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Topics - binggo

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1
https://github.com/bitshares/bsips/issues/275

概要

-风险管理池
-抵押坏账
-稳定债券
-BSIP74
-BSIP62
-智能资产市场手续费
-智能资产管理账户

动机

BTS的智能抵押资产一直没有一个合适的机制来处理黑天鹅及抵押坏账。
BSIP18/BSIP71的缺乏逻辑而且极易摧毁智能抵押资产的信用。
bitbtc/bitgold/bitsilver已经在BSIP18之下很长时间了,看看那个死样子就一清二楚,BSIP71与BSIP18相比只是50步笑100步而已。
智能资产持有者在黑天鹅情况下只有一种选择对智能资产及BTS的生态来说非常不健康;
用这套机制来处理黑天鹅及抵押坏账可以给锚定资产持有者更多的选择。

Rational

智能资产有持续的收入可以处理抵押坏账,即使在极端情况下发行了债券,持续的收入也足以支撑债券的回收。

智能资产持有者在黑天鹅情况可以有三种选择:
1.从市场中购买bts;
2.购买债券;
3.忍受贬值;

不需要BSIP18/BSIP76/BSIP71/BSIP58


Specifications

RSKM:风险管理
风险管理池有风险管理资金。
风险管理资金来自于:
1.BSIP74;
2.BSIP62;
3.锚定资产市场手续费;

每个智能资产都有独立的风险管理池。

第一步: 风险管理池收纳抵押坏账(抵押率<1);

风险管理资金中的智能资产将自动平掉一部分仓位;
风险管理资金中的抵押资产将使风险管理池抵押率>1;

第二步:如果风险管理池抵押率<1;

智能资产管理账户将发行”稳定债券“到市场(稳定债券/智能资产)中以购买足够的智能资产用来将风险管理池抵押大于等于MCR;

如果风险管理池抵押率又一次小于1,继续发行”稳定债券“以购买足够的智能资产用来将风险管理池抵押大于等于MCR;

循环基本如上。

稳定债券/智能资产 市场是自由市场,任何人都可以交易。

如果“稳定债券”不能够购买到足够的智能资产,那说明智能资产持有者已经做出了决定,他们必须忍受贬值。

第三:当风险管理池开始处理抵押坏账时;

锚定资产市场手续费将不再进行分享;

BSIP74开始收取智能资产作为流动性罚金,因此BSIP74必须可以收取智能资产作为流动性罚金。

第四:来自于BSIP74/BSIP62的智能资产将会缓慢的逐步平掉风险管理池的仓位;

第五:当风险资金池的抵押率大于5,部分智能资产收入可以开始逐步回购“稳定债券”;

“稳定债券”的利率在发行“稳定债券”的时候由BTS持有者投票决定。

问题:利率模型、回购时间及操作。

第六:在回购完所有“稳定债券”及平掉所有仓位后;

恢复市场手续费分享;
恢复BSIP74收取抵押物作为流动性罚金;

资金的流动方向:BSIP74/BSIP62/智能资产手续费 →智能资产管理账户→风险管理池

Bts持有人投票决定多少资金流向风险管理池.



Summary for holders

风险管理池可能会锁定很多BTS,需要有一个资金流出方式,类似于现在的资金池方式。


See also

https://blog.bitmex.com/the-bitmex-insurance-fund/
https://blog.bitmex.com/bitmex-insurance-fund-your-questions-answered/
https://cdn.bytom.io/res/MOV-Stable-EN.pdf
https://www.bitmex.com/app/insuranceFund
https://www.binance.com/en/futures/funding-history/2



另外:

通缩并不是一个好的经济模型,希望通缩来实现价值增长是不过是一种非常低级的经济思维方式,黄金,BTC,ETH等等,数量全是通胀的。

存在的问题:

只要喂价同步与外部市场,在这种黑天鹅处理方式下,即使风险管理池的抵押率小于1,锚定资产可能也根本贬值不了...现实的市场已经例证了这一情况...

2
General Discussion / Design a "RSKM pool" to handle the bad debt
« on: May 27, 2020, 01:28:35 am »
https://github.com/bitshares/bsips/issues/275

Abstract

-RSKM pool
-Bad debt
-Stability bond
-BSIP74
-BSIP62
-Market fee of bitasset
-The Management account of bitasset

Motivation

The bitasset of BTS still didn't have a feasible mechanism to handle the black swan or bad debt.
BSIP18/BSIP71 lacks illogical and can break the credit of bitasset very easily.
We can check the bitbtc/bitgold/bitsilver which were all in the BSIP18.
The holders of biasset only have one choice to take care of their fund, this is very unhealthy to the ecology of bitasset and BTS.
So we need to design a more feasible mechanism to handle the black swan or bad debt, give more choices to the holders of bitasset.

Rational

The market of bitasset have many sustainable revenue to deal with the bad debt and can use the sustainable revenue to buy-back the bond in extreme cases.

The holder of bitasset have three choices to take care of their bitasset:
1.BUY bts in the market;
2.BUY bond;
3.Suffer the devalue;

NO BSIP18, NO BSIP76, NO BSIP71,NO BSIP58

Specifications

RSKM:Risk Management
RSKM pool will have RSKM fund in the RSKM pool.
The fund of RSKM pool will come from:
1.BSIP74;
2.BSIP62;
3.Market fee of bitasset;

Every bitassset have their separated RSKM pool.

First: The RSKM pool will handle the bad debt which collateral ratio < 1;

The bitasset fund in RSKM pool will close parts position automatically;
The bts token fund in RSKM pool will make the collateral ratio of RSKM pool > 1;

Second: If the collateral ratio of RSKM pool < 1;

The Management account of bitasset will issue the "Stability bond" to the market(Stability bond/bitasset) to buy enough bitasset to make the collateral ratio of RSKM pool >= MCR;

If the collateral ratio of RSKM pool < 1 again, issue the "Stability bond" second time(Stability bond/bitasset) to the market to buy enough bitasset to make the collateral ratio of RSKM pool >= MCR;

This is the cycle.

Stability bond/bitasset market is a free market, everyone can trade.

If "Stability bond" can't buy enough bitasset, so the holders of bitasset have made a decision, they must suffer the devalue.

Third: When the RSKM pool begin to handle the bad debt which collateral ratio < 1;

The market fee of bitasset will not have the referral reward;
BSIP74 will begin to charge the bitasset as the fees, so the BSIP74 must can charge the bitasset as the fees;

Fourth: The bitasset comes from market fee and BSIP74/BSIP62 will close the position slowly;

Fifth: When the position of RSKM pool > 5, then begin to buy back the "Stability bond";

The interest of "Stability bond" will be determined by the Management account of bitasset when begin issue the "Stability bond".

Problem: Interest Mode and buy-back time and order.

Sixth: After repurchased all the "Stability bond" and closed the position;

Recover the market fee referral reward;
Recover BSIP74 to charge the collateral as the fees;

Flow of Funds: BSIP74/BSIP62/Market fee of bitasset → Management account of bitasset → RSKM pool

The Management account of bitasset will manage how many funds inflow into the RSKM pool.

STABLECOIN MANAGE ACCOUNT


Summary for holders

Maybe this RSKM pool will lock a lot of bts.


See also

https://blog.bitmex.com/the-bitmex-insurance-fund/
https://blog.bitmex.com/bitmex-insurance-fund-your-questions-answered/
https://cdn.bytom.io/res/MOV-Stable-EN.pdf
https://www.bitmex.com/app/insuranceFund
https://www.binance.com/en/futures/funding-history/2

3
This is very dangerous for the fund in the committee account, these fund didn't belong to the committee, they belong to the community,  but these fund can be easily used by several committee members, we should get the lessons from the OMO and MM, they didn't follow the proposal and principle of the community, and no one came out to take the responsibility and loss.

For the sake of assurance, the fund in the committee account shouldn't be more than 10,000.0 bts, the extra fund should burn to the reserves pool.

Issue: how to deal with the bitasset in the committee account? there have a destruction proposal, but the committee didn't follow it.

What do you think? community members of BTS!


4
General Discussion / It's time to recover feed price fo bitcny!
« on: May 26, 2020, 12:32:23 pm »
It's time to recover feed price fo bitcny.

oh……

5
中文(Chinese) / 社区需要注意BSIP86的法律担责情况
« on: May 26, 2020, 12:05:34 am »
BSIP86:https://github.com/bitshares/bsips/issues/194

如果BTS只收取网络处理费用,打个比方来说也就是联通/电信的网络服务商角色,别人利用网络干什么业务,也没BTS啥事情;

但是如果BTS收网关资产的市场交易手续费,形同与参与网关或者诈骗资产运营,网络服务商的角色也发生变化,而是天猫滴滴的角色,国外的法律不清楚,起码国内电商法是明确有连带责任,而且BTS无法对收取市场交易手续费的这些资产(无论是合法还是非法)进行监督管理。

BTS也有法律提案团队,咨询一下没什么坏处。

而且对于网关来说,可以替代的区块链太多了,而对于bts来说,想要把服务迁过来的几无!!!

不要试图用BSIP86去挑战网关的底线,网关有选择的机会,而bts没有选择的机会!!!

BSIP86很明显没有搞清楚主动权到底在谁手里,倒逼现有网关离场,其它网关不再进场,慢慢就会一个死循环!


请理事会说明一下:如果出现了法律追责,谁来承担与负责处理这个法律问题?还是到时候理事会谁批准谁担责?

6
中文(Chinese) / Bytom 稳定币设计 多看多学
« on: March 25, 2020, 12:08:39 am »
这是比原链的稳定币设计:

MOV稳定金融体系

https://cdn.bytom.io/res/MOV-Stable-ZH.pdf

其它:

DAI: https://oasis.app/trade/market/WETH/DAI
USDE: https://www.pizzadex.io/?pair=usdt2usde
WUSD:https://sw91.net/whitepaper/whitepaper-zh.pdf

去中心化稳定币的货币政策与财政政策治理--A Framework for Decentralized Stablecoin Monetary Policy
https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php?topic=29662.0



不要天天蹲在井里观天,别人在井外被雨淋了还要嘲笑一下,没有能力去设计就去反抄一下,照抄总会吧?


我也是无奈,没有金融设计能力何必要天天的牵强附会?还一次一个认识的...

真是坐守钻石金山,穿金戴银吃蚂蚁!

7
BTS community need to notice:the witness of HIVE!They can fork the things as they wish,then building a small kingdom they can control.

The witness of HIVE have three active committee of BTS.

Congratulates.


1    gtg    166,648M    48.39%    564    41,830,578       3    $0.287    0%    0%    65,536    211    797    347,321    0.23.0
2    good-karma    164,215M    47.69%    3829    41,830,567       3    $0.283    0%    0%    65,536    284    797    347,321    0.23.0
3    roelandp    163,848M    47.58%    2045    41,830,562       3    $0.299    0%    0%    65,536    122    797    347,321    0.23.0
4    blocktrades    163,049M    47.35%    3571    41,830,580       3    $0.286    0%    0%    65,536    247    797    347,321    0.23.0
5    themarkymark    159,528M    46.33%    962    41,830,559       3    $0.270    0%    0%    65,536    189    797    347,321    0.23.0
6    anyx    157,186M    45.65%    1655    41,830,581       3    $0.277    0%    0%    65,536    368    797    347,321    0.23.0
7    steempress    156,815M    45.54%    316    41,830,570       3    $0.277    0%    0%    65,536    163    797    347,321    0.23.0
8    cervantes    155,337M    45.11%    1706    41,830,552       3    $0.189    0%    0%    65,536    403    797    347,321    0.23.0
9    ausbitbank    155,121M    45.05%    1567    41,830,565       3    $0.282    0%    0%    65,536    335    797    347,321    0.23.0
10    someguy123    154,342M    44.82%    2203    41,830,558       3    $0.282    0%    0%    65,536    291    797    347,321    0.23.0
11    drakos    152,105M    44.17%    840    41,830,576       3    $0.190    0%    0%    65,536    269    797    347,321    0.23.0
12    followbtcnews    147,604M    42.86%    1429    41,830,575       3    $0.303    0%    0%    65,536    256    797    347,321    0.23.0
13    lukestokes.mhth    147,430M    42.81%    896    41,830,573       3    $0.276    0%    0%    65,536    288    797    347,321    0.23.0
14    therealwolf    147,250M    42.76%    979    41,830,568       3    $0.211    0%    0%    65,536    68    797    347,321    0.23.0
15    aggroed    147,149M    42.73%    1519    41,830,556       3    $0.289    0%    0%    65,536    323    797    347,321    0.23.0
16    yabapmatt    144,138M    41.86%    1663    41,830,557       3    $0.270    0%    0%    65,536    399    797    347,321    0.23.0
17    thecryptodrive    143,426M    41.65%    1572    41,830,566       3    $0.289    0%    0%    65,536    297    797    347,321    0.23.0
18    steempeak    142,918M    41.50%    20    41,830,577       3    $0.263    0%    0%    65,536    187    797    347,321    0.23.0
19    abit    139,537M    40.52%    323    41,830,579       3    $0.185    -43%    0%    65,536    132    797    347,321    0.23.0
20    ocd-witness    126,737M    36.80%    1117    41,830,569       3    $0.186    0%    0%    65,536    322    797    347,321    0.23.0
21    emrebeyler    120,887M    35.10%    120    41,830,495       3    $0.293    0%    0%    65,536    126    797    347,321    0.23.0
22    netuoso    118,235M    34.33%    753    41,830,483       3    $0.217    0%    0%    65,536    938    797    347,321    0.23.0
23    arcange    114,997M    33.39%    267    41,830,574       3    $0.264    0%    0%    65,536    0    797    347,321    0.23.0
24    pharesim    113,693M    33.02%    2728    41,830,427       3    $0.296    4%    0%    65,536    938    797    347,321    0.23.0
25    curie    102,646M    29.81%    2268    41,830,342       3    $0.263    0%    0%    65,536    263    797    347,321    0.23.0
26    stoodkev    102,144M    29.66%    82    41,830,386       0.1    $0.229    0%    0%    65,536    0    797    347,321    0.23.0
27    timcliff    88,076M    25.58%    2232    41,830,549       3    $0.300    0%    0%    65,536    148    797    347,321    0.23.0
28    riverhead    81,760M    23.74%    3979    41,818,412       0.2    $0.298    0%    0%    65,536    937    797    347,321    0.22.1
29    liondani    71,864M    20.87%    1467    41,830,144       3    $0.193    0%    0%    65,536    938    797    347,321    0.23.0
30    actifit    69,968M    20.32%    43    41,830,240       3    $0.177    0%    0%    65,536    167    797    347,321    0.23.0
31    jesta    59,617M    17.31%    2871    41,297,372       3    $0.187    0%    0%    65,536    283    797    347,321    0.22.2
32    pfunk    50,123M    14.56%    1390    41,830,052       3    $0.287    0%    0%    65,536    280    797    347,321    0.23.0
33    smooth.witness    38,224M    11.10%    2600    41,830,383       3    $0.222    0%    0%    65,536    253    797    347,321    0.23.0
34    nextgencrypto    34,250M    9.95%    1308    41,829,962       3    $0.270    -10%    1%    65,536    938    797    347,321    0.23.0
35    bhuz    33,718M    9.79%    335    41,830,316       3    $0.810    0%    0%    65,536    938    797    347,321    0.23.0
36    guiltyparties    27,234M    7.91%    165    41,830,006       3    $0.288    -58%    0%    65,536    0    10,000    3,307,750    0.23.0
37    quochuy    25,040M    7.27%    9    41,829,563       3    $0.281    0%    0%    65,536    0    797    347,321    0.23.0
38    mahdiyari    22,804M    6.62%    12    41,830,513       3    $0.270    0%    0%    65,536    0    797    347,321    0.23.0

8
整个BTS社区都需要警惕名单里的见证人,然后与BTS社区的见证人进行交叉比对,肆意性的分叉与黑名单并不遥远,当意见不合与实力有差距时,他们便可以进行分叉,然后建立一个自己能够控制与说了算的小王国,嗯,这个做法...虽然官面上说得头头是道。

尤其注意,里面至少有三位BTS在任理事!!!

还有一位blocktrades持有社区500万个bts,在被追问是否可以归还社区资产时,似乎blocktrades也说过,来分叉搞我啊 ;D

我的一个看法时:这些以实际行动与技术支持参与分叉的见证人或者大户群体,既然认为HIVE具有与原版steem等同的价值,那么起码要以身作则,把自己手里的steem代币全部烧掉销毁以明其志,以实际行动进行割席,不然这个分叉就充满了浓浓的铜臭味道。


我们这些韭菜自然是各种happy了,毕竟是有糖果吃,另一边还有销毁,吃瓜子看两边各种作。

祝好。



1    gtg    166,648M    48.39%    564    41,830,578       3    $0.287    0%    0%    65,536    211    797    347,321    0.23.0
2    good-karma    164,215M    47.69%    3829    41,830,567       3    $0.283    0%    0%    65,536    284    797    347,321    0.23.0
3    roelandp    163,848M    47.58%    2045    41,830,562       3    $0.299    0%    0%    65,536    122    797    347,321    0.23.0
4    blocktrades    163,049M    47.35%    3571    41,830,580       3    $0.286    0%    0%    65,536    247    797    347,321    0.23.0
5    themarkymark    159,528M    46.33%    962    41,830,559       3    $0.270    0%    0%    65,536    189    797    347,321    0.23.0
6    anyx    157,186M    45.65%    1655    41,830,581       3    $0.277    0%    0%    65,536    368    797    347,321    0.23.0
7    steempress    156,815M    45.54%    316    41,830,570       3    $0.277    0%    0%    65,536    163    797    347,321    0.23.0
8    cervantes    155,337M    45.11%    1706    41,830,552       3    $0.189    0%    0%    65,536    403    797    347,321    0.23.0
9    ausbitbank    155,121M    45.05%    1567    41,830,565       3    $0.282    0%    0%    65,536    335    797    347,321    0.23.0
10    someguy123    154,342M    44.82%    2203    41,830,558       3    $0.282    0%    0%    65,536    291    797    347,321    0.23.0
11    drakos    152,105M    44.17%    840    41,830,576       3    $0.190    0%    0%    65,536    269    797    347,321    0.23.0
12    followbtcnews    147,604M    42.86%    1429    41,830,575       3    $0.303    0%    0%    65,536    256    797    347,321    0.23.0
13    lukestokes.mhth    147,430M    42.81%    896    41,830,573       3    $0.276    0%    0%    65,536    288    797    347,321    0.23.0
14    therealwolf    147,250M    42.76%    979    41,830,568       3    $0.211    0%    0%    65,536    68    797    347,321    0.23.0
15    aggroed    147,149M    42.73%    1519    41,830,556       3    $0.289    0%    0%    65,536    323    797    347,321    0.23.0
16    yabapmatt    144,138M    41.86%    1663    41,830,557       3    $0.270    0%    0%    65,536    399    797    347,321    0.23.0
17    thecryptodrive    143,426M    41.65%    1572    41,830,566       3    $0.289    0%    0%    65,536    297    797    347,321    0.23.0
18    steempeak    142,918M    41.50%    20    41,830,577       3    $0.263    0%    0%    65,536    187    797    347,321    0.23.0
19    abit    139,537M    40.52%    323    41,830,579       3    $0.185    -43%    0%    65,536    132    797    347,321    0.23.0
20    ocd-witness    126,737M    36.80%    1117    41,830,569       3    $0.186    0%    0%    65,536    322    797    347,321    0.23.0
21    emrebeyler    120,887M    35.10%    120    41,830,495       3    $0.293    0%    0%    65,536    126    797    347,321    0.23.0
22    netuoso    118,235M    34.33%    753    41,830,483       3    $0.217    0%    0%    65,536    938    797    347,321    0.23.0
23    arcange    114,997M    33.39%    267    41,830,574       3    $0.264    0%    0%    65,536    0    797    347,321    0.23.0
24    pharesim    113,693M    33.02%    2728    41,830,427       3    $0.296    4%    0%    65,536    938    797    347,321    0.23.0
25    curie    102,646M    29.81%    2268    41,830,342       3    $0.263    0%    0%    65,536    263    797    347,321    0.23.0
26    stoodkev    102,144M    29.66%    82    41,830,386       0.1    $0.229    0%    0%    65,536    0    797    347,321    0.23.0
27    timcliff    88,076M    25.58%    2232    41,830,549       3    $0.300    0%    0%    65,536    148    797    347,321    0.23.0
28    riverhead    81,760M    23.74%    3979    41,818,412       0.2    $0.298    0%    0%    65,536    937    797    347,321    0.22.1
29    liondani    71,864M    20.87%    1467    41,830,144       3    $0.193    0%    0%    65,536    938    797    347,321    0.23.0
30    actifit    69,968M    20.32%    43    41,830,240       3    $0.177    0%    0%    65,536    167    797    347,321    0.23.0
31    jesta    59,617M    17.31%    2871    41,297,372       3    $0.187    0%    0%    65,536    283    797    347,321    0.22.2
32    pfunk    50,123M    14.56%    1390    41,830,052       3    $0.287    0%    0%    65,536    280    797    347,321    0.23.0
33    smooth.witness    38,224M    11.10%    2600    41,830,383       3    $0.222    0%    0%    65,536    253    797    347,321    0.23.0
34    nextgencrypto    34,250M    9.95%    1308    41,829,962       3    $0.270    -10%    1%    65,536    938    797    347,321    0.23.0
35    bhuz    33,718M    9.79%    335    41,830,316       3    $0.810    0%    0%    65,536    938    797    347,321    0.23.0
36    guiltyparties    27,234M    7.91%    165    41,830,006       3    $0.288    -58%    0%    65,536    0    10,000    3,307,750    0.23.0
37    quochuy    25,040M    7.27%    9    41,829,563       3    $0.281    0%    0%    65,536    0    797    347,321    0.23.0
38    mahdiyari    22,804M    6.62%    12    41,830,513       3    $0.270    0%    0%    65,536    0    797    347,321    0.23.0

9
反对:BSIP87:Force Settlement Fee 强清收费提案
https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php?topic=32203.msg341490;topicseen#msg341490

理由我已经说的很清楚了。
https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php?topic=32176.0

强清收费高了,没人强清,开发费用都收不回来。

强清收费低了,强清如云,你们会被清的死去活来。

你们还期望理事会会给你们一个虚无飘渺的合适参数?宁可信猪上树。

当然你们乐意做这种冤大头,愿意被宰,真心想听信各种甜言蜜语,那神仙也阻止不了你们,一个5%的补偿他们都理解不能,通过不了,强清收费后是什么情况,你们自己去掂量掂量。




另外: 我也反对任何围绕强清开发的功能:

bsip73 - Match force-settlement orders best-price
bsip73一旦实施,内盘就是强清的天堂。


201910-bsip62 - Close Margin Position
https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php?topic=29722.0

里面漏洞多的不忍直视。


----------------------------------------
强清本身来说就无意义,自身也得不到足够的逻辑做支撑,现在也就BTS如获珍宝一样认为它有用。

围绕一个缺乏足够逻辑支撑的机制再开发一些功能本身就是在浪费时间与金钱,沙堆上堆砌的大楼,只需要一桶水就够了。

所有人应该理解基本的社会契约,强清恰恰破坏了这个契约。

对于强清收费的逻辑,我是没有搞清楚,一个反市场逻辑的机制也成了收费的手段,到底是谁的不幸?是否有必要?就跟BSIP73一样,强清本身就存在极大的逻辑问题,围绕这么一个缺乏完整逻辑支撑的机制开发这些功能是否有必要?是否是在浪费开发资源?何况收了费就能解决问题了?还是纯粹为了收费而收费?我是没有看到有任何一篇帖子能够推实它。

就拿强清最基础的逻辑来说,为了保证锚定资产者随时可以兑换到相应的等值资产。这本身就存在逻辑缺陷,锚定资产者无法在市场上买到其希望价格的抵押资产,这说明市场流动性或者市场共识出了问题,而不是抵押者的问题,抵押者没有义务去提供这个流动性,只要其抵押在正确市场喂价的情况下是足额的,抵押者就维持了这种共识,任何人都不能进行强行抽贷,这是社会最基本的契约问题,锚定资产持有者利用强清去强行抽贷,本身就是在强行反市场共识,破坏这个社会上最基本的契约精神。

一个反基础契约的东西我们还在用着念念不忘,到底说明了什么问题那?

何况,贬值了锚定资产持有者可以强行抽贷,那么升值了抵押者为什么不能按照期望的价格强行还贷?逻辑上讲不过去吧?
起码合约市场多方与空方互相平衡收费逻辑上是相洽的。

makerdai我们就不说了,人家也没有这种强清,就拿国内的两个抵押锚定资产来说,一个奶王的USDE, 一个维基链的WUSD, 他们难道对BTS的抵押机制了解难道还不够深刻?谁见过他们用过强清这个机制?难道他们还没有现在的BTS这些人精明?

强清本来就计划经济中的计划价格,金融抑制的手段,这是强清的本质,根本就不存在合理的逻辑。

再者说,顺应你们的逻辑,折价代表供应过剩,那么所有抵押的都有原罪,凭什么抵押靠前的要被清?按照公平原则,所有抵押的都应该被清一些,清掉靠前的抵押者难道就合理?雪崩的时候难道有哪一片雪花是无辜的?

再者说,既然折价被清?那么升值的时候,是不是应该抵押者可以去反清锚定资产持有者?难道允许锚定资产持有者光捅抵押者刀子,抵押者难道在升值的时候不应该去捅锚定资产持有者的刀子,如果不允许,难道这个市场,这个机制公允吗,合理吗?这样难道不就能够“锚”的更好?

爆仓了直接不用抛向市场,直接反清锚定资产,岂不是可以把锚定资产死死的“锚”住,而且还能消除风险,这样岂不是两全齐美?!

都是借条,有强兑的权力,怎么可能没有强行收回的权力?反正大家又不在乎什么狗屁的社会契约。

既然学了发改委的油价"天花板",那么就应该清楚还有油价"地板价"。

我们讨论一个机制与参数的时候,能否先卡以下几点?

1.每个机制是否有足够强的逻辑做支撑?

2.每个机制是否符合基本的社会契约精神?

3.每个机制的参数是否构成了对自由市场的直接冲击?

4.每个机制是否相对公允?

---------------------------------

为什么我们应该提高bitcny的强清补偿从2%到5%?

我们都应该清楚什么是金融抑制!

1. 强清补偿对bitasset的折价帮助不大。

当有人完成强清后,他会挂一个市场卖单作maker,挂单价格会略高于市场价,而不是选择直接砸向市场,首先市场承接不会时时满足要求,第二这是一个简单而且基础的市场交易逻辑。

这种贬值在市场常态情况下,会一直存在,属于健康经济的常态通胀,而且这种通胀牵扯的因素相当复杂,单价格论无法支撑,即使供应量下降到100块,这种情况还是会存在,难道也要强清不停?

2. 一个市场在正常条件下是无法持续维持bts的高溢价状态的,价格会自然回落到市场认可的运行区间。

3. 强清其实是另一种形式的计划经济。

过低的强清补偿在直接干预市场的自我运行,属于计划市场调节。
大多数的资金正在利用市场的漏洞绞杀新用户与正常用户,而不是流向正常的市场交易,这本身就不健康。
bitasset大户持有者可以轻松利用固定与低强清补偿摧毁一个市场与抵押群体。
我们可以查看biteur及bitcny。

4. DAI与USDE属于bts的复制者,在没有强清机制的情况下却可以“锚”的很健康,我们都需要思考一下。

https://oasis.app/trade/market/WETH/DAI
https://www.pizzadex.io/?pair=usdt2usde

5,5%的强清补偿将会保持到新的强清机制生效。
https://github.com/bitshares/bsips/issues/160
https://github.com/bitshares/bsips/issues/260


6. 为什么参数是5%而不是其它参数,因为我们已经使用 5%的强清补偿已经有了相当长的时间,牛小牛大熊小熊好几次(about 11/01/2017-08/08/2019),并没有出现过大的问题(BSIP42除外)。

相关讨论

https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php?topic=32137.0
https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php?topic=32075.0

https://dpos.club/t/topic/748

-----------------------

10
中文(Chinese) / 存锚定资产获取利息收入
« on: March 01, 2020, 03:21:35 am »
现实金融体系中一个很为通用的调节手段是:利息调节。

DAI也借鉴了这一手段DSR。

所以:

我们可以设计一个个人锚定资产存款池,存入锚定资产可以获取利息,随存随取,以日计息。

设计一个公式进行派息计算。

当锚定资产开始贬值时,派息幅度越大;(特殊情况除外,比如喂价被锁了,喂价不能及时合理的反应现价)

当锚定资产开始升值时,派息幅度越小,最小为零。

需要设计每日派息规模。

获取的利息是否需要一个解冻期?

息费来源于:爆仓的流动性罚金,锚定资产自身的市场交易手续费,或者其它借贷机制的利息收入。

这样可以通过间接锁定锚定资产的流动性来侧面调节“锚”,对市场各方都没有直接影响。

11
Proposal 1.10.57536 is created to set force_settlement_offset of bitCNY from 2 % to 5 %.

The proposal will expire in UTC  Mar 3, 2020 16:57.

Committee members, please check and vote!


https://cryptofresh.com/p/1.10.57536

Why we should set force_settlement_offset of bitCNY from 2 % to 5%?

We must all know what is theory of financial repression!

Force settlement=Exchange Rate Manipulation.

1. force_settlement_offset didn't have help for bitasset discount;

When a person finished a force settlement, he will make a market order which is a little higher than the market price, he will not chose to dump in the market directly, this is a very simple trade Logic.

2. A market can't maintain high discount under a normal conditon, the price will fall back into the normal price point by the self-regulation of market, currency arbitrage, these will lock the liquidity of bitasset, force the the discount into a normal level.

3. Force settlement is another form of planned economy.

A lower force_settlement_offset is disrupting the market directly, this is a performance of planned economy.
Most of the fund is taking the advantage of the market loopholes to kill the new and normal users, didn't flow into the normal transaction, this is not healthy.
Big holder of bitasset can destroy the market and debtor easily with a fixed and lower force_settlement_offset.
We can check biteur and bitcny.

4. DAI and USDE can "anchor" healthy without force settlement, all we should think about these.
https://oasis.app/trade/market/WETH/DAI
https://www.pizzadex.io/?pair=usdt2usde

5. 5% offset will maintain until some new mechanism of force settlement is available.
may be:
https://github.com/bitshares/bsips/issues/160
https://github.com/bitshares/bsips/issues/260

6. Why it is 5% not other "parameters", as we have 5% offset for a long time(about 11/01/2017-08/08/2019) , didn't have any big problem.


Related discussion:

https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php?topic=32137.0
https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php?topic=32075.0

https://dpos.club/t/topic/748

See also:

Inflation Index:
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/spn/2010/spn1003.pdf
<Inflation, Unemployment, and Monetary Policy>  by Robert M. Solow, John B. Taylor, Benjamin M. Friedman
<Inflation, Saving and Growth in Developing Economies> by Anthony Thirlwall
<Financial Deepening in Economic Development> by  Edward S. Shaw
<Money and capital in economic development> by Ronald I.Mckinnon




---------------------------
This is the first step.

Second step will be instead of BAIP 2 with EMA which can track the price more quickly.

https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php?topic=32153.0

Third step may be MPLP.

https://github.com/bitshares/bsips/issues/182

-----------------------------

理事会提案 1.10.57536 已创建, 提案内容:bitcny强清补偿从 2% 提高至 5% .

提案到期时间:UTC时间 2020/03/03 16:57

理事会成员们,请查看并投票。

https://cryptofresh.com/p/1.10.57536


为什么我们应该提高bitcny的强清补偿从2%到5%?

我们都应该清楚什么是金融抑制!

1. 强清补偿对bitasset的折价帮助不大。

当有人完成强清后,他会挂一个市场卖单作maker,挂单价格会略高于市场价,而不是选择直接砸向市场,首先市场承接不会时时满足要求,第二这是一个简单而且基础的市场交易逻辑。

这种贬值在市场常态情况下,会一直存在,属于健康经济的常态通胀,而且这种通胀牵扯的因素相当复杂,单价格论无法支撑,即使供应量下降到100块,这种情况还是会存在,难道也要强清不停?

2. 一个市场在正常条件下是无法持续维持bts的高溢价状态的,价格会自然回落到市场认可的运行区间。

3. 强清其实是另一种形式的计划经济。

过低的强清补偿在直接干预市场的自我运行,属于计划市场调节。
大多数的资金正在利用市场的漏洞绞杀新用户与正常用户,而不是流向正常的市场交易,这本身就不健康。
bitasset大户持有者可以轻松利用固定与低强清补偿摧毁一个市场与抵押群体。
我们可以查看biteur及bitcny。

4. DAI与USDE属于bts的复制者,在没有强清机制的情况下却可以“锚”的很健康,我们都需要思考一下。

https://oasis.app/trade/market/WETH/DAI
https://www.pizzadex.io/?pair=usdt2usde

5,5%的强清补偿将会保持到新的强清机制生效。
https://github.com/bitshares/bsips/issues/160
https://github.com/bitshares/bsips/issues/260

6. 为什么参数是5%而不是其它参数,因为我们已经使用 5%的强清补偿已经有了相当长的时间,牛小牛大熊小熊好几次(about 11/01/2017-08/08/2019),并没有出现过大的问题(BSIP42除外)。

相关讨论

https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php?topic=32137.0
https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php?topic=32075.0

https://dpos.club/t/topic/748


---------------------------
这是第一步
第二步将使用跟踪价格更快的EMA来代替BAIP 2.

https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php?topic=32153.0

第三步可能是MPLP或者其它替代方案。

https://github.com/bitshares/bsips/issues/182


---------------------------

相关链接:
反思宏观经济政策:https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/spn/2010/spn1003.pdf
<通货膨胀、失业和货币政策>  by Robert M. Solow, John B. Taylor, Benjamin M. Friedman
<发展中经济体的通货膨胀、储蓄和增长> by Anthony Thirlwall
<经济发展中的金融深化> by  Edward S. Shaw
<经济发展中的货币与资本> by Ronald I.Mckinnon

13
General Discussion / BAIP4: use 1 hours period EMA(6) to instead of BAIP 2
« on: February 22, 2020, 02:57:15 am »
BAIP4:  use 1 hours period EMA(6) to instead of BAIP 2
https://github.com/bitshares/baips/issues/12


Current price : The real-time BTS price of CEX, and notice: we still have many feed provider give a most lower feed price of CEX.

1 hours period EMA(6): Get the bar data from CEX,then calculate out the EMA6.

Weighting factor:  EMA(6) is the latest bar.

Weighting factor of EMA(6)= EMA(6) / (X * current price + EMA(6)), We can try X=6 first,X=(1,10)

Quote
FEED PRICE =max(weighting factor * 1 hours period EMA(6) + weighting factor * current price,current price)

Explanation:

As the EMA(6)come from the latest finished 1 hour bar, and the current price come from the next hour which the 1 hour didn't finish, so the feed price was constituted by a fixed EMA(6)in 1 hour and a variable current price.

If use proportion of weighting factor, the weighting factor of EMA(6)will be great when the price spread became great between EMA(6)and current price, the value of X will determine the upper limit,  if the price spread became small, the weight of EMA(6) will become small followling.

This FEED PRICE can track the real-time price more quickly, can avoid the lower shadow and repair price more faster(but still need 5/6 hours to repair).

Shorting attack will need more time to make the price down.

There still have a big discount space, so i think to add the weighting factor * current price to make the big discount space more smaller.

Weighting factor * current price will increase the nondeterminacy of feed price.



We can get the EMA6 can track the real-time price more quickly, and have enough price buffer.
Repair price more faster(but still need 5/6 hours to repair).






The price had plummeted in 09/25/2019, many users were margin called by the lower shadow.






Why we not use 30m or smaller period, we can check below, almost didn't have bar.




This is the EMA3, can track more faster, but maybe we shouldn't use it now.




https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php?topic=32143.msg341235;topicseen#msg341235
https://github.com/bitshares/baips/issues/4
https://github.com/bitshares/baips/issues/7

EMA, DEMA, XEMA

14
中文(Chinese) / BAIP4: 对于现在BAIP2的喂价改的修正方案
« on: February 21, 2020, 12:01:25 am »
BAIP4: Use 1 hours period EMA(6) to instead of BAIP2
https://github.com/bitshares/baips/issues/12

https://dpos.club/t/topic/714/21

对于喂价改我的观点是改了比不改好,至少有了试错的机会,有了调整的机会。

从这一小段时间来看,确实起到了防止打针的作用,但是从另一方面来看,带来了严重的折价效应,使本来该爆的债仓没有爆,有点温水煮青蛙的意思,喂价改成了半锁喂价的形态。
喂价改的太过于迟钝与走线的易于判断,极大影响了整体的交易环境。

我们喂价改的最终目的是为了防止被打针,但是不是为了阻止别人做空(当然我以前的观点也陷入过这样的误区),应对做空导致的风险释放我们应当寻找其它合理的风险释放方式(注意:强清不在其中)。
如果别人靠硬实力连续小时线的下砸,我们还是痛痛快快地认怂,该跪就跪,让这些债仓把脑子里的那根弦绷起来,不能慢条斯理的喝着茶以为价格弹上来能救,不然这个市场有失公允。

我们喂价最终还是要向现在这些市场领先的合约市场的喂价形态靠拢的,更加合理与严密,更加富有逻辑性。



我建议: 采用小时图EMA6与现价结合的方法,
这样可以兼顾延迟性与现价灵活性, 价格变化速度基本一致,但是幅度没有那么大,这样与其它合约交易所的理念也基本一致,具体就是:
EMA值的特点是离当前价格越近,当前价格权重越高。

Quote
喂价 =max(权重 * 1小时EMA(6) + 权重* 现价, 现价)

权重分配:EMA取得是上条柱子的值。
权重作比例变化: 小时EMA6的权重=EMA(6)/(X * 现价+EMA(6)), X 可以尝试为4.5,X取值范围(1, 10)

EMA6值:每小时抓一次交易所柱子,算出最新的EMA6值;

外盘现价:每2分钟或者3分钟或者5分钟或者15分钟抓取一次,看见证人的设置。


小时图EMA6可以更快更灵敏的追踪价格,也有相当的平滑性,

外盘现价权重的加入提升了不确定性,增加了价格的即时性,使市场更有竞争性。

而且对于外盘现价的取价方式,是否需要掐头去尾?但是似乎我们能够取价的交易所选择不多,有量的就三个:币安,火币,ZB。

另外:
我解释一下,取得EMA(6)的值是最近收线的小时柱的值,在新的小时柱没有收线之前是取不到EMA(6)值的,而现价都是取自还没有收线的小时区间内的值,所以这个喂价是有一个在一小时内固定的EMA(6)值与变化的现价构成。

如果采用比例权重,EMA(6)与现价差价约大,EMA(6)的权重就会越大,X值决定这个权重的上限。

EMA(6)的权重在现价跌幅扩大时会增大, 这个跌幅缩小时会缩小.

后面帖子又历史数据图表分析。

---------------------------------

另外我需要驳斥一下一个跌了折价套利的逻辑,大前提:风险厌恶

我来捋下折价逻辑:
目前看有两种折价,一是涨了折价,二是跌了折价。

涨了折价大家其实是不怕的,因为抵押会随着涨越来越足额,
跌了折价大家就比较怂了,因为抵押会越来越不足额,
跌的周期与时间远远长于涨的周期与时间,甚至于一跌不起。

而涨了折价还有一个逻辑在于,大家在涨的时候会比较疯,这个时候折价大家进场的意愿比较强,假如跌了不折价而是保值的话,大家在涨了折价情况下进场的意愿会更强,因为下跌时间远长于涨的时间,这个时间成本很短,炒汇也变得容易,都在涨的时候利用折价进场,变相就把bitcny的供应量与流动性给降低了,从而导致涨的时候的折价根本无法维持多长时间,而跌了保值的话,大家都会选择持有避险会更进一步锁流动性促进保值。

而跌了折价,就有些比较坑爹了,一个很明显的实例告诉我们,人们只会在跌的时候做等等党,交易心理决定了人们不敢入场,而且万一阴跌+连续暴跌,甚至于清盘,在没有足够心理支撑与时间成本过长的情况下,这个折价根本无法缩小,从而导致供应量与流动性无法降低,折价也无法缩小。比如锁喂价期间,折价率这么大,真敢入场的有几个,到了1毛又在等五分。而喂价改的过于迟钝也导致了这个问题,当然不能说喂价改是错的,一杆子打死,问题出在太迟钝。

而对于承兑而言,涨的时候的折价根本无法维系,你进场手续费折的不够多,大家会从外盘买进内盘砸等着套汇,你折的够多,很快bitcny储量会不够,逼着折价降低。

跌的时候这些套汇的资金要出来,方法有两个,一个是走承兑,一个是内盘买bts砸外盘。

这里面就有几个逻辑:
比如以前的喂价及大MSSR的情况下,承兑的出金费率很快就会变负,一部分资金会从承兑走,而在大MSSR的作用下,内盘是可以吃低价筹码的,所以大部分资金会吃掉低价筹码,利用价差优势去外盘砸盘走。
所以为了规避这种大MSSR的连环砸盘弊端,我们把MSSR给降下来了,现在降到了1.02,这样连环砸盘的力度会小很多,但是依然有潜在的风险,于是我们计划将来上BSIP74, 利用BSIP74我们可以将爆仓价格直接等于喂价,这种连环砸盘的风险也就能基本消除,套汇资金走承兑的量也会大幅增加,当然也不能完全消除从外盘走的,这也是很正常的。

普罗大众的交易心理是: 越涨越敢买,越跌越敢卖。所以不要违背这个基本的交易基础。

从风险面讲,跌了保值是很关键的,因为用户需要一个保值的资产做风险规避;所以需要稳定币不能在跌了的时候贬值。

但是从另一个方面讲,大家这个时候都需要持有锚定资产来规避风险,从而会导致大量抛出手中的抵押物,矛盾与对立。

再从另一个方面讲,既然大家在跌的时候都需要大量的锚定资产来规避风险,必然需要在没跌的时候有足量而且还必须泛滥的流动性量供应,那么问题就来了,谁在前期去提供与制造这个量?

-----------------------
https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php?topic=32120.15
https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php?topic=32139.0
https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php?topic=32075.0
https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php?topic=29698.0

https://github.com/bitshares/baips/issues/7
https://github.com/bitshares/baips/issues/4

15
https://github.com/bitshares/baips/issues/22
BAIP5: Set force_settlement_offset of bitCNY from 2% to 5%

I suggest to set force_settlement_offset of bitCNY to 5%, maybe should incloud bitusd and biteur.

I (or appointed other committee) will  propose a committee proposal to set force_settlement_offset of bitCNY to 5%.

Why we should set force_settlement_offset of bitCNY to 5%?

1. force_settlement_offset didn't have help for bitasset discount;

When a person finished a force settlement, he will make a market order which is a little higher than the market price, he will not chose to dump in the market directly, this is a very simple trade Logic.

2. A market can't maintain high discount under a normal conditon, the price will fall back into the normal price point by the self-regulation of market, currency arbitrage, these will lock the liquidity of bitasset, force the the discount into a normal level.

3. Force settlement is another form of planned economy.

A lower force_settlement_offset is disrupting the market directly, this is a performance of planned economy.
Most of the fund is taking the advantage of the market loopholes to kill the new and normal users, didn't flow into the normal transaction, this is not healthy.
Big holder of bitasset can destroy the market and debtor easily with a fixed and lower force_settlement_offset.
We can check biteur and bitcny.

4. DAI and USDE can "anchor" healthy without force settlement, all we should think about these.
https://oasis.app/trade/market/WETH/DAI
https://www.pizzadex.io/?pair=usdt2usde

5. 5% offset will maintain until some new mechanism of force settlement is available.
may be:
https://github.com/bitshares/bsips/issues/160
https://github.com/bitshares/bsips/issues/260


6. Why it is 5% not other "parameters", as we have 5% offset for a long time(about 11/01/2017-08/08/2019) , didn't have any big problem.


Related discussion:
https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php?topic=32075.0

Interfering factor:
BSIP76:https://github.com/bitshares/bsips/issues/221
BAIP 2: https://github.com/bitshares/baips/issues/4


and i suggest to make BAIP 2 to track the current market price more quickly, but this will be another post.
https://github.com/bitshares/baips/issues/18
https://github.com/bitshares/baips/issues/7
https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php?topic=32120.15

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