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41
Stakeholder Proposals / Re: [Witness proposal] btspp-witness(双语)
« Last post by btspp on August 16, 2018, 03:32:51 pm »
Thanks.
Voted for testnet witness.
Will vote for mainnet witness once you've proven yourselves.
Thank you. Please vote for us. Our mainnet is running the patchd branch.
42
Stakeholder Proposals / Re: [Witness proposal] btspp-witness(双语)
« Last post by btspp on August 16, 2018, 03:31:21 pm »
Please keep it English (if you want the non-chinese community to be involved)

For the future posts, yes please.
Thank you. Please vote for us.
43
Stakeholder Proposals / Re: [Witness proposal] btspp-witness(双语)
« Last post by btspp on August 16, 2018, 03:30:10 pm »
Hello everyone.
Running the test witness for 2 weeks, our server has been running steadily, and we have lost 0 block. We also tested the hot-swap feature on the backup server. Our feeding program is also working fine.

Our website is online. Website: http://www.btsplusplus.com/

Please vote for us: Witness: btspp-witness

We will work hard to do better. Thanks.
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MSSR is an important parameter here, it determine the gap between margin call price and the margin call order sell price, and will impact the behavior of different roles.

the higher the MSSR, the bigger the gap, the easier the margin call order will be eaten, but at the same time, the higher profit of shorting and the bigger the shorting incentive.

the lower the MSSR, the smaller the gap, more difficult the margin call order will be eaten, however at the same time, the lower the profit of shorting and the smaller the shorting incentive.

I'm glad to see that we agree about the mechanisms.

margin call is not bad or good, it will always happen, no use to blame bitCNY shorters who prefer being margin called, they have their risk and they provide liquidity.

I agree that the margin call as such is neither good nor bad. It is, however, an indication of a bad (read: dangerous) situation, i. e. short positions without sufficient collateral, which increases the likelyhood of a black swan.

The health of the system depends on shorters providing sufficient collateral. In bitCNY, shorters don't do that. They prefer being margin called. They even deliberately try to keep the collateral as low as possible, perhaps because only the least collateralized positions can profit from the 5% settlement offset.

IMO this is an indication of a very unhealthy situation. The settlement offset is an incentive for shorters to keep their collateral as low as possible, and the current MSSR isn't sufficient incentive for providing enough collateral. Your suggestion increases the likelyhood of a black swan, as you correctly pointed out above.
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中文(Chinese) / Re: 喂价模式不改,比特股永远走不出自己的价值
« Last post by gghi on August 16, 2018, 02:43:58 pm »
希望理事会和社区的粉丝们积极探讨,让bts早日摆脱这种依附外盘的尴尬境地,喂价之殇,磨灭了价值,伤不起了。

是的,没有足够好的改进的话,SPRING这样的基金乃至公市基金可能都是给空头准备的蛋糕。

       喂价改革已经迫在眉睫了,喂价没有必要直接采用外盘交易所的价格。喂价应该反映出bitcny的需求状况。
46
锚定不成功主要表现为bitCNY的短缺和过剩,其实感觉跟这些参数关系不大,原因在于bitCNY的市场需求和BTS价格没有直接的决定关系,需求无法有效传导给供应。

BSIP38等改动意义很大,可以很有效地降低出现黑天鹅的风险,但对于调节bitCNY供给来说,个人认为还是要靠公开市场操作这样的方式。

这两个参数虽然是BM拍脑袋得出,但个人觉得还算比较合理,不象当初40BTS的转账费用,以及0清算补偿那样明显不合理。

如果改怎么改呢?比如现在的价格下,把1.75改为1.5?虽然增加了供应量,但也增大了黑天鹅的风险吧?不一定是个好主意。

       巨蟹的认识很清楚,锚定偏差很大的确不是这些参数决定的。主要还是bitcny的市场需求和bts 的价格之间脱节了。应该是bitcny需求大,那么喂价随之升高才对。bitcny过剩那么喂价降低才合理。应该随着bitcny 的需求动态调整喂价的价格才是根本解决办法。bitcny的市场需求目前从鼓鼓的充值费看的比较清楚,所以鼓鼓给我们提供了bitcny的供求状况。那么我们应该参照鼓鼓的充值费率来动态调整喂价,是时候让喂价掌握在内盘系统手里了,不应该伸长脖子被外盘割了。

        靠巨蟹以及资金救市其实不是好办法,应该从机制上改变。只要让bitcny的需求和喂价之间联动,那么爆仓惩罚下调为20%,或者更高都行,做到无论牛熊锚定都很稳定。这样BTS就成功了。我的建议是只要鼓鼓充值费率为正值,那么就不断的抬高喂价,动态调整直到充值费为0而无法拉高为止。

        目前的问题应该是不合理的市场定价,从而导致了”喂价“不能很好的与bitcny需求联动。所以现在急需调整喂价,让喂价很好的反映出bitcny的需求。也就是根据bitcny的需求动态调整喂价,那么这些问题就迎刃而解了。智能货币bitcny的锚定人民币必将会更加精确,波动范围一定会很小很小。
但是之前不是谁说充值手续费往往落后于市场实时价格的反馈吗?如果手续费的滞后于市场,那bitcny的需求如何实时能反馈出来?


    bitcny的需求通过鼓鼓充值费率可以实时反映出来的,这是最直接的市场。
47
中文(Chinese) / Re: 喂价模式不改,比特股永远走不出自己的价值
« Last post by gghi on August 16, 2018, 02:32:46 pm »
哪个高用哪个不行的。

如果内盘BTS价高(相对于bitCNY来说),等于是 bitCNY 贬值,能凭空多借出来钱,没人给你提现的。

我觉得abit这么说可能没考虑到加充值费率,加上充值费率就没这个问题。

总之,某些暂时性的喂价过低会造成灾难,而暂时性的喂价过高没太大副作用,两害相权取其轻,我觉得内外盘比较法是个不错的主意。

target CR 是否强制无所谓,大债仓肯定会第一时间采用的。除非被割肉还感觉不到疼。

外盘来源喂价还有很多其他问题,比如经常是BTC->USDT->CNY这样一个长链条转换形成价格,容易失真,其中的美元汇率经常来自官方数据,与真实的市场汇率常常有差距。

CNY喂价就应该是回答以什么样的价格可以用人民币买卖BTS,内盘bitCNY价格加上充值费率是最直接的答案,加上外盘价格一起取其高就更可靠。
我发展下巨蟹的理论,CNY喂价应该是回答bitcny的供求状况的,需求旺盛喂价就涨涨涨,需求不足喂价就降。根据bitcny的需求动态调整bts的价格,即动态调整"喂价”。目前的问题就是bitcny的需求和BTS的价格(喂价)之间产生了矛盾。因为目前我们的喂价是从交易所采集来直接“喂”的,而应该采集之后修正一下。
48
Stakeholder Proposals / BSIP 40: Custom active permissions **discussion**
« Last post by sschiessl on August 16, 2018, 02:27:03 pm »
See the full BSIP here:

https://github.com/bitshares/bsips/blob/master/bsip-0040.md

Abstract

Strengthening user security is one of the main factors to elevate BitShares. In light of recent hacking and phishing attempts this becomes even more important. The need for a more sophisticated account security preceeded the idea for a finer-grained control of account permissions. We propose to add an additional authority to the account, called Custom Active (Permission). The permission contains a list of operationid-to-authority mappings that each grant access to the respective operation as if it were the active permission of the account. Additionally, the arguments of said operation can be restricted.
49
MSSR has one specific purpose: to incentivize shorters to avoid being margin called (or rather to punish them if they are). Margin calls are bad for the health of our smartcoins and should be avoided. Shorters are expected to actively manage their positions so they are *not* margin called.

It is clear, IMO, that bitCNY shorters are doing a very bad job here. As can be seen here (https://wallet.bitshares.org/#/asset/CNY ), most shorters make use of the recently introduced target_collateral_ratio to keep their collateral at the bare minimum. Obviously, they *prefer* being margin called. At the same time, they are *rewarded* from the settlement offset of 5% everytime someone settles a long position!

The logical conclusion is that the MSSR must be increased so its original purpose is fulfilled.


*Once again*, while BTS is in a downtrend, certain people come up with creative ideas to protect their own interests. So tired of this.

margin call is not bad or good, it will always happen, no use to blame bitCNY shorters who prefer being margin called, they have their risk and they provide liquidity.

in current condition it's clear one should not do force settlement, to just buy is obviously cheaper.

from the perspective of the whole system, the rules need to guarantee the risk being released in time and the BTS longers being encouraged enough.

Yes, while BTS is in a downtrend, I always think a lot on how to protect the interests of BTS longers, I feel this is  a BTS committee members' responsibility.
50
锚定不成功主要表现为bitCNY的短缺和过剩,其实感觉跟这些参数关系不大,原因在于bitCNY的市场需求和BTS价格没有直接的决定关系,需求无法有效传导给供应。

BSIP38等改动意义很大,可以很有效地降低出现黑天鹅的风险,但对于调节bitCNY供给来说,个人认为还是要靠公开市场操作这样的方式。

这两个参数虽然是BM拍脑袋得出,但个人觉得还算比较合理,不象当初40BTS的转账费用,以及0清算补偿那样明显不合理。

如果改怎么改呢?比如现在的价格下,把1.75改为1.5?虽然增加了供应量,但也增大了黑天鹅的风险吧?不一定是个好主意。

       巨蟹的认识很清楚,锚定偏差很大的确不是这些参数决定的。主要还是bitcny的市场需求和bts 的价格之间脱节了。应该是bitcny需求大,那么喂价随之升高才对。bitcny过剩那么喂价降低才合理。应该随着bitcny 的需求动态调整喂价的价格才是根本解决办法。bitcny的市场需求目前从鼓鼓的充值费看的比较清楚,所以鼓鼓给我们提供了bitcny的供求状况。那么我们应该参照鼓鼓的充值费率来动态调整喂价,是时候让喂价掌握在内盘系统手里了,不应该伸长脖子被外盘割了。

        靠巨蟹以及资金救市其实不是好办法,应该从机制上改变。只要让bitcny的需求和喂价之间联动,那么爆仓惩罚下调为20%,或者更高都行,做到无论牛熊锚定都很稳定。这样BTS就成功了。我的建议是只要鼓鼓充值费率为正值,那么就不断的抬高喂价,动态调整直到充值费为0而无法拉高为止。

        目前的问题应该是不合理的市场定价,从而导致了”喂价“不能很好的与bitcny需求联动。所以现在急需调整喂价,让喂价很好的反映出bitcny的需求。也就是根据bitcny的需求动态调整喂价,那么这些问题就迎刃而解了。智能货币bitcny的锚定人民币必将会更加精确,波动范围一定会很小很小。
但是之前不是谁说充值手续费往往落后于市场实时价格的反馈吗?如果手续费的滞后于市场,那bitcny的需求如何实时能反馈出来?
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