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Messages - abit

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91
General Discussion / Re: New BSIP:GS protection via core code
« on: July 19, 2019, 02:37:39 pm »
I'm for the 4th option now:
* allow undercollateralization
* no globally settlement
* has individual settlement, the system take over the undercollateralized debt positions (which would form a pool)
* when undercollateralization happens and someone tries to settle, fill the settlement request with the positions with lowest CR (can be the pool) first, so first settler will get less

so the pool as a debt position may have CR<1, when some tries to settle, how can the pool fulfill the request with CR<1? or the pool can only fulfill the request with CR>1?
The pool pays less BTS per bitUSD.

so when someone tries to settle,
the pool has a settle price of 0.05USD,
the margin call order price is 0.04USD,
the normal force settlement price is 0.043USD

which will fill the settle request? the pool?
Compare CR of the pool and the call order, whose CR is lower gets settled.

If CR of the order or pool > 1 / (1+force_settle_offset), fill settle order at normal force settlement price,
if CR of the order or pool < 1 / (1+force_settle_offset), fill settle order at CR.

92
General Discussion / Re: New BSIP:GS protection via core code
« on: July 19, 2019, 02:35:18 pm »

The word "settle" is used in too many places but means different things.


I was referring to "Force Settlement" and the idea that the first person that settles bad debt gets less BTS.
Current rule aka GS means everyone who settles bad debt gets less BTS.

Yes, and that's bad business. And how about if we introduce a 24hr debt settlement where the debt holder gets a chance to close his debt before GS?
Before discussing your idea, how about you think about the 4 options I described?
It's better if you can explain what are the pros and cons first then ask others.

In your words you mentioned "debt holders", I guess you mean "debt position holders"?
When the debt positions turned into margin calls, the debt position holders are already willing to close their positions. It's that nobody buys into the margin calls caused the final undercollateralization. It's the debt asset holders' fault.

When it's already undercollateralized, what's the use of the 24 hours? Assume some debt asset holders will settle, what's the fair price? where to get the collateral to pay them? You still need to face the fact: whether first settler will get less.
I am not here to argue your points. I simply state my thoughts. If we were to increase MCR and MSSR (tools we already have) we might be able to avoid GS or "GS protection". That's my point. You think otherwise and that's ok, we are all entitled to our opinions.
Increasing MCR may probably reduce chance of undercollateralization, however, it may probably lead to the opposite as well.

With increased MCR, less bitUSD can be produced with same amount of BTS as collateral. Higher MSSR means debt position holders will lose more when being margin called, it means higher risks for debt pisition holders. So it will lead to lower bitUSD supply, poorer liquidity, and likely higher premium.

If we want to grow, we need to bear some risks.

Take bitEUR as an example. Its overall collateral ratio is very "healthy", but it has too little supply.

93
General Discussion / Re: New BSIP:GS protection via core code
« on: July 19, 2019, 02:20:00 pm »
I'm for the 4th option now:
* allow undercollateralization
* no globally settlement
* has individual settlement, the system take over the undercollateralized debt positions (which would form a pool)
* when undercollateralization happens and someone tries to settle, fill the settlement request with the positions with lowest CR (can be the pool) first, so first settler will get less

so the pool as a debt position may have CR<1, when some tries to settle, how can the pool fulfill the request with CR<1? or the pool can only fulfill the request with CR>1?
The pool pays less BTS per bitUSD.

94
General Discussion / Re: New BSIP:GS protection via core code
« on: July 19, 2019, 01:58:54 pm »

The word "settle" is used in too many places but means different things.


I was referring to "Force Settlement" and the idea that the first person that settles bad debt gets less BTS.
Current rule aka GS means everyone who settles bad debt gets less BTS.

Yes, and that's bad business. And how about if we introduce a 24hr debt settlement where the debt holder gets a chance to close his debt before GS?
Before discussing your idea, how about you think about the 4 options I described?
It's better if you can explain what are the pros and cons first then ask others.

In your words you mentioned "debt holders", I guess you mean "debt position holders"?
When the debt positions turned into margin calls, the debt position holders are already willing to close their positions. It's that nobody buys into the margin calls caused the final undercollateralization. It's the debt asset holders' fault.

When it's already undercollateralized, what's the use of the 24 hours? Assume some debt asset holders will settle, what's the fair price? where to get the collateral to pay them? You still need to face the fact: whether first settler will get less.

95
General Discussion / Re: New BSIP:GS protection via core code
« on: July 19, 2019, 01:55:46 pm »
The market will run as your thought? en,that's very interesting.

How about we just increase MSSR to to least 5%? Margin calls will be bought before GS happens. If you continue to 100% protect the debt holders GS events will happen all the time.

If you settle the under collateralized positions to smart coin owners that's just stealing from them and goes against DEX rules.

GS happens because of 1 thing:
1. debt positions don't adjust debt

It's that undercollateralization happens ..., not GS happens .... Whether to GS is what we're discussing, aka whether to change the rule.

Quote

To correct that DEX should:
1. Margin call their position with enough incentive for the position to be liquidated (MSSR), the margin call should be such that debt holder would want to adjust their debt or close it.

We didn't find the way so far, as you can see, changing MSSR didn't work.

You think they "should" do it, but they didn't do it. It means you are wrong, but not them.


Simply, collateralized debt means if you can't pay the debt, you lose the collateral, but nothing more.
When undercollateralization happens, the debt position holder is already prepared to lose the whole collateral.
It's not justice to ask debt position holders to put more funds into the collateral, although they could, they don't have to.

We're on blockchain. Thus "anonymity and unnacountability. If you take margin anywhere outside crypto your liability is unlimited. It is not limited to your deposit. The brokers have your details and can and will pursue you through the courts. In cryoto your liability is limited to your deposit." (credit to Anthony Garner in Telegram BitShares Community Group)

Quote
Shifting risk to the DEX, smart coin holders or anyone else is just not a good business practice.

Think it in another way:
It's the debt asset holders' responsibility to settle before undercollateralization.
The debt asset holders are responsible to keep value of collateral as high as possible, otherwise when they settle they can't get the full face value. It's simple, because settling for collateral is the only way to "redeem the value".

When you go into a position (borrow bitUSD or hold bitUSD) you bear some risks, although different risks for different parties. There is no such thing 100% safe. Current rule, aka GS, doesn't solve the issue.


Quote

But you are most likely a debt holder so you probably want others to pay for the risk you took and lost. When BTS goes up I don't see any debt holders creating GS funds, they just want to use other people's money to cover their risk. And that's the gist of it. The sad part is that by seeing only your way, you fail to notice that BTS continues to slide because of people's mistrust and bad practices.

96
General Discussion / Re: New BSIP:GS protection via core code
« on: July 19, 2019, 01:33:37 pm »

The word "settle" is used in too many places but means different things.


I was referring to "Force Settlement" and the idea that the first person that settles bad debt gets less BTS.
Current rule aka GS means everyone who settles bad debt gets less BTS.

97
General Discussion / Re: New BSIP:GS protection via core code
« on: July 19, 2019, 01:29:41 pm »
The market will run as your thought? en,that's very interesting.

How about we just increase MSSR to to least 5%? Margin calls will be bought before GS happens. If you continue to 100% protect the debt holders GS events will happen all the time.

If you settle the under collateralized positions to smart coin owners that's just stealing from them and goes against DEX rules.

GS happens because of 1 thing:
1. debt positions don't adjust debt

To correct that DEX should:
1. Margin call their position with enough incentive for the position to be liquidated (MSSR), the margin call should be such that debt holder would want to adjust their debt or close it.

Shifting risk to the DEX, smart coin holders or anyone else is just not a good business practice.

But you are most likely a debt holder so you probably want others to pay for the risk you took and lost. When BTS goes up I don't see any debt holders creating GS funds, they just want to use other people's money to cover their risk. And that's the gist of it. The sad part is that by seeing only your way, you fail to notice that BTS continues to slide because of people's mistrust and bad practices.
Too many wrong assumptions in your comment.

I'd say please understand the situation before starting to argue on something.

98
General Discussion / Re: New BSIP:GS protection via core code
« on: July 19, 2019, 01:21:02 pm »
How about we just increase MSSR to to least 5%? Margin calls will be bought before GS happens. If you continue to 100% protect the debt holders GS events will happen all the time.
Last time bitUSD MSSR is 10%, GSed.
This time bitUSD MSSR is 2%, GS-protected.

This means "MSSR" is irrelevant to whether undercollateralization will happen.

Quote
If you settle the under collateralized positions to smart coin owners that's just stealing from them and goes against DEX rules.

The word "settle" is used in too many places but means different things.

Perhaps we need to find a better word.

Force settle - bitUSD holders will pay bitUSD to debt position holders or the GS pool and get BTS
Globally settle - all debt positions will be closed and a pool will be formed, nothing changes to bitUSD holders
Individual settle - undercollateralized debt positions ( whose CR < a special threshold) will be closed and the collateral will be put into a pool, nothing changes to bitUSD holders

What did you mean when saying the one word "settle"?

And what's "against DEX rules" in your sentense?
IMHO, rules can be changed if BTS token holders agree to change via stake-based voting, that's why we have BSIPs. That's why we're discussing how to change.

99
Somebody maybe knows why the volume and price of BTS of BitShares Asset Exchange have been excluded on CMC ?
https://blog.coinmarketcap.com/2019/05/01/happy-6th-birthday-data-alliance-block-explorers-and-more/

"Data Accountability & Transparency Alliance (DATA)" section.

In short, CMC asked every exchange to provide something to them, but we didn't do it.

100
General Discussion / Re: New BSIP:GS protection via core code
« on: July 19, 2019, 12:23:47 pm »
Why have many threads to discuss the same thing?

https://github.com/bitshares/bsips/issues/179#issuecomment-512175417

IMHO @bitcrab and @sschiessl were essentially saying the same thing, which is the 2nd option as I described in the BSIP issue: simple GS protection.
* allow undercollateralization
* no globally settlement
* no individual settlement, the system don't take over the undercollateralized debt positions
* when undercollateralization happens and someone tries to settle, fill the settlement request with the positions with lowest CR first, so first settler will get less

I'm for the 4th option now:
* allow undercollateralization
* no globally settlement
* has individual settlement, the system take over the undercollateralized debt positions (which would form a pool)
* when undercollateralization happens and someone tries to settle, fill the settlement request with the positions with lowest CR (can be the pool) first, so first settler will get less

I think the mechanism that I proposed in https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php?topic=27273 favors debt holders too much.
* allow undercollateralization
* no globally settlement
* has individual settlement, the system take over the undercollateralized debt positions (which would form a pool)
* when undercollateralization happens and someone tries to settle, fill the settlement request with the fully-collateralized positions with lowest CR (can be the pool) first, so settlers will always get the same unless the asset is globally undercollateralized.


Perhaps best if the core provide all the options, and let asset owners decide to choose which one.

101
Quote
Price dropped to 0.27x CNY yesterday. I don't know where is the bottom. Personally I tend to agree with @pc

Somewhere between now and end of july.You will have the confirmation when fed makes the USD interest lower.
Based on a longterm Dominance chart we hit bottom and after hitting bottom there comes a big spike for altcoins.

Why altcoins but not bitcoin?

103
I have to agree with bitcrab.
Am already working last couple of days and brain storming to propose a bit diffrent OMO fund as last time with strict rules ,full transparency and most important hopefully also buy support on CEX which in my opinion the last OMO fund was leaking making it easy to destroy inner disk buy support.
Timing is good (beginning july) for starting an OMO fund and increasing its power with rising prices and i doubt we will see soon again a price drop from 1.08CNY to 0.22CNY like the last OMO fund did.

Will post my ideas about the modified OMO funds tomorrow.
Price dropped to 0.27x CNY yesterday. I don't know where is the bottom. Personally I tend to agree with @pc

I think we should instead learn from the catastrophic results of the OMO fund, use the accumulated CNY to pay back the OMO debt and return the few remaining OMO funds to the reserve pool.
Use any fuiure CNY fee income to slowly buy back BTS (or maybe trade off-market against BTS, e. g. those escrowed workers that are paid in CNY) and return them to the reserve pool as well.

104
问题是充钱不够多
        不是充钱不够多的问题,是充钱不能盈利。当有投资盈利的预期之后,充钱不够多的问题自然解决了。巨蟹的3亿BTS和源水基金死亡的原因,就是喂价不能控制住。否则也不会爆仓完的。如果及时控制住喂价不跌,现在巨蟹的三亿BTS还是巨蟹的。当时也提出阻止喂价下跌,让BITCNY贬值的方案,巨蟹死脑袋,强调不能贬值,结果死的很难看!
因为充钱不够多,托不住盘,所以挡不住喂价下跌。

105
中文(Chinese) / Re: bitcny的需求量决定了bts的价格。
« on: July 17, 2019, 10:25:01 pm »

为什么要给持有bitcny的账户发利息?港元的持有者难道要享受港府的分红?这本身的方向就反了,应该给抵押者进行分红,鼓励长效抵押,增加长效锚定资产的供应量,使锚定资产在抵押物大幅贬值时,不至于使锚定资产的流动性大幅萎缩。
羊毛出在羊身上。分红的钱从哪里来?
发利息不能改变跌价会爆仓、爆仓会损失本金的现实。
给抵押者分红,不抵押的大户会抵押出来bitCNY转给小号,白拿利息。bitCNY流动性没有增加。
抵押出来做承兑的,已经在做了。
贴线的会贴的更欢。

Quote
bitcny正确的方向应当是多资产抵押,加入BTC,eth,eos等,使其流动性抗波动,而BTS其更大作用应发挥到其平台币的本质上来。


指望跨链抵押还不现实。

用 GDEX.BTC 抵押出 一个新的CNY或者USD是可以的,但巨蟹不愿搞。
其实谁都可以创建这样的资产,至少现在是不需要特别权限的。如果我创建出来,有人玩吗?
喂价要喂大饼价,估计也有些争议。

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