票太少 执行起来太慢 砸到两毛我们吸点筹吧蟹老板 增加点话语权

没关系，靠说服达成的共识执行更健康。

你们先仔细想想，有多大机会砸到2毛，以及真砸到2毛的话有多大机会低价把筹码收回。

过低的MSSR会使“黄单”提前处于悬挂状态，当然也分三种情况：
1.市场情绪高涨的时候，“黄单”即爆即吃；
2.市场情绪一般的时候，“黄单”虽然说达不到即爆即吃的程度，存在的时间也不长；
3.市场情绪低迷的时候，“黄单”就会一直挂着，内盘被爆仓单砸成的惯性会导致卖单一直低于买单。

也不能说是有害，也不能说是有益，但是黄单只要挂着，对内盘就有直接的威慑作用。

如果MSSR足够小的话，强平所起的作用就会大幅下降，爆仓单也不会在市场中被及时的消除掉，既然这样，是否可以将强平取消掉？

1.是否需要将强清重新设计，将强清补偿率与抵押率挂钩，让市场自己进行风险消除，这样黄单就不会再出现；

2.抵押率与爆仓线分开，用户可以在限定的爆仓范围内自定义爆仓线，这样可以提供的相当大侧向供给量；

另外建议在全局抵押率不足60%的时候，对锚定资产进行反向强清，维持全局抵押率在60%，以保证锚定资产持有人可以自动换成“价值黄金”bts，以避免手中的锚定资产变成废纸 。

啥威慑作用？正因为黄单高挂，类似我这样的交易者才敢贴线抵押，要是随爆随吃，谁吃饱了撑的去贴线抵押？

在去年大熊市中经历了BTS公市基金和源水基金的惨败之后，我一直在想症结在哪里，总有人苦口婆心地告诉我，只有更多的真金白银入场，才能把一个币的价格拉上去。这是一句正确的废话，提供不了太多的指导意义。在对系统设计的不断反思中，我逐步意识到的是，对于BTS这样一个去中心化的自带杠杆的交易系统+稳定币发行系统，规则才是第一重要的。规则好比管道，而资金好比水，只有设计合理的管道，才会把水导向正确的方向，只有足够合理的规则，才能把逐利的，永不眠的金钱吸引到正确的地方，让其发挥出正确的作用。

对BTS来说，优化规则的出发点，首先是如何防御做空攻击，其次是如何激励多方，为bitCNY和bitUSD提供足够的流动性。而且，由于BTS已经是一个成型的产品，不太可能在架构层面作大的改动，所以这些问题必须在对系统改动尽量小的前提下解决。

曾经的BTS面对做空攻击非常不堪一击，那时还没有引入目标抵押率的设置，一个债仓爆仓所有的抵押物都被挂单拍卖，那时爆仓惩罚参数MSSR高达1.1，于是那时的BTS成了空头的乐园，空头屯足bitCNY/bitUSD，然后看准时机砸盘，因为爆仓的抵押物是按喂价/MSSR的价格被强制拍卖的，大的债仓爆仓之后，几乎可以瞬间把价格砸下10%，引发新的爆仓，等到这种被称为“死亡螺旋”的连环爆仓戏码一轮接一轮上演完毕，BTS价格跌无可跌的时候，屯足bitCNY/bitUSD的空头就会像闻到尸体味道的秃鹫一样出来享受他们的大餐，在一轮轮剧烈的牛熊转换中，bitCNY/bitUSD的流动性和稳定性得不到足够的保证。

BTS的智能货币体系本质上是一个稳定币发行系统，抵押借贷，杠杆交易只是其表现形式，这样一个稳定币发行系统与传统的抵押借贷和杠杆交易的本质区别是，体系中交易用到的基础货币正是通过借贷创造的，如果无视如何保障基础货币供应这样一个根本性问题，而只是按传统抵押借贷和杠杆交易的风控思路来制定规则的话，就会因为基础货币供应量的不断紧缩而加重危机，从而不断陷入“处理危机的操作催生了更多的危机”这样一个死局。

对降低MSSR的争论反应了社区在这一问题上的认知差异，一派人士认为，MSSR就应该足够高，让被爆的债仓的拥有者受到足够惩罚，同时也让吃爆仓单（黄单）的用户有足够的利润空间，从而保证黄单能尽快被吃掉，降低系统风险。

如果对市场中的人的行为逻辑有足够认识的话，不难理解高MSSR会带来什么结果，因为吃黄单会有高利润空间，空头不会满足于持币等待，他们会主动出击，通过看准时机砸盘来制造黄单出来然后收割。打个比方，这就好比政府为了防止火灾的危害对灭火这一行为实施高奖励，于是引发了一些人主动放火然后灭火领取高奖励。当规则不合理，资金有可能会带来灾难。

即便不考虑做空攻击，高MSSR也等于放大了市场下跌对BTS系统造成的危害，从而使BTS系统成为一个非常脆弱的系统，而在市场暴跌之后，BTS内盘现场常常是大额黄单压盘，直接导致bitCNY和bitUSD高溢价，脱锚。

过去两个月之内，通过投票，bitCNY和bitUSD的MSSR都被降到了1.02，过去的几天BTS又经历了一次剧烈的下跌，给我们观察降低后的MSSR对BTS市场的影响提供了一个好的机会。

下面是北京时间5月1日下午1:49左右BTS内盘BTS/bitCNY交易对的K线和盘口的情况，之前BTS的价格在攀升到0.52CNY之后，经历了几次大跌在29日回到了0.32CNY左右，又在30日和5月1日经历了一波小幅上涨到了0.34左右，bitCNY的溢价超过了5%，与以往不同的是，由于MSSR调低到了1.02，所以当前的黄单卖价是0.3549，比盘口价格高出3%以上，过去三天，这些黄单都静静地挂在那里，没有发生黄单被吃的现象。





这样的“黄单高悬”现象对市场有几个方面的影响，与以往比较，首先，做空攻击获利变得更困难了，MSSR的降低削弱了连环爆仓效应，也使得黄单有较大机会在市场低迷时挂在比盘口价格高很多的位置，从而挤压了空头的获利空间；其次，在BTS处于相对低价的时候贴线借入bitCNY的风险降低了，因为BTS相对低价对应着bitCNY的短缺和高溢价，也就意味着黄单会挂在比盘口价格高很多的价格处，有较高的概率不被吃掉而等到价格恢复之后全身而退；还有，黄单高悬也避免了bitCNY供应量的收缩。

上面谈到的都是“黄单高悬”对市场的正面影响，当然也有负面影响，那就是黄单不被吃掉容易引起风险累积，增加了系统进入黑天鹅防护状态的概率。

但我认为这里正面影响可以抵消乃至超过负面影响，黄单高悬避免了bitCNY供应量的收缩，本身就有利于抵御BTS价格的进一步下跌，而因为进入黑天鹅防护状态会导致bitCNY的贬值，当系统处于黑天鹅状态边缘时，bitCNY持有者有动力通过吃黄单或者强清的方式降低全局清算价，避免黑天鹅防护状态的发生，而且即便进入黑天鹅防护状态，之前的经验表明回复到正常状态的难度并不大。

如果我们把脑洞开得再大一点的话，“黄单高悬”本身是否就可以当成一种对多方的激励来使用？让这种现象造成的多方相对空方的优势激励多头为市场提供更多的流动性？

1.02这样的MSSR值对于当前的bitUSD是合适的，但对于bitCNY来说还嫌高，观察表明当BTS的价格达到0.4-0.5CNY的时候，bitCNY的溢价就会降低到1%以内，黄单就会从高悬变成随爆随吃的状态，对多方的激励也会降低很多。

MSSR的设置原则应该是在不小于1的前提下尽量小，对于bitCNY来说，下一步降到1.01是非常必要的。

一年以来，BTS系统通过引入目标抵押率，降低MSSR，降低MCR来不断激励系统提供智能货币流动性的能力，接下去还需要增加“平多”功能，更好地降低风险和维护流动性。

这些措施的效果最终会如何，让我们拭目以待。

The article ran into the details (parameters) too fast, e.g. without explaining what's a short position, what's margin call, what's force settlement, what's global settlement, how to "protect" it and etc, IMHO hard to be understood by an average Joe.

The questions to ask: who are the target audiences? What they have already known?

For serious discussions, IMHO we'd better wait for Dr. @biophil's research. Several conclusions and inferences in your article IMHO are controversial/debatable.

I hope the reader at least know BTS and understand the basic concept of BTS. I'd like to focus on how to optimize the rules.

I expect Dr. @biophil can bring suggestive ideas, but I don't think we need to wait for his research result or even depend on his research.

my conclusions come from what happened to BTS that we experienced together, it does not come from nothing, surely I know it may lack data analysis and maybe the logic is doubtful, so any debate is welcome, I'd like to see Dr. @biophil also join the discussion.

plan to publish an article in some media to introduce the evolution of smartcoin, post here in advance for review, if any thoughts please share.

Background

In 2013 BitShares introduced the concept of smartcoin, which is designed to track the value of fiat with BTS as collaterals to back the value, actually smartcoin like bitUSD or bitCNY is a service provided by the shorts to the longs. bitUSD/bitCNY is operated by creating an order book between those who wanted leverage on BTS and those who wanted price stability. To provide liquidity for those who purchased bitUSD/bitCNY, bitUSD/bitCNY holders were allowed to force settle the least collateralized short positions at the price feed plus an offset after 24 hours delay with limited amount. This created an effective margin call and assured buyers of bitUSD/bitCNY that their token was always worth about 1USD/CNY worth of BTS. The system also designed ways to handle bad debt, which has been global settlement but now it is global settlement protection.

Some key parameters can be adjusted to adapt to the market, they are:

MCR: Maintenance collateral ratio, it defines the least collateral ratio a debt position should have, if CR fall under MCR, margin call will be triggered, this parameter is maintained by witnesses.

MSSR: Maximum short squeeze ratio, the margin call orders will be forced placed at feed price/MSSR, it can be seen as penalty to margin called positions and reward to those who eat the margin call orders, this parameter is maintained by witnesses.

Force settlement offset: if define the fee that the smartcoin holders need to pay while issue force settlement. this parameter is maintained by committee.

In the past these parameters have been changed for several times, taking bitCNY as an example, MCR is changed from 1.75 to 1.6, MSSR is changed from 1.1 to 1.05 and then 1.02, force settlement offset is changed from 0 to 2%.

Another big change is the introduction of TCR(Target Collateral Ratio), with setting a TCR, while a debt position is margin called, not all the collateral will be placed in margin call order,   the order amount will be calculated out based on the logic that paying debt with the got smartcoin via the sold amount will increase the CR to TCR.

Core consideration on rule update

If we compare bitCNY with Maker DAI, we can find that DAI business has little impact on ETH price, and ETH has a big enough market cap to support DAI supply, on the other hand, bitCNY business has big impact on BTS price, and as BTS market cap is so low bitCNY can succeed only when BTS price have a big rise up.

In the past years Bitshares community experienced a lot short attacks, at the early time of BTS2.0, all the smartcoins were set MCR=1.75 and MSSR=1.1, TCR (Target Collateral Ratio) is not introduced yet, while the market is in down trend and provide good chance to shorts, shorts will sell BTS in large volume to speed up the down trend of BTS price to make margin call, if some big debt positions is margin called, all the collateral of the position will be sold at feed price/1.1, which will lead to further price fall and more margin calls, while the “death spiral”make disaster and BTS price has no space to fall further, the shorts that has accumulated big amount of smartcoins will come out to eat the big margin call orders, shorts benefit most while the whole BTS ecosystem is in huge disaster.

Even we suppose there is no shorting attack in bear market, the high MSSR will always speed up the down trend of BTS price, and prohibited the system to provide enough smartcoin supply.

what the system responded to crisis finally aggravated the crisis, the same story repeated in each market cycle，BTS become a game field that speculators enjoy but the ecosystem cannot grow up, BTS community has to answer the following questions:

How to resist shorting attack?
How to provide incentive for creating smartcoin supply?
How to respond to crisis?

In long time Bitshares follow the traditional risk control logic of traditional mortgage loan and leverage trading to ensure security, but essentially Bitshares is a stable coin issuing system, the key difference is that traditional mortgage loan and leverage trading system do not have the problem of base currency supply, which is the key issue of Bitshares smartcoin system, any rules that ignoring the base currency supply will not lead to success, any measure that pursue security via punishing margin call will not make sense.

Below shows the candle chart of BTS/bitCNY pair at UTC 1st May, 5:49, several days before BTS price has risen up to 0.52CNY and then returned to 0.32CNY after several big falls, at 30th April and 1st May it went up a little to 0.34CNY, at the time bitCNY has a premium of more than 5%, different than before, as MSSR has been reduced to 1.02, so the margin call orders(yellow orders) is at 0.3549CNY, 3% more higher than the top sell orders, in the past 3 days, these yellow orders just stayed there without any partly being eaten.
 
This “yellow orders highly placed” phenomenon have some effect: first, it make shorting attack more difficult, low MSSR lessen both the “death spiral”effect and the profit space of shorting attack; second, it lower the risk of borrowing bitCNY at low CR, because at this scenario even when a position is margin called there is also a high possibility that the margin call orders stay for long time without being eaten and disappear after the BTS price recover; third, this “yellow orders highly placed” phenomenon avoid the deflation of bitCNY.





In long time smartcoins lack a mechanism of encouraging creating supply in high premium scenario, but now I see possibility to build such a mechanism via MSSR, if we adjust MSSR to a suitable value, it can encourage smartcoin supply in high premium scenario and at the same time keep the possibility of bad debt low enough.

We can see currently bitCNY is in such a status, an about 4.8% premium encourage speculators to borrow with CR=MCR and buy more BTS, we can also see that bitCNY supply keep almost unchanged while BTS price fall from 0.4CNY to 0.32 CNY, the mechanism works. However according to observation, when BTS price rise up to about 0.5CNY, bitCNY premium will fall under 2%, and the encouraging mechanism will not work, if we need it to work at that price, we need an even lower MSSR.

So in my view, MSSR value selection depend highly on the market depth of the smartcoin, it is time for bitCNY to try a lower MSSR such as 1.01 and 1.02 is a low enough MSSR for bitUSD.

Bad debt handling

In the past months bitUSD has experienced global settlement and revived, bitCNY has also been at the edge of global settlemet but is protected by witnesses.

Global settlement(GS) is a bad way to handle bad debt, it is just like suicide, it collect all the collaterals into one global settlement pool and sell in fixed price, while none can borrow more smartcoins. When bitUSD is global settled, bitUSD holders are hurt as bitUSD is devaluated, debt positions with high CR are also involved unfairly, stop bitUSD borrowing makes it difficult for bitUSD to revive.

Comparatively, the core idea of GS protection is not allowing feed price to fall under GS price, this cannot be understood as simple “faked price”, actually it is “we try best to avoid bad debt, but if it really happen for some positions, we will keep the book value  of all positions not bad and wait for the market to solve it, while keep the borrowing feature continue and gs price can also go down while margin call orders are eaten or force settlement happen. Which minimize the devaluation of smartcoin”.

BSIP58 is implemented on bitCNY and bitUSD, the problem is it still depend on witnesses' operation, a better solution is to include the logic in the core code -  remove GS by not allowing feed price under GS price.

There is no way to completely avoid bad debt, what we can do is to minimize the possibility and the possible harm to all the parties in the market.

Conclusion

To cultivate smartcoin ecosystem, we need to include reasonable incentive in the rules, which will make BTS longs get advantage in the long-short game when smartcoin is in obvious premium.

MSSR will be reduced toward 1 step by step, to ensure the incentive to BTS longs and good pegging. this will limit the premium of smartcoin. this will also provide solid support to BTS price in bear market when smartcoin is in high premium.

Force settlement will limit the discount of smartcoin.






to be continued...

I will not participate this voting because I am benefit related one.

every USD debt position owner, every USD holder is benefit related, you are not so special.

now USD is in higher premium and more serious shortage, lower liquidity than bitCNY. voters need to consider more on how to solve these questions and how to push the evolution ahead, less on how to avoid suspicion or keep political correctness.

at least you can vote both the for and against workers, to increase the participation rate, but let other voters to make the final decision.

Based on BSIP59, https://github.com/bitshares/bsips/blob/master/bsip-0059.md, now 2 poll worker proposals have been created:

1.14.187   Poll - BSIP59 - Reduce MCR of bitUSD to 1.6
1.14.188   Poll - BSIP59 - Do Not Reduce MCR of bitUSD

The purpose of this change is to improve the liquidity and also the peg, at the time while bitUSD is in great shortage and premium.

The MCR of bitCNY has already been reduced from 1.75 to 1.6 and worked well up to now, it's also necessary to set MCR of bitUSD as same as bitCNY, otherwise more users would like to select to borrow bitCNY to lessen the liquidity of bitUSD。

Please vote according to your opinion.

Didn't the OMO fund bought at arround 0.88 CNY if i remember correctly your margin call ? Wasn't the OMO fund placed directly  under your margin call price so you didn't even lost the 10% penalty at that time ?
Didn't you received a lot of messages from other committee members that this is not acceptable?

I don't remember what you said had happened.

please provide proof.