变化，采用升级/降级机制。
发起锁仓交易后，投盘人并不是马上获得对应倍数的投票权重，而是逐渐升级到指定的锁仓级别。
升级：每升一级需要 15 天。
如果 15 天内取消升级，资金从取消时间开始继续锁 7 天。
降级：即时生效，资金按之前指定的锁仓时间释放。

每个帐户可以有多个锁仓仓位，各仓位的时间、金额各自独立。
锁仓仓位可以拆分，不能合并。

锁仓仓位升级到“永久锁仓状态”前可随时修改；
锁仓仓位升级到“永久锁仓状态”后不可修改。


4. 永久锁仓生效后的投票规则

当链上出现第一个“永久锁仓状态”的锁仓仓位后，如下投票规则生效：

4.1 不持有“永久锁仓状态”仓位的帐号，投票权重为零
4.2 抵押的 BTS 和挂单的 BTS 不再有投票权


更新：如何通过 cli_wallet 命令行进行锁仓相关操作，请往下翻页查看。

更新2： BitShares Mobile (BTS++) 手机钱包 v6.2 已经加入锁仓功能