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31
General Discussion / Re: New BSIP:GS protection via core code
« Last post by abit on July 19, 2019, 05:08:51 pm »
I'm for the 4th option now:
* allow undercollateralization
* no globally settlement
* has individual settlement, the system take over the undercollateralized debt positions (which would form a pool)
* when undercollateralization happens and someone tries to settle, fill the settlement request with the positions with lowest CR (can be the pool) first, so first settler will get less

so the pool as a debt position may have CR<1, when some tries to settle, how can the pool fulfill the request with CR<1? or the pool can only fulfill the request with CR>1?
The pool pays less BTS per bitUSD.

so when someone tries to settle,
the pool has a settle price of 0.05USD,
the margin call order price is 0.04USD,
the normal force settlement price is 0.043USD

which will fill the settle request? the pool?
Compare CR of the pool and the call order, whose CR is lower gets settled.

If CR of the order or pool > 1 / (1+force_settle_offset), fill settle order at normal force settlement price,
if CR of the order or pool < 1 / (1+force_settle_offset), fill settle order at CR.

so in my above example, obviously the pool has lower CR and will be settled with price 0.05USD.

maybe at the time the feed price is 0.042(not exact), but when user settle, they have to settle the pool with price 0.05, not the margin call order with price 0.04?

you tell the people the price is 0.042, but you only allow them to settle at 0.5...confusion...
feed_price = 0.04
settlement_price = 0.05

两个数,没毛病。

现在UI也是两个数:
feed_price = 0.3
settlement_price = 0.303

如果你硬是要因为 settlement_price = 0.05 而显示 feed_price = 0.05 才让人更困惑,明明外盘成交价在0.04
32
I put through a request to the "Data Accountability & Transparency Alliance (DATA) Partnership Application" and will follow up through BBF & Move regarding official engagement from these legal entities.
33
General Discussion / Re: New BSIP:GS protection via core code
« Last post by sschiessl on July 19, 2019, 03:59:23 pm »
Followed abit's style and added a 6th option to https://github.com/bitshares/bsips/issues/179#issuecomment-513269772
34
To Ronny and the OpenLedger ApS Team I say, "carpe diem." Quite an ambitious project to say the least. I've only read through the introductory PDF once and all the bits have yet to fully settle in. The implementation details are left out, so I look forward reading more details about the adaptation of the Graphene Toolkit for use as a private blockchain platform incorporating KYC requirements.
35
General Discussion / Re: New BSIP:GS protection via core code
« Last post by bitcrab on July 19, 2019, 02:54:00 pm »
I'm for the 4th option now:
* allow undercollateralization
* no globally settlement
* has individual settlement, the system take over the undercollateralized debt positions (which would form a pool)
* when undercollateralization happens and someone tries to settle, fill the settlement request with the positions with lowest CR (can be the pool) first, so first settler will get less

so the pool as a debt position may have CR<1, when some tries to settle, how can the pool fulfill the request with CR<1? or the pool can only fulfill the request with CR>1?
The pool pays less BTS per bitUSD.

so when someone tries to settle,
the pool has a settle price of 0.05USD,
the margin call order price is 0.04USD,
the normal force settlement price is 0.043USD

which will fill the settle request? the pool?
Compare CR of the pool and the call order, whose CR is lower gets settled.

If CR of the order or pool > 1 / (1+force_settle_offset), fill settle order at normal force settlement price,
if CR of the order or pool < 1 / (1+force_settle_offset), fill settle order at CR.

so in my above example, obviously the pool has lower CR and will be settled with price 0.05USD.

maybe at the time the feed price is 0.042(not exact), but when user settle, they have to settle the pool with price 0.05, not the margin call order with price 0.04?

you tell the people the price is 0.042, but you only allow them to settle at 0.5...confusion...
36
General Discussion / Re: New BSIP:GS protection via core code
« Last post by abit on July 19, 2019, 02:37:39 pm »
I'm for the 4th option now:
* allow undercollateralization
* no globally settlement
* has individual settlement, the system take over the undercollateralized debt positions (which would form a pool)
* when undercollateralization happens and someone tries to settle, fill the settlement request with the positions with lowest CR (can be the pool) first, so first settler will get less

so the pool as a debt position may have CR<1, when some tries to settle, how can the pool fulfill the request with CR<1? or the pool can only fulfill the request with CR>1?
The pool pays less BTS per bitUSD.

so when someone tries to settle,
the pool has a settle price of 0.05USD,
the margin call order price is 0.04USD,
the normal force settlement price is 0.043USD

which will fill the settle request? the pool?
Compare CR of the pool and the call order, whose CR is lower gets settled.

If CR of the order or pool > 1 / (1+force_settle_offset), fill settle order at normal force settlement price,
if CR of the order or pool < 1 / (1+force_settle_offset), fill settle order at CR.
37
General Discussion / Re: New BSIP:GS protection via core code
« Last post by abit on July 19, 2019, 02:35:18 pm »

The word "settle" is used in too many places but means different things.


I was referring to "Force Settlement" and the idea that the first person that settles bad debt gets less BTS.
Current rule aka GS means everyone who settles bad debt gets less BTS.

Yes, and that's bad business. And how about if we introduce a 24hr debt settlement where the debt holder gets a chance to close his debt before GS?
Before discussing your idea, how about you think about the 4 options I described?
It's better if you can explain what are the pros and cons first then ask others.

In your words you mentioned "debt holders", I guess you mean "debt position holders"?
When the debt positions turned into margin calls, the debt position holders are already willing to close their positions. It's that nobody buys into the margin calls caused the final undercollateralization. It's the debt asset holders' fault.

When it's already undercollateralized, what's the use of the 24 hours? Assume some debt asset holders will settle, what's the fair price? where to get the collateral to pay them? You still need to face the fact: whether first settler will get less.
I am not here to argue your points. I simply state my thoughts. If we were to increase MCR and MSSR (tools we already have) we might be able to avoid GS or "GS protection". That's my point. You think otherwise and that's ok, we are all entitled to our opinions.
Increasing MCR may probably reduce chance of undercollateralization, however, it may probably lead to the opposite as well.

With increased MCR, less bitUSD can be produced with same amount of BTS as collateral. Higher MSSR means debt position holders will lose more when being margin called, it means higher risks for debt pisition holders. So it will lead to lower bitUSD supply, poorer liquidity, and likely higher premium.

If we want to grow, we need to bear some risks.

Take bitEUR as an example. Its overall collateral ratio is very "healthy", but it has too little supply.
38
General Discussion / Re: New BSIP:GS protection via core code
« Last post by bitcrab on July 19, 2019, 02:30:48 pm »
I'm for the 4th option now:
* allow undercollateralization
* no globally settlement
* has individual settlement, the system take over the undercollateralized debt positions (which would form a pool)
* when undercollateralization happens and someone tries to settle, fill the settlement request with the positions with lowest CR (can be the pool) first, so first settler will get less

so the pool as a debt position may have CR<1, when some tries to settle, how can the pool fulfill the request with CR<1? or the pool can only fulfill the request with CR>1?
The pool pays less BTS per bitUSD.

so when someone tries to settle,
the pool has a settle price of 0.05USD,
the margin call order price is 0.04USD,
the normal force settlement price is 0.043USD

which will fill the settle request? the pool?
39
General Discussion / Re: New BSIP:GS protection via core code
« Last post by abit on July 19, 2019, 02:20:00 pm »
I'm for the 4th option now:
* allow undercollateralization
* no globally settlement
* has individual settlement, the system take over the undercollateralized debt positions (which would form a pool)
* when undercollateralization happens and someone tries to settle, fill the settlement request with the positions with lowest CR (can be the pool) first, so first settler will get less

so the pool as a debt position may have CR<1, when some tries to settle, how can the pool fulfill the request with CR<1? or the pool can only fulfill the request with CR>1?
The pool pays less BTS per bitUSD.
40
General Discussion / Re: New BSIP:GS protection via core code
« Last post by sahkan on July 19, 2019, 02:14:47 pm »

The word "settle" is used in too many places but means different things.


I was referring to "Force Settlement" and the idea that the first person that settles bad debt gets less BTS.
Current rule aka GS means everyone who settles bad debt gets less BTS.

Yes, and that's bad business. And how about if we introduce a 24hr debt settlement where the debt holder gets a chance to close his debt before GS?
Before discussing your idea, how about you think about the 4 options I described?
It's better if you can explain what are the pros and cons first then ask others.

In your words you mentioned "debt holders", I guess you mean "debt position holders"?
When the debt positions turned into margin calls, the debt position holders are already willing to close their positions. It's that nobody buys into the margin calls caused the final undercollateralization. It's the debt asset holders' fault.

When it's already undercollateralized, what's the use of the 24 hours? Assume some debt asset holders will settle, what's the fair price? where to get the collateral to pay them? You still need to face the fact: whether first settler will get less.
I am not here to argue your points. I simply state my thoughts. If we were to increase MCR and MSSR (tools we already have) we might be able to avoid GS or "GS protection". That's my point. You think otherwise and that's ok, we are all entitled to our opinions.
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