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81
Somebody maybe knows why the volume and price of BTS of BitShares Asset Exchange have been excluded on CMC ?
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General Discussion / Re: New BSIP:GS protection via core code
« Last post by bitcrab on July 19, 2019, 10:45:07 am »
then bitUSD holders begin to exploit debt position owners with force settlement.

even worse, the last bitUSD balance cannot do force settlement, it can only fill the settlement orders with higher price.

I don't understand how that exploit works. If I force settle while there are positions with CR < 1 are present, I settle for BTS that are worth less then 1 USD, accepting the undercollaterization. This also closes out the bad margin position, but that is of course the risk of running a undercollaterized position (it's a loss-loss scenario so I expect this is not an exploit for you). In my scenario force settlement still eats the margin position with least CR. There will of course be margin call orders with a price different than the feed price, but that does not force the traders to deviate from the peg. Can you please make another example please?

you cannot force settle debt positions with CR<1 with market price, as that will lead to a debt position with pure debt and 0 collateral, which is not allowed.

you can only force settle debt position with CR<1 with price higher than market price, bitUSD holders obviously will select to force settle debt positions with CR>=1, as it is cheaper.

while bad debt appear, bitUSD is easily be devaluated, as it is not backed by sufficient BTS.

you use devaluated bitUSD(insufficient collateral) to force settle a debt position in market price, is it fair?
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General Discussion / Re: New BSIP:GS protection via core code
« Last post by sschiessl on July 19, 2019, 10:16:14 am »
then bitUSD holders begin to exploit debt position owners with force settlement.

even worse, the last bitUSD balance cannot do force settlement, it can only fill the settlement orders with higher price.

I don't understand how that exploit works. If I force settle while there are positions with CR < 1 are present, I settle for BTS that are worth less then 1 USD, accepting the undercollaterization. This also closes out the bad margin position, but that is of course the risk of running a undercollaterized position (it's a loss-loss scenario so I expect this is not an exploit for you). In my scenario force settlement still eats the margin position with least CR. There will of course be margin call orders with a price different than the feed price, but that does not force the traders to deviate from the peg. Can you please make another example please?
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General Discussion / Re: New BSIP:GS protection via core code
« Last post by bitcrab on July 19, 2019, 09:57:31 am »
this is similar to the individual settlement solution with disabling force settlement as described above, and has similar disadvantages.
Those debt in settlement pool are <1 MCR and thus is unfair for BitAsset who use force settlement, so force settle does not apply to those in settlement pool.
No need to disable force settlement for those in low CR list with MCR =>1.


disadvantage of "individual settlement with force settlement" has also been discussed above.
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General Discussion / Re: New BSIP:GS protection via core code
« Last post by bitcrab on July 19, 2019, 09:55:13 am »

Margin call price would need to be adjusted. If CR is less than MSSR, adjust the price such that the full debt would be bought (which is essentially their global settlement price). If CR is higher, use existing rules. Force settlement would still eat the least collaterized positions first, in that sense the punishment goes to holders that decide to force settle instead of sell on the market. Incentivization would be possible by adjusting the force settlement price if it settle a margin position with CR < MCR (the force settlement offset could then be MSSR (punishment for margin position holder)).

For the bitasset holders it is similar as compared to being in global settlement state.

With "prevent global settlement flag":
 - bitasset holder can sell into the margin calls which is equal or even better compared to global settlement price instead of force settling
 - bitasset holder can force settle, accepting the undercollaterization
 - margin position holder can recollaterize
 - new margin positions can be created
 - margin positions with CR < 1 receive a bit of protection that is shifted to bitasset holders iff they are using force settlement, on the other hand force settling is incentivized if applied to a margin position that is currently being called

what you describe is very similar to "individual settlement with force settlement", the disadvantage has been already discussed above.
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General Discussion / Re: New BSIP:GS protection via core code
« Last post by Bangzi on July 19, 2019, 09:14:15 am »
this is similar to the individual settlement solution with disabling force settlement as described above, and has similar disadvantages.
Those debt in settlement pool are <1 MCR and thus is unfair for BitAsset who use force settlement, so force settle does not apply to those in settlement pool.
No need to disable force settlement for those in low CR list with MCR =>1.


another disadvantage is that this is so complicated for common users to understand, and also cost big development efforts.
Honestly, this is for advance players eg. alt, clockwork etc with some capital because huge reward come with huge risk.
The core team have more than enough $$$ on hand.
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General Discussion / Re: New BSIP:GS protection via core code
« Last post by sschiessl on July 19, 2019, 09:09:52 am »
Let's assume we want to explicitly allow undercollaterization. In my opinion, a more suitable way would be to implement a bitasset parameter "prevent global settlement", which then can be turned on by committee, and leave the price feed as is. Then the undercollaterization is transparent.

What are your thoughts on that?

what does bad debt mean? which means the debt in the position cannot be fully paid by selling the collateral with margin call/force settlement referencing the market price.

then you choose to disable margin call and force settlement while bad debt appears? or you allow the existence of a debt position with pure debt and 0 BTS?

Margin call price would need to be adjusted. If CR is less than MSSR, adjust the price such that the full debt would be bought (which is essentially their global settlement price). If CR is higher, use existing rules. Force settlement would still eat the least collaterized positions first, in that sense the punishment goes to holders that decide to force settle instead of sell on the market. Incentivization would be possible by adjusting the force settlement price if it settle a margin position with CR < MCR (the force settlement offset could then be MSSR (punishment for margin position holder)).

For the bitasset holders it is similar as compared to being in global settlement state.

With "prevent global settlement flag":
 - bitasset holder can sell into the margin calls which is equal or even better compared to global settlement price instead of force settling
 - bitasset holder can force settle, accepting the undercollaterization
 - margin position holder can recollaterize
 - new margin positions can be created
 - margin positions with CR < 1 receive a bit of protection that is shifted to bitasset holders iff they are using force settlement, on the other hand force settling is incentivized if applied to a margin position that is currently being called
88
General Discussion / Re: New BSIP:GS protection via core code
« Last post by bitcrab on July 19, 2019, 08:41:19 am »
1.do not stop the borrowing feature.
Yes

2.ensure smartcoin holders to settle bad debt positions from lower CR to higher CR.
Even better, Smartcoin holders does not need to use their BitAssets to settle bad debt which mean number of BitCNY/USD will not reduced.

3. accept the possibility that the smartcoin will devalue, just try to minimize the hurting to the ecosystem.
Yes. No price manipulation required and under collateralized time will be shorter than GS protection due to huge incentive.

Please check this:
https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php?topic=27273.msg332494#msg332494

this is similar to the individual settlement solution with disabling force settlement as described above, and has similar disadvantages.

another disadvantage is that this is so complicated for common users to understand, and also cost big development efforts.
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General Discussion / Re: New BSIP:GS protection via core code
« Last post by Bangzi on July 19, 2019, 08:28:32 am »
1.do not stop the borrowing feature.
Yes

2.ensure smartcoin holders to settle bad debt positions from lower CR to higher CR.
Even better, Smartcoin holders does not need to use their BitAssets to settle bad debt which mean number of BitCNY/USD will not reduced.

3. accept the possibility that the smartcoin will devalue, just try to minimize the hurting to the ecosystem.
Yes. No price manipulation required and under collateralized time will be shorter than GS protection due to huge incentive.

Please check this:
https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php?topic=27273.msg332494#msg332494
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General Discussion / Re: New BSIP:GS protection via core code
« Last post by bitcrab on July 19, 2019, 07:36:44 am »
Let's assume we want to explicitly allow undercollaterization. In my opinion, a more suitable way would be to implement a bitasset parameter "prevent global settlement", which then can be turned on by committee, and leave the price feed as is. Then the undercollaterization is transparent.

What are your thoughts on that?

what does bad debt mean? which means the debt in the position cannot be fully paid by selling the collateral with margin call/force settlement referencing the market price.

then you choose to disable margin call and force settlement while bad debt appears? or you allow the existence of a debt position with pure debt and 0 BTS?

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