@JonnyB, it is a little unfair to claim he is changing anything. If at all, it is the committee that has the power to modify parameters. That includes more than just bitcrab.

Thats why i asked what changed on the OMO fund for bitcrab,jademont,ebit who broke community consensus.
You are leaving that question and it seems for part of the community like a free ticket.

0.Currently nothing because we are in a bear market and BTS price could go way lower.The market is already dried out at 10%.
It would create an additional risk when currently lowering to 5% that there will be a gap which can't be filled by external funds
anymore and could lead to a quicker dump of the BTS price.
It would also cause that the USD/CNY price will diverge even more seeing a USD price of arround 7.35 CNY which is also not anatural price .

1.

2.Only when the bear market ends.Else the commitee adds even more uncalculated risk to the community which could harm it.

3.Change from 2 weeks to 3 months i don't understand.Please explain this to me

4.If i understand it correctly during that time you let the MSSR  stay at 1.05 and will only reset it if there is enough opponents to it raising their concern ?
Turning arround the way it should be that it will only get changed if there will be enough for worter for it into it only won't get changed if there are not enough against speaker ?

as I know, 2 witnesses has switched to push 1.05 as MSSR, more witnesses are working for the change.

These witnesses have changed the MSSR based on community consensus ?


JUST AS INFO I'M GOING TO PUBLISH THE WITNESSES NAME WHICH CHANGED IT ALREADY TO 1.05 WITHOUT ANY CONSENSUS.

I hope the community will show you their love for it

I believe, once we have the custom operations BSIP approved and ready on chain, we might actually be able to technically hire someone for trading and pay them for doing so. (different topic)

any detail about the custom operations BSIP?

That said, I would propose the following procedure:
0. let's continue discussion about how much the MSSR should be lowered
1. let's define a metric that allows us to identify if that has had any effect
2. a proposal shall be created for committee to lower it with an expiration of at least 2 weeks!
3. 3 months after the proposal has executed, the MSSR should be re-evaluated in public discussion together with the metrics of 1.
4. 2 other proposal shall be created to the committee to either approve the lower MSSR or to reset it to 10.

actually MSSR is pushed by witnesses like feed price, it's not a committee controlled parameter, so witnesses can push the MSSR value which they think proper.

as I know, 2 witnesses has switched to push 1.05 as MSSR, more witnesses are working for the change.

python-bitshare库，
或者自己用cli-wallet,

首先，一直在bitCNY市场交易的用户都能注意到一个现象：bitCNY在BTS上涨趋势中是基本不会有溢价的，而在下跌趋势中基本都会溢价10%左右。

而且因为bitCNY可以通过MagicWallet提供的承兑服务与 Fiat CNY（法定货币）进行自由兑换（兑换汇率是动态的，市场化的），bitCNY 成为了 Fiat CNY（银行账户里的RMB）进出DEX的通道，而且兑换汇率基本与bitCNY的溢价联动：溢价10%左右的时候Deposit fee （充值费率）是10%左右，Withdrawal fee（提现费率）是-10%左右。

为什么下跌趋势中会长期溢价10%？不是5%、15%？一个很可能的原因是：因为 Maximum short squeeze ratio（MSSR）=1.1，被强制平仓的BTS会以10% off（低于市场价10%）的价格挂卖单卖出，所以当BTS的市场价格下跌时，买家可以预见到：一旦市场价格下跌形成趋势将会触发大量的抵押仓被强制关闭仓位，而拍卖的BTS比市场价便宜10%，那么，你会在市场价买入还是以10% off （便宜10%）的价格下订单并等着？这样一来买盘价格就会逐步后退，一开始会低于市场价（在中心化交易所的BTS价格）的1% off ，然后2%off再到5% off、10% off甚至12% off、15% off。而这时，在MagicWallet承兑平台，bitCNY的出入金手续费也跟着联动。

其次，将MSSR（Maximum short squeeze ratio）从1.1调整到1.05也许是一个可以尝试的试验。我们可以借此观察一段时间，看长期维持在10%左右的溢价（出入金手续费）会不会降低到5%左右。如果结果确实如此，那么MSSR将可以成为一种灵活应对市场趋势的可调参数工具：在下跌趋势中，可以调整为1.05、1.02、1.005、1.001甚至1.0，而在上升趋势中，如有必要（比如牛市市场疯狂的时候）则可以调整到1.1甚至1.2、1.3、甚至1.5以打击激进的高杠杆抵押，让系统杠杆率不至于太高。

另外，我建议由 committee-account 控制的参数 Force settlement offset of SmartCoins （强清补偿比例，目前bitCNY为5%）应该与MSSR一起作为组合工具：在MSSR降低后高杠杆抵押仓会变得更激进，从而进一步推升系统杠杆率。但，如果我们将Force settlement offset of SmartCoins （强清补偿比例）从5%或者2%调整为0%甚至-1%，我们就可以用自由市场的力量来打击杠杆率太高的抵押仓：鼓励想以市场价购买大量BTS的人用发起Force settlement的方式购买BTS——抵押率最低的Margin positions（债仓）将逐个被强制以市场价进行结算。

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Non-Chinese users can use Google Translate to understand this Chinese, for example, translation into English would be like this:

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First of all, users who have been trading in the bitCNY market can notice a phenomenon: bitCNY is basically not a premium in the BTS uptrend, and basically has a premium of about 10% in the downtrend.

And because bitCNY can be freely exchanged with Fiat CNY (legal currency) through the acceptance service provided by MagicWallet (the exchange rate is dynamic and market-oriented), bitCNY becomes the channel for Fiat CNY (RMB in bank account) to enter and exit DEX, and The exchange rate is basically linked to the premium of bitCNY: when the premium is about 10%, the Deposit fee is about 10%, and the Withdrawal fee is about -10%.

Why is there a long-term premium of 10% in the downtrend? Not 5%, 15%? A very likely reason is that because the Maximum short squeeze ratio (MSSR) = 1.1, the BTS that is forced to close the position will sell at 10% off (10% below the market price), so the market price of the BTS When falling, buyers can foresee that once the market price declines will trigger a large number of mortgages to be forced to close the position, and the auction BTS is 10% cheaper than the market price, then you will buy at the market price or 10 % off (10% cheaper) price to place an order and wait? As a result, the buying price will gradually retreat, starting at 1% off the market price (on the BTS price of the central exchange), then 2% off to 5% off, 10% off or even 12% off , 15% off. At this time, in the MagicWallet acceptance platform, bitCNY's deposit and withdrawal fees are also linked.

Second, adjusting the MSSR (Maximum short squeeze ratio) from 1.1 to 1.05 may be an experiment that can be tried. We can use this to observe for a period of time, and see if the premium (the deposit and withdrawal fee) that is maintained at around 10% for a long time will be reduced to about 5%. If this is the case, MSSR will be a tunable tool for responding flexibly to market trends: in the downtrend, it can be adjusted to 1.05, 1.02, 1.005, 1.001 or even 1.0, and in the uptrend, if necessary ( For example, when the bull market is crazy, it can be adjusted to 1.1 or even 1.2, 1.3, or even 1.5 to combat aggressive high-leverage mortgages, so that the system leverage is not too high.

In addition, I recommend that the Force settlement offset of SmartCoins, which is controlled by the commit-account, should be used as a combination tool with the MSSR: the high-leverage mortgage will become more aggressive after the MSSR is lowered. This further pushes up the system leverage. However, if we adjust the Force settlement offset of SmartCoins from 5% or 2% to 0% or even -1%, we can use the power of the free market to combat mortgages with too high leverage: Encourage Those who want to buy a large number of BTSs at market prices buy BTS by initiating Force settlement – ​​Margin positions with the lowest mortgage rate will be forced to settle at market prices one by one.

FFS bitcrab, I thought BitShares was supposed to be decentralised.
You adjust all the parameters to suit your whale positions.
you run the open market operations (a major conflict of interest.)
you got the committee to change force settlement on BitCNY to 5%(supposedly temporarily) when all other bitassets are 1%
now you want to change MSSR for your own ends.
lets just rename it Crabshares

@JonnyB, it is a little unfair to claim he is changing anything. If at all, it is the committee that has the power to modify parameters. That includes more than just bitcrab.
In the forums, we should keep a friendly environment to proposals and learn from discussions.
@bitcrab merely proposed a change to get things started with discussions.

Have you been around here when Dan Larimer proposed to have only 7 block producers? Same thing: A controversial proposal

All of these potential changes should be considered for all bit assets.  No reason for CYN to be different, this is more confusing for users.

I need to disagree here, bitCNY has much more liquidity than any of the other assets. Disconnecting its parameters from others makes sense IMHO.



With respect to the actual proposal, I think it is worth exeperimenting with the MSSR for bitCNY (only bitCNY!) given the increased volume there (we had over 100M BTS volume there yesterday).
We've known from the beginning that eventually some bitassets will be more prominent than others, and bitCNY certainly went through the charts compared to others. It should be allowed to have
a different set of parameters *AS LONG* as we let all market participants know about those changes before they get implemented.

To the change of MSSR, I believe it makes sense for CNY which has quite some liquidity near the spread. Lowering the MSSR might bring the premium of CNY down in case of BTS price decline.
However, it also reduces the potential profits for those that shortsell into the margin calls (because their profit is less then).

The other concern I have is the use of OMO in bitCNY. I am unclear how much of the liquidity is offered by OMO and how much comes from 3rd party traders. Certainly, yesterday, the 100M volume
has not been caused by OMO. The more I think about OMO the more I believe it should be replaced by a more something that is called "community hedge fund" and allows for actual market making
to act as a regular market participant with profits for the reserves.

I believe, once we have the custom operations BSIP approved and ready on chain, we might actually be able to technically hire someone for trading and pay them for doing so. (different topic)

To conclude the discussion about MSSR, I think we should continue discussion about lowering it. I would like to see its effect on bitCNY.
However, we should learn from the lessons of raising settlement offset of 5% and make clear that we all understand when an expiriment is a success or when it failed.

That said, I would propose the following procedure:
0. let's continue discussion about how much the MSSR should be lowered
1. let's define a metric that allows us to identify if that has had any effect
2. a proposal shall be created for committee to lower it with an expiration of at least 2 weeks!
3. 3 months after the proposal has executed, the MSSR should be re-evaluated in public discussion together with the metrics of 1.
4. 2 other proposal shall be created to the committee to either approve the lower MSSR or to reset it to 10.