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Messages - abit

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1
来个年度总结?worker资金使用情况?有无剩余资金,如有,怎么处置?

2
General Discussion / Re: Price Feed Review
« on: May 25, 2019, 07:39:32 pm »
Complain XMAN, as a witness he has not updated the price for more than 22 hours.
Actually xman was voted out of top 21 so unable to update price feed.

3
中文(Chinese) / Re: 喂价规则讨论贴
« on: May 24, 2019, 09:48:00 am »
EOS的BP们在努力的到处传销EOS, 扩张建立EOS的生态, 我们的BP哪?
EOS BP一年挣多少?
这也是理由?
当然有关系。

打个比方,当初bts几分的时候,alt是投票反对所有worker的,没多少人申请worker,社区也比现在小。
后来涨了,worker才多起来,alt也投票支持一些worker。

那么,是因为涨了才有人宣传呢,还是因为有人宣传了所以涨?

4
As most of you know, clicking on BitShares account under the profile name and avatar was leading to url "bts:username" and was not working.

My personal preference for block explorer from Alredo (bitshares-explorer), but I haven't seen friendly URL on accounts with his explorer, cryptofresh has a lot of downs and data that is not reliable (delay of few days even), while bts.ai was fully compatible and up2date option.

So, as per screenshot below, now you can directly from forums check each account directly on bts.ai explorer.



More updates will follow!

Chee®s
Please change the link to https.

5

Quote
e) How many articles will your worker produce?
5 fully featured articles
18500 USD , so around 4000 USD each.

Will all the articles be published at same time, or?

7
中文(Chinese) / Re: 喂价规则讨论贴
« on: May 23, 2019, 06:25:02 pm »
EOS的BP们在努力的到处传销EOS, 扩张建立EOS的生态, 我们的BP哪?
EOS BP一年挣多少?

8
IMHO it's more reasonable to compare votes of all the related workers:

* 1.14.168 Poll - BSIP59 - Reduce MSSR of bitCNY to 1.02,                      834,717,273 votes
* 1.14.144 Poll-BSIP41-Reduce MSSR of bitCNY from 1.1 to 1.05,            799,257,175 votes
* 1.14.181 Poll - BSIP59 - Reduce MSSR of bitCNY to 1.01,                      483,677,666 votes
* 1.14.169 Poll - BSIP59 - Do Not Reduce MSSR of bitCNY                       243,231,913 votes

Apparently 1.14.168 has the highest support. So my conclusion is we should set the parameter to 1.02.
Even 1.05 has much more support than 1.01

updated votes:
1.14.181   Poll - BSIP59 - Reduce MSSR of bitCNY to 1.01            584,525,311   
1.14.144   Poll-BSIP41-Reduce MSSR of bitCNY from 1.1 to 1.05   434,145,867   
1.14.168   Poll - BSIP59 - Reduce MSSR of bitCNY to 1.02            425,959,411   
1.14.175   Poll - BSIP59 - Do Not Reduce MCR of bitCNY              26,603,654

584M vs 4xxM. IMHO debatable.

By the way, 1.14.169 and 1.14.175 have same description, especially, no new "no" worker has been created for 1.14.181, voters may got confused. If now create a "no" worker, IMHO we need to extend the voting period.

9
IMHO it's more reasonable to compare votes of all the related workers:

* 1.14.168 Poll - BSIP59 - Reduce MSSR of bitCNY to 1.02,                      834,717,273 votes
* 1.14.144 Poll-BSIP41-Reduce MSSR of bitCNY from 1.1 to 1.05,            799,257,175 votes
* 1.14.181 Poll - BSIP59 - Reduce MSSR of bitCNY to 1.01,                      483,677,666 votes
* 1.14.169 Poll - BSIP59 - Do Not Reduce MSSR of bitCNY                       243,231,913 votes

Apparently 1.14.168 has the highest support. So my conclusion is we should set the parameter to 1.02.


Even 1.05 has much more support than 1.01

1.14.168 does not represent "1.02", it represent the operation of "reduction from 1.05 to 1.02", it lost effect after the reduction is done. now we only need to compare the two WPs - "reduce from 1.02 to 1.01" and "Do Not Reduce".
Then we should not reuse 1.14.169, but need to create a new worker e.g. "keep MSSR at 1.02".

11
中文(Chinese) / Re: 喂价规则讨论贴
« on: May 20, 2019, 01:35:34 pm »
另外,一个小系统里面的利益并不能完全左右行为。
这个就有点远了,万事万物都是如此,不能说是缺陷。

而DPOS这种机制,做的不好的见证人被选下去之后,被选上来的见证人谁也不知道好还是不好?只能走一步看一步。

再说,有些时候,我们怎么知道这个被挤下去的见证人做的与刚上来的见证人有什么竞争区别那?

被选下去的感觉没有什么风险,被选上来就有种捡便宜的的感觉。

没有资本的注入注定与整套系统的利益相关不会太紧密,就跟ofo一样,虽然200块钱的押金不多,但总也是利益相关者,也要时不时的关注一下ofo的死活,时不时的要发表一下意见,骂上几句,要是没有这200块的押金,鬼才关心它。

竞争一个节点,起码要设一个门槛,交了门票才能成为节点的竞争者,既然是竞争节点,自然是看好节点的发展,锁仓资金与交保证金起码也是一种态度的表示,不然一个竞争者什么也没有质押给系统,没有忧患性,就会抱着选上也可以,选不上也没损失的无所谓心态。
现在只有个创建见证人的手续费,也没见很多人来竞选呀。
再加个锁仓门槛,会如何?
如果没选上的也有工资,还差不多。

12
中文(Chinese) / Re: 喂价规则讨论贴
« on: May 20, 2019, 09:35:28 am »
我不是反驳,BTS现在的节点机制并没有比原始POS好多少,而POS的变种并不能以原始的POS缺陷来评判, DPOS何况也是POS的变种。

我们不能噼里啪啦的批判一通,缺点全点一遍,然后就没有然后了。

比如见证人不从资金池里获取报酬而改为从手续费获取报酬,那升级分叉的时候,见证人会不会在两个链上都出块?毕竟见证人没有门槛,不需要交保证金或者锁仓,整体的利益相关性并不是那么强,而等权益方发现的时候,破坏已经形成。

怎么总觉得你是想反驳我一下,但结果和我说的是一个意思。

POS,或者一票一投的DPOS,有多少比例的票,就控制多少比例的出块人。
然而,根据最长链原则,仍然是>50%票就能控制全部,只是从技术上说,出现争议会分叉,长短分叉会并存,影响使用体验。

一票多投的制度,结果就是>50%的票就可以直接控制全部出块人,这是BM提到的所谓的“强化共识”,
一旦短分叉出现,会被快速丢弃,用户体验好一点。(注:当然短分叉可以硬分叉出去,但这样也不会影响长分叉)

单从出块来说,见证人是很难作恶的,除了
1. nothing-at-stake也就是分叉时两个链都出块
2. 打包时故意过滤某些交易
少量见证人合谋达不到效果。

bts又给见证人派了个喂价的工作,但中间价算法下,少量见证人合谋也无法作恶。

如果说多数见证人都是坏的?这就是阴谋论了。
大部分投票人不是傻子。比如这次beos控制了1/3的活跃票数,社区应对还是相当积极的。


再说利益论。
当然,没利益的时候,大部分人做事会不积极;
有点利益的时候,很多人做事也不见得积极,而是倾向于取巧、占便宜。
一个激励措施能不能起到效果,规则设计很关键,但有难度。
给见证人普涨工资并没有起到很好的激励效果;
反而,当初巨蟹要求见证人提供公共api服务器,威胁不提供就撤票,效果就很好。当然,仅此而以,公共API主要只是钱的问题,喂价是要投入精力的。


另外,一个小系统里面的利益并不能完全左右行为。
打个比方,假设某人持有或者抵押了1千万BTS,可以说不少了吧?
如果这是他的全部身家或者大部分,那很可能他会全力推动BTS价值上升。
谁能保证持有1千万BTS的就一定会托盘或者拉盘?
因为他可能在哪里做空BTS的仓位不止千万,而内盘明盘的只是为了对冲、降低做空风险。
或者,为了要吃更多货,所以会继续砸盘压盘。
或者,比如为了分散风险,他同时持有BTS和BTC,但BTC仓位大很多,当BTS威胁到BTC时,他会毫不犹豫的放弃BTS。


扯远了。

13
@fuzzy: please change "Https" to "https" then the links would work. E.G. https://sharebits.io

15
General Discussion / Re: Bitshares at the cross roads
« on: May 19, 2019, 09:23:08 pm »
The account histories are interesting.

Apparently quite some genesis funds are claimed, just for BEOS.

HUGE.

Is it I3's hidden treasury? The AGS fund?

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