Thanks for the warm welcome back.

To answer a few questions:

Quote from: abit on April 28, 2019, 10:59:05 am

The only thing that concerns me is it seems that you don't have a clear economy-related background, so possibly an average Joe (who don't understand computer science nor game theory nor economy) won't believe you nor your research results.

Messaging to average Joes is one of my favorite things to do -- check out my "Game Theory of Steem" series I published on Steemit a couple years back. As to my background, I actually do have training in economic thinking -- more than most computer science/engineering people, and one of my key research areas is developing algorithmic incentive mechanisms to influence human behavior. The topic of MPA/bitassets is fundamentally interdisciplinary, so anyone working on it needs access to a range of background material, and this is something I bring. In addition, the PhD student who will likely be working on the project is a software engineer with trading experience, so he brings some good relevant diversity as well.

Quote from: abit on April 28, 2019, 10:59:05 am

When talking about economy, bitAsset is impacted by the impossible trinity theory. More discussions are linked below:
https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php?topic=27203.msg322852#msg322852
https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php?topic=11946.0
Looking forward to your inputs about this.

Yes, I'm aware of the impossible trinity and I'm looking forward to formalizing that kind of concept for bitassets in particular. More about my thoughts on this in the future.

Quote from: ripplexiaoshan on April 28, 2019, 02:25:38 pm

Good to see you are preparing to do deep research on bitAsset, it is very necessary indeed. However, is there any specific target?  or we can we expect from your future research?

You can find a very brief summary of the project goals here. In a nutshell, we'll do two things:

• We'll ask BTS-specific questions: How should MSSR be selected? Could dynamic collateral requirements be helpful? What is the right way to eliminate global settlement as an undercollateralization safety mechanism?
• We'll ask broader price-stable-asset questions, focusing on the fundamental design tradeoffs in the space. My favorite question here concerns risk: there is a complex interplay between the behavior of bitasset shorts and the risk assumed by bitasset longs. The system can only work if the shorts assume most of the longs' risk, and yet in BTS bear markets, the shorts want to assume as little of that risk as possible. However, if the shorts offload the risk back to the longs, then the bitasset may un-peg and thus lose its value proposition, which in turn harms the value of BTS, ultimately hurting the shorts as well. Thus, the system must be designed so that this long-term risk is somehow directly "priced in" to the shorts' incentives.

This sounds very interesting. You'll get my support. Looking forward to more outcome from your research. Do you have a schedule about the research, e.g. at what time you will publish what?

Quote from: crazybit on April 26, 2019, 04:36:29 am

How ridiculous is this!!!

 the feeding program is developed by community and open-sourced, you are lazy to simulate with the provided evidence, but keep asking unless questions and trying to impose your willingness on others.

i did a deep~~~ track on logs and the feeding activity i provided before, what i observers is it might drop on the "median" on most of times if you simulate with [email protected] and following config, i do not know whether it is as designed or program bug，you could have a try by your self。

Code: [Select]

CNY:
        target_price_algorithm: 'adjusted_feed_price'
        target_price_adjustment_scale: 0
        maximum_short_squeeze_ratio: 105
what i see from this thread is Bitshares already controlled by a few whales, and many community members cannot distinguish what is right and wrong, what you do is just following, i don't care any more ,just do as you like.

I have removed my votes for crazybit.

The above comment proves that

a) it was NOT done on purpose IMHO but

b) crazy bit has no understanding of the various discussions on feeding


        target_price_algorithm: 'adjusted_feed_price'
        target_price_adjustment_scale: 0

The above are BSIP42 settings....Meaning it's based on negative feedback on the MEDIAN price.
When BSIP42 became inactive he just changed the feedback factor (target_price_adjustment_scale) to 0 so there was no feedback and just fed the last read median price outright.

This might be the most reasonable reply.

Welcome back and thanks for the offer.

The only thing that concerns me is it seems that you don't have a clear economy-related background, so possibly an average Joe (who don't understand computer science nor game theory nor economy) won't believe you nor your research results. (I guess) the majority of voting BitShares stake is in the hands of average Joes which are hard to educate. To develop the community/ecosystem, we've chosen a hard path. You may want to research topics about the voting mechanism as well.

When talking about economy, bitAsset is impacted by the impossible trinity theory. More discussions are linked below:
https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php?topic=27203.msg322852#msg322852
https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php?topic=11946.0
Looking forward to your inputs about this.

存在“准备金”，也就是一定程度上由系统兜底。

行不行，走着瞧呗。

https://github.com/bitshares/bitshares-core/releases/tag/3.0.0

* HTLC
* 交易手续费分成/返还
* 修复智能资产总量可能超出上限的问题
* 修复交易大小限制问题
* 修复MCR问题

升级时间4月23号14点（UTC）

Can someone explain the best way to "arb" this in terms of USD? I can just buy BTS, and sell on the BTS/USD market (for a higher price, in exchange for risk of holding BitUSD)?

IMHO the best way is to participate in collateral bidding, you'll get a (cheap) debt position if succeeded, in the risk of being margin called later. The higher current BTS price is, the higher potential profit and lower risk will you have.

Note: fees for new operations have been explicitly set, however, some of them didn't honor original USD--denominated value.
Specifically, bid_collateral fee was set to same as call_order_update fee, it's now increased to $5, which greatly discourages participation. Here I suggest that we revert this change with a new proposal.

Thanks for the head up. Just wanted to post the same, E.G. force inactive accounts to reactivate if they want to post again.

Merry Christmas!